Apart from what has been written by Babur himself on the conditions of Hindustan in his Baburnama, there is a communal interpretation which has been forwarded according to which Babur was a Muslim conqueror who came to India to defeat the infidel faiths and establish Islam. Secondly that India too was divided on the basis of religion and that, had Babur not come, Hinduism would have triumphed and the Muslim Sultans and Sultanates would have been replaced by Hindu kingdoms.
This was first articulated by Rushbrooke Williams who wrote the first detailed biography of Babur in English. According to his thesis there existed conflict between Hindu and Muslim states and that had Babur not intervened, there was every likelihood of Rana Sanga to establish Hindu Supremacy.
Let us examine this thesis. How far does our evidence support it?
The evidence, which perhaps Williams kept in mind while formulating his views are of two kinds:
First,those which have been derived from Baburnama, mainly from the Fathnama of Kanwa composed by Shaikh Zain Khawafi
Second those Evidences derived from Mirat-i Sikandari, the account of Muzaffar Shah II and the invasion of Malwa in 1515
Babur had at one place referred that Hindustan was divided into a number of states, 5 Muslim: i.e., Kingdom of Bengal (Lodis), Gujarat, Malwa, Bahmani and the Kingdom of the Deccan. Then there were two kafir states, viz. Mewar and Vijayanagar. Rushbrooke Williams takes cue from here.
Then Babur’s description of the Sisodias under Rana Sangram Singh is yet another piece of evidence taken by Rushbrooke to hold that the Sisodias under Rana Sanga were capable of annexing territory of neighbouring Muslim powers. Babur says that Sanga had succeeded in conquering strongholds in Malwa – Ranthambhore, Saranpur, Bhilsa & Chanderi.
Shaikh Zain in his Fathnama mentions 10 pagan chiefs, each a leader of pagans who had rallied around Rana Sanga. At another place, Zain mentions that just before Kanwa, Rana Sanga had succeeded in over-running 200 cities inhabited by people of faith and that he oppressed the Muslims.
Other kind of evidence is Mirat-i Sikandari. Here are statements which the author makes in the context of Muzaffar Shah II’s invasion of Malwa in 1515. Muzaffar had invaded to suppress Medni Rai. The ruler of Malwa had fled to Gujarat. In this context the author of Mirat says this was a Hindu revolt and Muzaffar invaded to put down the kafirs.
At another place he says that Medni Rai was getting support from Rana Sanga (who wanted to annex Malwa).
Let us examine the other side of the picture.
Evidence of a different nature is not lacking but has been completely ignored by Rushbrooke Williams. Much of this kind of evidence can be derived from some passages of Baburnama and Mirat-i Sikandari itself.
For example, the passage in which Babur talks of Muslim & non-Muslim states in Hindustan: he at no place place hints that these were arraigned against each other or fighting over religious differences.
Then, in the passage testifying expansion of Sisodias towards Malwa, Babur says that thre existed a large number of rais & rajas in Hindustan who can be divided into two groups: (a) those obedient to Islam & allied to Muslim states, & (b) those independent of any affiliation.
Thus the same passage admits fact of existence of smaller chieftains allied to Muslim states. Thus there was no clear-cut Hindu-Muslim difference!
Then, in the list of the 10 kafir chiefs who rallied around Rana Sanga in 1527, Sh.Zain also includes Hasan Khan Mewati, who commanded 10,000 Muslim troops & Sultan Mahmud Lodi, again with 10,000 Afghan troops in the same battle. So how can Kanwa be labelled as a Battle of Islam & Kufr?
Before the battle, the Rana had formally arranged the proclaimation & accession of Sultan Mahmud Lodi as the Sultan of the Delhi Sultanate at Mewar. Coins were also struch at Mewar to this effect. One gold coin proclaiming Mahmud as ‘Sultan of the Lodi Empire’ at Mewar has also survived. This has also been mentioned by Babur. Rana Sanga, thus it seems, had no design or desire to establish himself as the Supreme ruler: He was ready to accept the Delhi Sultanate by the Afghans under Mahmud Lodi, while he controlled Mewar and parts of Malwa which he had capture in 1514.
Then, the author of Mirat-i Sikandari, in the same passage where he describes the attempts of Muzaffar Shah II in 1514 to re-establish Islam & destroy Hindu chiefs, includes a list of Malwa chiefs killed in the battle. This list includes names of both Muslim & Afghans side by side with the names of Hindus. Thus he mentions Fateh Khan & Malle Khan.
Thus on both sides the Muslims were fighting & they still constituted a sizeable chunk of nobles & ordinary soldiers!
Lastly, one interesting evidence: Risqullah Mushtaqi in Waqi’at-i Mushtaqi makes a statement regarding Rana Sanga’s move to oppose & challenge Babur. He says it was Hasan Khan Mewati who persuaded the Rana to take up arms against Babur. We may conclude that it was on Hasan Khan’s initiative that the “confederacy of the kafir chiefs” was established.
The impression that the conflict or political tussle in Hindustan on the eve of Babur’s invasion was a religious issue is not supported by our evidences. The specific evidence does not correspond with the general statements made in this regard quoted by Rushbrooke Williams.
It seems that so far as Rana Sanga was concerned, he had no imperial pretensions: He had neither the capacity nor the will to establish himself as a Ruler of India.
In 1514 the Rana had invaded Malwa. During this period he occupied the frontier-outposts like Ranthambore. He had also captured Mandu, the capital of Malwa & the Khalji king had been taken prisoner. This was a golden opportunity to annex the territory. But he carried the Khalji King to Chitor as prisoner, had him treated & then allowed him to return back to Mandu & be re-established as the King. The only precaution taken by Rana Sanga was to persuade him to maintain friendly relations with Mewar in future. This indicates, of course, Mewar’s interest in frontier strongholds to ensure the secure territory of Mewar – but beyond this the Sisodias were not interested.
The only state having this capability was the kingdom of Gujarat. The tussle was only on frontier adjustments.
The Lodi Empire was an Afghan Empire. The majority of the officers and nobles were from the Afghan regions. The Afghan identity gave it an advantage as there existed a large number of Afghan populations in N. India as a result of the continuous process of migration throughout the Sultanate period. By Tughluq period two Afghan rebellions against Mohd Tughluq had occurred. Then in 1441 Bahlul captured power with large Afghan following. He made a direct to Afghan tribal sentiments. The text of Bahlul’s announcements and farmans have been quoted by Abbas Khan and other Afghan history, the Tarikh-i Khan Jahani. Mushtaqi also wrote that he made an appeal to the Afghan tribals.
To quote Abbas Khan: ‘God in his goodness has granted kingdom of Delhi to Afghans….whatever be conquered shall be shared with us’.
Thus RP Tripathi calls it the Afghan Confederacy. But then, not withstanding the Declaration, not all Afghans were given a share in the empire. Distribution was made between the favoured and the privileged on the one hand and those not important to be given position. For example, nobles under Bahlul and Sikandar Lodi were recruited from the clans of Lodis, Sarwanis, Lohanis and Farmulis (the Shakhzadas of Ghazni). The others were ignored and totally excluded. For example the Niazis, who were supposed to be the uncouth people and not fully fit even for the army. Similarly ignored were the Surs and the Kakkars etc.
Thus one can say that the Lodi Empire, which Babur replaced, was not an empire with Afghans having equal share.
Let us also be clear that from the very beginning, in the Lodi Empire the non-Afghan section was given a considerable share. Thus it was not exclusively an Afghan concern. The Indian Shaikhzadas were recruited in large numbers in the nobility. Thus for example, Shaikh Ghuran of Koil, the Syeds of Amroha, the Shaikhzadas recruited from the Gangetic plain and the Punjab. Then there were also incorporated a large number of Rajputs under Sikandar Lodi.
So by Sikandar’s time, the Lodi nobility was divided into two groups, the Privileged Afghan clan groups; and People of Non-Afghan origin, some of whom were non-Muslim and Rajput chieftains. This made the social base of the Lodi state very wide, in fact much wider than the early Mughals.
There was a large Afghan population. It has been roughly estimated in the range of 80 lakh families, i.e., 4 crore Afghans. Afzal-ut Tawarikh gives this number to explain Humayun’s defeat at the hands of Sher Shah. In addition to this, a very large section of Hindu chiefs were given a share in the Empire. The Lodis could rally the population paying allegiances to these groups.
This is reflected in the hymns of Guru Granth Sahib (tr. Macaulay in Sikh Religion vol.I) which suggests that the overthrow of the Lodis was a loss to the people. But in spite of the large social base behind them, the Lodis were not able to throw back the Mughal challenge. This can be explained if we keep in mind the contradictions in the Lodi state between the Lodi aspirations and centralization on the one hand and the decentralization of aspirations of the Afghan nobility. The history of the struggle between the two date back to the period of Sikandar Lodi. He gave up many of the policies and measures of Ibrahim Lodi pacifying nobles of equal position. This was altered and resulted in wide-spread discontent. Sikandar had no alternative but to depend on the section comprising the non-Afghan nobility in order to deal with the dis-satisfied Afghan nobles. The kind of autonomy which the Afghan nobles enjoyed till that time, and sought to be curbed by Sikandar Lodi, can be gauged by going through Abbas Khan Sarwani’s section on Sher Shah’s early career and his description of Sher Shah’s administration of his father’s jagir at Sahsaram.
Now what impression does this account of Abbas Khan create as far as the position of the Afghan noble’s are concerned?
First. That the nobles were free to decide the mode of assessment and mode of collection from their iqtas: ghallabakhshi or measurement. This indicates that there was no policy laid out by the centre. This is a situation of autonomy.
Secondly Any extra collection from the iqta or the assignment was pocketed by the noble himself. This was a laxity of the administration. In strong administration, this had to be deposited with the state. But this was not being done so during the reign of Sikandar. Sher Shah talks of ‘extra revenue’ being a boon to his iqta.
Third. The noble’s were free to wage a war against local chiefs. They had assumed authority to create jagirs and zamindars to uproot established chief. The job of creation of new zamindars was never allowed or given to a noble, before or after this reign.
Fourth. Afghan nobles in some cases were holding iqtas practically (not in theory) on hereditary basis. When Hasan Khan Sur died, a tussle arose in which Sher Khan won over his brother to hold over his iqta.
Fifth. The principle of transfer of iqta followed under the Khanljis was conspicuous by its absence at this time.
During the reigns of Sikandar and Ibrahim Lodi revolts became more accentuated. For eg. Daulat Khan Lodi who controlled Punjab revolted and invited Babur to come to Hindustan. Alauddin Khan Lodi also turned against Ibrahim. The revolt of the Farmuli nobles was also a result of this situation.
The contradiction between the king and the nobles further accentuated and differences sharpened due to yet another factor. This was the shortage of precious metals which eventually resulted in the minting of smaller number of silver and gold coins during the Lodi period. This is borne out by the surviving collection of the silver and gold coins of this country. The surviving coins from the pre-Lodi period as well as those from the Mughal and Sur period is quite large. The surviving gold and silver coins of the contemporary states are also considerable. Their number is quite large indeed. This for the first time is noticed by John F.Richards, ‘Economic History of Lodi period’, JESHO, Aug’65
This paucity would naturally affect the position of the nobles. Further on account of slowing down of the pace of the money economy, resulting from the absence of silver and gold currency would promote the custom of collecting revenues in kind and not in cash. Naturally this would lead to paucity of money to raise troops. Absence of ready cash would also affect the ostentatious pretences.
Most probably the shortage of precious metals was due to short supply due to coming in existence of independent states on the coast. Lodi Empire had become land-locked, says Moreland. Edward Thomas, ‘Economy of Pathan Kings’, says this short supply was a result of Timur’s plunder of 1498. Richards has however pointed out that if this was the result of land-locked nation, then why the other land-locked states not experienced the same shortage? In case of Kashmir or Mewar or Malwa, we don’t observe this phenomenon. Richards also points out that Timur’s plunder is also not a good explanation. His explanation is that Bahlul paid lip-service to the nobles as the brothers wanted to curb their independence and power by withdrawing gold and silver currency deliberately.
Whatever the cause, the nobles were hurt due to this. During Ibrahim’s reign this situation became almost unbearable for the nobles. Under Ibrahim, for several consecutive years, there were very good rains, and thus bumper crops. This resulted in a sharp fall in the prices of food grains and especially influenced the general price index. Side by side to this, before Ibrahim Lodi, there was the introduction of a new coin. Bahlul had introduced this coin which came to be known as the Bahluli Tanka. This was different from the tanka of the Sultanate period. It was of copper (tanka-i siyah) and had a ratio of 1:20 with earlier coins. Thus this was a debased tanka and this was a further catastrophe. The result was that the peasants were not in a position to make payments or submit revenue to the nobles in cash or in the new copper tanka. And whatever revenue was collected in kind was almost entirely valueless as there was no market for it. Thus the income of the nobles was further adversely affected by this. Thus we encounter widespread revolts during Ibrahim’s reign. Thus the fiscal policy was partly responsible for the extinction of the Lodis.
India on the eve of Babur’s invasion provided a peculiar scene on its political as well as social levels. It was a theatre of chaos. There was a scene of divisions, tensions and frustrated ambition. It appeared as if politically the country was in decline. Every one had plans for enlargement to some extent which was wrecked by the conspiratorial circumstances. The beginning of the 16th C in India was one of the transitional phases of its extended history. Let us first deal with the political conditions and in order to do so scrutinize the hypotheses propounded by Rushbrooke Williams.
Rise of Large Rajput Zamindaris:
Apart from the coming of the Portuguese in the Indian Waters and its consequences, which we would be dealing subsequently, an important development which took place just on the eve of Babur’s invasion was the rise of large Rajput zamindars within the areas controlled by the Delhi Sultanate as well as by other regional states. This was important from two angles:
For the first time we find a situation in which different clan holding zamindars in different places came to identify themselves as belonging to the same caste, viz. the Rajputs.
Secondly As compared to the earlier situation which existed in the 13th & 14th C., the zamindars that had existed in the heartland of the Delhi Sultanate and the heartland of other states like Malwa, Gujarat and other states in the Deccan were comparatively creating bigger units and zamindaris.
If one reads the sources of Delhi Sultanate, one comes to references to local chiefs and zamindars. But one notes a significant difference in the sources of Sultanate period and those of the 15th C. From 15th Century onwards, we find all the local chiefs and zamindars mentioned as Rajputs. But in the earlier period, they are referred to as individual kshatriya clans: eg. Katihar chiefs, Chauhans, Khos, Bundelas, etc.
In the sources of the 13th & 14th C. it is nowhere mentioned or indicated that they together formed a caste – the caste of Rajputs. In some modern works, the misconception is reflected that non-Muslim chiefs of the 13th C. were Rajputs. Inscriptions from Rajasthan, in Rajasthani and Persian, do not make any reference to these groups as being Rajput or there being a bigger unit called Rajput. It was only from the 15th & 16th C. that one finds so. This important development had very important consequences.
This point is established by Prof. Irfan Habib in his article “Social Distribution of Landed Property”, pub. In Enquiry in 1965 (pp.54-56 & 67-69) where one comes across data to establish the point that Rajputs as a zamindar caste emerged in the 15th & 16th C. and were not there in the 13th & 14th C. This emergence of the Rajput caste during this time was a result of different processes: Sometimes by gradual absorption of aboriginal groups having land into groups. As an example we know that the Gond rulers of Chauragarh (Chhattisgarh area) were not regarded by other chiefs as Rajput caste down to the 15th C. One ruler of this dynasty made a proposal of marriage to Durgavati, the daughter of the Mahoba ruler. This proposal was put down on the ground that the Chauragarh rulers were not Rajputs! Ultimately Durgavati was taken by force. From that time onwards, these Gonds came to be regarded as new clan of Rajputs: the Nagvanshi Rajputs. Thus we see the rise of a new clan.
Similarly we have the case of the Cooch ruler of Cooch Bihar in North Bengal. They belonged to the Cooch tribe, which was a sub-tribe of the Ahom race, who were not a part of the varna system till now. As a process of Sanskritization, they were also absorbed. They started claiming for themselves the status of Kshatriyas and also part of the larger Rajput caste. This legitimization was again brought out through a myth: i.e., the Purohit of one ruler of Cooch Bihar in the 16th C. had a dream. In the dream he met Goddess Bhawani who informed him that the ruler was a Kshatriya and a thakur. Thus they were taken to be Rajputs and were incorporated in this group as such. According to Abul Fazl, the territory of Cooch Bihar was 200 kuroh in length and 20 to 30 kurohs in breadth.
Then there was another way in which this came to happen. Displacement of earlier groups who refused to be incorporated as Rajputs by those incorporated as Rajputs. Defeat those who refused and establish themselves. An example can be given of Ujjainiya Zamindars, now represented in the Shahabad district of Bihar. The Cheros of this region were overthrown by the Ujjainiya Rajputs. They were the people migrated from Ujjain. What was their actual clan group is not certain: sometimes they are supposed to be the Panwars. They overthrew the aboriginal Cheros who refused to be absorbed in the Rajput caste.
The Afghan chiefs also helped in this replacement process. Sher Shah also contributed to this. When Abbas Khan Sarwani talks of abolition of zamandars by zamindars, he is speaking of the Cheros.
Similarly the Meenas were evicted from Amber region and replaced by the Kachhawahas.
As a result of this process, in the whole of the Gangetic plain and region constituting the heartland of Malwa and Gujarat were established large zamindaris controlled by groups claiming to be belonging to a large unit, the Rajput caste. The only exception was Bengal, where the zamindaris emerging were of the Kayastha class and not the kshatriyas.
The fact that these zamindaris, comparatively speaking, were larger units is important. In the sources of the Delhi Sultanate reference to zamindars tends to indicate two kind of local chiefs and zamindars.
Barani speaks of rais, ranas and rawatas. It is obvious that they were autonomous chiefs located on the periphery of the area controlled by the Turks. But then, side by side he also refers to Chaudhuries, khuts and muqaddams. It is obvious these were zamindars located within the concentrated territory controlled by the Turks all over. Chaudhuries it seems were bigger zamindars and intermediaries with 100 or more villages. Muqaddams were village level chiefs. These chiefs and zamindars were small and village level officials. Chaudhuries were bigger but were small units as compared to the rais. They were not in a position to resist or defy imperial authority on their own. So the rebellion in the Gangetic plain of these petty chiefs was possible only when famines or great pressure occurred; or they received help from one or the other section of the Turkish nobility like the revolt of Malik Chhajju. They could not rebel on their own strength.
But in the 16th C. this situation had been altered. With territories controlled, there emerged large zamindari units not located on periphery but in the heartland of the imperial territory. We have Bachgoti zamindars who held sway over a large tract in Awadh. By the beginning of the 16th C. they were so strong that they succeeded in overthrowing the Lodi administration over a large area. And this is borne out by an interesting reference in Lataif-i Quddusi, a collection of anecdotes and sayings of Shaikh Abdul Quddus Gangohi who was forced to migrate from Rudauli in Barabanki District to Shahabad sometime in 1491-92. The Bachgotis had overthrown Lodis in this region and established practices repugnant to Shariat. Thus the saint had migrated to Shahabad in Haryana.
Thus we can say that this period saw two important developments: (1) emergence of larger zamindar class: the Rajput class; (2) these zamindaris were now comparatively big units by the end of 15th C.
The second point can be further stressed by the example of the Bhadorias. According to Abul Fazl, the Bhadorias controlled areas in the vicinity of Agra itself. In the vicinity of Agra according to Abul Fazl, there is no one as powerful as the Bhadorias. Mainpuri and Etah districts were under the Bhadorias.
While dealing with the Rajput policy, Arif Qandhari writes in Tarikh-i Akbari, that there are 2 or 3 hundred zamindar chiefs. Their suppression is very difficult as they possess strong forts. If they are able to hold on to each one of these forts, say for six months, or one year, they can be contented about their safety for the next two hundred years.
Thus as the Rajput zamindars were very strong, Akbar had to enter into matrimonial alliance. If force was used, 2 or 3 hundred years would have been needed to subdue them.
Then there was another complication. As all belonged to the same caste, there was much more degree of solidarity with each other as compared to the earlier situation.
This is borne out by the example of Medni Rai of Chanderi who had entered service of the Khalji ruler of Malwa. He first tried to gain power in Malwa by mobilizing the Afghans and the Rajputs behind him. He sought the intervention of the Sisodias of Mewar in his favour. In 1419 as a result of a coup de tat the Khalji ruler had to flee and could be brought back by the Gujarat ruler.
Medni Rai wrote to the Rana Sanga, that being the chief of the Rajputs, he should help him. Thus this caste solidarity compelled them to work together. Then in 1529, Rana Sanga mobilized a large number of Rajputs under him. Shaikh Zain says 10 kafir chiefs had been employed by Rana Sanga to throw out the Islamic rule.
Mewatis, from south of Delhi down to Amber was under Hasan Khan Mewati, who was a Muslim and not a Rajput. The Mewatis were non-Muslims in the 13th C. and were converted in the 14th C. The Bhatti clans in Punjab and the Ghakkars were also Muslims who identified themselves with the Rajputs.
Babur had to tackle this Rajput-Zamindar factor. Akbar’s Rajput policy should not be taken as a result of his religious policy. Mughals were not in a position to control Hindustan without the Rajput help. It had nothing to do with religion. From Sikandar Lodi’s time, evidences suggest that a large number of Rajputs had been enrolled and given positions. (See IH Siddiqui, ‘Composition of nobility under Lodi Sultans’, Miscellany)
The most conspicuous feature of the Sur administration was its highly centralized nature despite a large participation of numerous Afghan groups. It was a highly centralized political system. If we examine the working of this system, we can discern significant features which go to establish that this system had a high degree of centralization from the very beginning, and it went of increasing.
We find that Sher Shah and Islam Shah, in their policy of recruiting nobles, tried to undermine the position of the privileged groups of the Afghan chiefs, which naturally resulted in the coming into existence of a new kind of nobility which did not have the same kind of high claims. And as they were the creation of Sher Shah or Islam Shah, they were loyal to them.
Secondly we find that both Sher Shah and Islam Shah were very particular in enforcing a high degree of discipline amongst these nobles – thus we have the transfer of iqtas, introduction of dagh wa chehra regulation or the measure of putting the entire nobility on cash payment under Islam Shah.
Thirdly there was also a close supervision by the king of the working of the central government – a sharp contrast with the Mughal central government, where various officers were responsible for various departments; and the wakil us saltanat, the intermediary between the king and the nobles, ran the central government on behalf of the king. Sher Shah on the other hand, personally supervised the working of each and every department. He did not leave it in the hands of independent officers.
Fourthly, we have a peculiar kind of local administration which was sought to be created at the pargana and sarkar level. The degree of the supervision of the central government personally under the king is unique.
Fifthly, there was also the creation of a large standing army. In Sher Shah’s case, one finds that this standing army was in fact deployed all over the empire in such strength that it could be used against the defiant nobles whenever anyone of them should try to go against the central government.
Lastly, a new pattern of revenue administration was introduced in which was the introduction of the zabti system – a system providing the mode of assessment and realization of revenues was on the basis of area under cultivation.
So far as the composition of the Sur nobility was concerned, it is a false notion that the Lodi Empire was an Afghan concern in the sense that in this Empire all the Afghan people had an equal share. This negative assessment is important because some of the statements that are attributed by the Afghan historians to Bahlol Lodi do go to create the impression that at the time of its establishment, the Lodi empire was conceived by its founder as a state in which the power would rest – perhaps sovereignty as well – in the entire Afghan group. The author of Waqiat-i Mushtaqi says that Bahlol sent a message to nobles that we have established in India and Afghan rule, and share with me this empire. Thus an impression is created that it was a common concern of Afghan people.
But when we scrutinize the list of nobles of the Lodi empire, it emerges that only a few of the Afghan Khails were singled out for recruitment: the rest did not have any share in the nobility. At best they supplied personnel for recruitment as ordinary troopers.
Similarly under the Surs, the nobility comprised of a large number of minor Afghan clans, who did not get much share in power and privileges in the Lodi empire.
This situation was the result of a number of circumstances: One circumstance for the rise of only minor clans in the nobility was the rivalry and clash which developed between minor Afghan officers led by Sher Khan and some of the Lodi nobles who had come to Bihar after the defeat at the hands of the Mughals. In fact the rise of Sher Khan was a result of this struggle. He out-manouvred the Nauhanis, and such prominents groups as those led by Shaikh Bibban and Farmuli. Thus he would not be in a position to recruit in service nobles belonging to these clans.
Thus in his nobility there were basically two groups: (a) the majority belonging to minor clans, and (b) the khasa khails, i.e., those who were independent of clan ties and had a personal loyalty towards him. Thus the term ‘The Royal Clan’. Amongst them were the three sons of his personal slave Sukha: Khawas Khan senior, Sahib Khan and Khawas Khan Jnr. They were thus people of obscure origin who had been given highest positions. Then there were others: Shuja’at Khan Sur, Sarmast Khan Sarbini, Haibat Khan Niazi [about Niazis Waqiat-i Mushtaqi comments that they were not good enough even as ordinary troopers and were looked down upon as just menials!] Haibat Khan was even given the title of Azam Humayun and the charge of whole Punjab. The Niazis also controlled Malwa.
In addition, after 1553 Sher Shah had also taken some Lodis in service after their complete defeat: Amongst them was Isa Khan Sarwani, the ancestor of Abbas Khan Sarwani, the author of Tuhfa-i Shershahi. They were given minor appointments with the exception of Isa Khan who was made incharge of sarkar Sambhal.
When Islam Shah came to power, he made further changes in the composition of the nobility: he attempted to do away with the Khasa Khails whom he suspected of treacherous designs against his person. This bitternes was due to the fact that some of them had taken part in the tussle for succession and had sided with Adil Shah. Thus after coming to the throne, Islam Shah promoted enblock 6000 persons from his own contingents to positions of nobility. This information comes to us from Risqullah Mushtaqi. He says that this disturbed the old arrangement and displeased the nobles of Shershah. The Niazis were totally eliminated and ordinary troopers of his own khasa khail were promoted. Result was that the strength of non-Afghan section was augmented. Certain non-Muslim personnel was also appointed. One such person was Hemu who had held the small post of shahna-i bazaar under Shershah.
Measures to Control Nobility
Under Shershah, strict discipline had been imposed on his nobility: he saw to it that they did not enjoy uninhibited powers which they exercised under the Lodis. Their freedom was limited by sending periodic written instructions to them which gave detailed advice how they should run their administration or meet problems arising from time to time. This practice seems to have been carried on by Islam Shah as well. This is actually borne out by Badauni as well:
“Also the amirs of 5000, 10,000, and 20,000 used every Friday to pitch a lofty tent supported by 8 poles and bring the shoes of Salim Shah together with a quiver (tarkash) which he had given to the sardars, in front of the throne; and first of all commanders of the troops and after him the munsif, that is to say amin followed by others in due precedence with bowed heads and every expression of respect, would take their seats in their appointed palces, then a secretary would come and read out aloud that order, chapter and verse, which occupied 80 sheets of paper more or less. Any question which presented them any difficulty was referred by them in the conclave to the various provisions and rulings of that document, by which it was finally decided and if it should wo happen that any amin acted in contravention of that order, the secretary used to write a report of that action and despatched it to the sourt and the disobedient amin would forthwith be visited with punishment together with his family and his relations.”
Badauni writes from personal experience: he saw it once in Rajasthan where he was staying at that time. This shows that regular orders were issued to the nobles by the Sur Sultans.
In addition to this we find Shershah also tried to impose very strict discipline on his nobles and did not pardon anyone who committed indiscretion.
For example, the case of Khizr Khan in Bengal. He had married the daughter of the deposed king of Bengal. It was reported against him that he was behaving in a very haughty manner. He was not only removed but care was also taken to abolish governorship of that place and replace it with a sarkar administration. The governor was removed and in his place an amin was appointed.
We have an interesting account of Dattu Sarwani, who wrote his recollections and dreams in 1535 which are now part of Latiaf-i Quddusi. He writes that when Sher Shah ordered some Afghan families to Gwalior, fort, eunuchs were appointed to record their names in registers and in case if they refused, to set their houses on fire and send them forcibly in disgrace.
Similarly Shershah re-enforced branding of horses. According to Abbas Khan Sarwani this was done due to ‘liars and double faced persons who showed a large number of troops at the time of assignment, but once the jagirs had been assigned they would deprive their soldiers oftheir dues’. He further writes that Sher Shah proclaimed “ I have introduced the system of branding with this object in view that there should be no discrimination between the rights of the nobles and the troopers, that the nobles may not be able to deprive the troopers of their dues and the chiefs must maintain the soldiers in consonance with their mansabs and be not able to vary their numbers.’
When a report was mad against Shujaat Khan Niazi that his troopers were not being given their due Sher shah reportedly wrote to him:
‘Before the wakil of your troopers reach here, restore to the troopers their payments and pacify them. If their wakil comes to me and submits their complaints, I will deprive you of your jagirs and give you an exemplary punishment.’
One measure already discussed is that Islam Shah would send detailed instructions to his nobles which had to be strictly adhered to.
Orders were given that they should not lead an easy life and drive out of their establishments dancing girls. They were also asked to abolish akharas. They were directed that nobles would not be permitted to use red or crimson tents, as they were reserved for imperial use. They were to surrender all their elephants to central authority: only a few weak elephants were allowed for their personal use. Finally Islam shah also introduced the measure of converting a major part of the land into khalisa – Badauni says he brought whole country into personal control [ khasa-i khud saakht] and in accordance with this regulation and the custom of dagh, the troopers were paid in cash.
Badauni’s account of Islam Shah is very detailed. He is actually referring, albeit indirectly towards khalisa. But then it is difficult to believe that he succeeded in this as no other tells us about this. This is to be taken as an attempt. This would have affected the position of the nobles seriously.
Now the third aspect: the personnel and the close supervision of the central government by Shershah. Evidence in this regard has to be gleaned carefully. There is a passage in Abbas Khan where he quotes Sher Shah’s criticism of the working of the Mughal state as witnessed by him in 1528 during the brief visit that he had paid to the Mughal camp. He had gone to the Mughal camp with Junaid Barlas:
‘Since I have been amongst the Mughals and know their conduct in action, I see that they have no order or discipline and that their king do not personally supervise the govt bu leave all the affairs of the state to their nobles and ministers in whose sayings and doings they put perfect confidence. These grandees act on corrupt motives in every case whether it be that of a soldier or a cultivators or a rebellious zamindars.”
This was a defect which Shershah tried to rectify on coming to the throne. According to Abbas Khan:
‘He (king) should not repose much confidence in the pillars of the state (arkan-i daulat), for he said, I have always remained acquainted with the affairs of the kingdom and that whenever I have tested on the touchstone of my experience the words and acts of these pillars of the state and their agents. I have not found them to be wholly true. The means of my gaining possession of the kingdom lay in bribe taking habits of these officers of the state (Mughal officials).’
Abbas Khan further tells us:
‘ Shershah personally attended to all important campaigns and the affairs of the realm high or small, never allowed hours meant for prayers to go without offering them.’ ‘ The huliya (descriptive roles) of these soldiers and jorses were caused to be recorded before they were brought before him and with his own tongue he announced the fixation of their monthly salaries. After this he had the horses branded in his own presence.’
Thus evidence suggests that (a) Shershah’s experience indicated that if the king didn’t supervise personally then it was a loose administration and thus (b) the king should directly supervise the minutest details. This type of evidence made Qanungo to suggest that Shershah had no ministers but secretaries who manned his administration.
The Local Administration
As far as the local administration is concerned, it appears that it was a result of significant improvements in the communication system. The improvements achieved by constructing regular highways on all major routes of the empire. From Sonargaon to Rohtas was constructed the famous GT road. Then there was another between Agra and Burhanpur; another between Agra and Jodhpur; between Lahore and Multan etc.
Secondly, a number of sarais were established at regular intervals all along these important routes. These were multi-purpose structures. Abbas Khan informs that in each of these sarais, a space was reserved for official use, known as khana-i padshahi. In another part of the sarai was established the dakchauki, in which a few riders were always available for the relay horses. According to Abbas Khan in all 3400 horses were deployed in these sarais for the purpose of the dak chaukis.
This construction of roads, highways and sarais radically improved the communication system in the empire. Thus Abbas Khan testifies that for example, one messenger, Husain shiqdar travelled on one occasion 300 kurohs in one day (one kuroh = 2 ½ miles), i.e., more than 600m in one hour a record achievement! It was this which facilitated Islam Shah’s system of sending weekly instructions to all sarkar HQs
These sarais also acted as mini-fortresses and military establishments which further helped in consolidating the administration and places where the central standing army could be placed if needed. According to Abbas Khan the hashm-i qalb stood at 1 ½ lakhs. In addition were 25,000 matchlockmen, the infantrymen with guns. One should also remember that under the Mughals and the Surs, the central authority had a monopoly over firearms: it was not to be given to local nobles.
The General Administration:
The most important aspect of the Sur administration was the building up of an elaborate administrative machinery at the Sarkar level. If we believe Abbas Khan Sarwani, then there existed three levels of administration under Sur Empire: the Central administration, the Sarkar administration and the Pargana level administration. The Suba (provincial) level administration of the Mughals (between the central & Sarkar level) was missing. Under the Lodis and Syed, in place of Sarkars there used to be a number of designations: shiqs, khittas, wilayats, iqtas etc
Thus at Pargana level, the basic administrative unit, we find mention of shiqdar, amil, munsif, amin. Then at the Sarkar level, Abbas Khan in his concluding section says, the equivalent functionaries were shiqdar-i shiqdaran, munsif-i munsifan. The functions of the shiqdar at both Pargana and Sarkar level was basically military:
‘If the people from lawlessness or rebellious spirit creat disturbance regarding the collection of revenue, they were so to eradicate and destroy them with punishment that there wickedness and rebellion should not spread to others.’ The munsif / amin at the Pargana level was measurement of land and assessment of revenue demand. While the officer at the Sarkar level, though performing similar duties, was actually given the role of a supervisor over the Pargana munsif, as well as the arbiter between the munsifs of different parganas in their jurisdiction.
But then elsewhere in his account, especially in the narrative part of the history of Shershar’s reign, there is a different kind of information: there is no mention of such designations as shiqdar-i shiqdaran or munsif-i munsifan. Different terms are used to designate the heads of Sarkar level administration, viz., shiqdar, faujdar, munsif, muqta. Possibly terms like shiqdar-i shiqdaran was a figurative designation invented by Abbas Khan to give a standard term for the heads of Sarkar level administration indacting their supervisory role over a number of smaller shiqdars.
For example in Sarkar Delhi, Sher shah appointed three officers, the shiqdar, faujdar, and munsif. Now what was the need to have a faujdar and a shiqdar for Delhi? There should have been either a faujdar or shiqdar with the designation of shiqdar-i shiqdaran. Perhaps the person being appointed as shiqdar was only for adm & military control of the city, while the person appointed as faujdar was for the rest part of the sarkar apart from the city.
Soon after the defeat of the Lodis at the hands of Babur, Bahadurshah, , the Muzaffarid ruler of Gujarat, who had participated in the battle of Panipat along with Ibrahim Lodi, left Delhi for Gujarat where he gained the Gujarat throne a second time. His brother, Chand Khan was expelled and he fled to take shelter with the Malwa ruler, Sultan Mahmud Khalji.
Bahadurshah soon busied himself in consolidating his rule and started putting pressure against the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. As a result of two expeditions which he led against Ahmadnagar, he forced them to accept his overlordship. This naturally not only boasted his morale but added to his prestige as well.
It was only after adding to his prestige and impressing his neighbours, he started making a demand upon Mahmud Khalji to return Chand Khan to him as a prisoner or at least expel him from Malwa. The demand was made in such an aggressive manner that the Malwa ruler had no option but to turn it down.
It is borne out by subsequent evidence that Bahadurshah was not so much interested in gaining the custody of Chand Khan but to find some suitable pretext for invading and annexing Malwa.
In fact the history of Gujarat’s relations with Malwa is full of instances of Gujarati aggression against that state: But at no occasion are we able to discern a desire on the part of Gujarati rulers to annex the Malwa territory.
But Bahadurshah’s subsequent behaviour (i.e., 1531 onwards) is clearly indicative of his real aim: annex Malwa to his empire.
The only explanation for this basic change in policy was that perhaps the Gujarati assessment of the total political situation of the sub-continent had a basic transformation after the establishment of the Timurid rule in North Indian plains.
Apparently the Gujarati rulers feared that as soon as the Mughals would succeed in consolidating their position in North India after having suppressed the Afghan resistance against them, which was still active in Bihar and certain parts of Jaunpur and Awadh, they would turn their attention towards Malwa, Gujarat as well as territories of the Deccan plateau.
In other words, the assessment was that the security of the kingdom of Gujarat was dependent on the de-stabilized state of the Mughal control in North India. The Gujaratis felt that it was their task to do everything possible to frustrate Humayun’s hectic military moves for consolidating his position in the territory which he had inherited from his father.
For this purpose, Bahadurshah had no option but to try to gain a foothold in Malwa. He could hope to create military diversion for thwarting Humayun’s measures against Afghans only if he would be controlling the territory on two fronts, viz.
The southern flanks of the Empire – i.e., Malwa
The Western flanks of the Empire – Eastern Rajasthan, with its military and political headquarters at Ranthambhore.
This was necessitated due to the nature of the terrain: The difference between the terrain between Malwa and Gujarat was such that it made it difficult to rapidly move large number of troops from one region to another.
As a matter of fact, as one enters the confines of Malwa, there is a sudden rise in the altitude. The terrain on the Malwa side, represented by the Vindhyan hills served as a natural barrier between the two regions, thwarting easy military penetration of Malwa from the Gujarat side.
Some idea of this can be had if one keeps in mind that the altitudes of the Malwa plain was in the range of 15ft from sea level. But then the change takes place suddenly: From Champaner to Mandu it rises to 300 – 400 ft.
This nature of the range made it obligatory on Gujaratis to take Malwa. It was imperative for them to firmly establish themselves there, i.e., annex it.
This topographic and strategic reason explains Bahadurshah’s decision in 1531 to annex Malwa on the pretext of imprisoning Chand Khan.
Humayun’s accession to the throne coincided with Bahadurshah’s invasion of Malwa. Bahadurshah actually entered Malwa in January 1531 and at this time he was careful enough to make a temporary military alliance with the ruler of Chitor, Ratan Singh and other Rajput chieftains allied with Chitor, e.g., the rulers of Raisen, Bhilsa and Gagraon.
Salhadi was one chieftain with whom Bahadurshah made an alliance. This was an indication that Bahadurshah was deviating from the policy of Gujarati rulers of never making alliance with Mewar and other Rajput states. In fact a treaty in 1442 with Malwa laid down that the two powers would co-operate with each other in putting down Mewar etc. It was stated in this treaty that each power would have the right to annex the territory of Mewar. And down to 1530 Gujarat and Malwa abided by this treaty even while they fought elsewhere. They never allowed their conflict to come in any way to co-operate against Mewar. But in 1531, the Gujaratis, although briefly, are found making a common cause against Malwa.
The invasion started in January 1531. Humayun came to the throne in the end of December.
This expedition progressed in the next 3 months culminating in the total annexation of Malwa in March 1531. Mahmud Khalji was taken prisoner and sent to Champaner under guard of Gujarati officers who killed him on the way. Malwa ruling dynasty was thus extinguished and Malwa came under Gujarat. Bahadurshah now decided to stay back at Mandu.
Thus from Jan 1531, a new situation developed in Malwa to which Humayun could not remain indifferent in spite of his other occupations. And thus the relations between Humayun and Bahadurshah were activated. From now on both were constantly keeping an eye on each other’s military moves. This exchange of information included diplomatic exchanges. Humayun had reasons to be particularly perturbed by the Gujarati occupation of Malwa:
There appears to exist at least some evidence indicating that soon after coming to Mandu, Bahadurshah had started making moves for establishing contacts with Humayun’s adversaries in the east – namely Sher Khan resisting Mughal penetration of Bihar; and Nusrat Shah, the ruler of Bengal.
Evidence which we have on this count is such that it can’t be ignored. A passage given by Abul Fazl speaks for itself:
“In a short space of time he (Sher Khan) by craft and un-righteousness surpassed the rebels of the age. Accordingly Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat sent him a subsidy by the hands of merchants and summoned him to his side. Farid made the money into capital for sedition, and sent excuses for going”.
Exact timing of this episode is not mentioned. Abul Fazl writes this after he has reported Hasan Khan Sur’s death and Sher Khan’s gaining control of Sahsaram and other territories from Nauhani Afghan chiefs.
This in turn creates an impression that most probably this exchange took place sometimes in 1531 or 1532.
In any case it is obvious that Bahadurshah made this move only after coming over to Mandu and at a time when the Afghan groups in Bihar were trying to mobilise themselves around Sultan Mahmud Lodi for making yet another bid to out the Mughals from the Gangetic plain – the Battle of Dadra we know took place in 1533.
Another very significant inference which can be drawn is the exact nature of message which these merchants brought: put pressure your side and I from mine!
It is also clear that Bahadurshah also made considerable funds available to Sher Khan: this would bolster Sher Khan against Humayun.
This would explain Humayun’s tension and anxiety to come to Gujarat.
Then there is another piece of evidence: This is an information furnished by Nizamuddin Ahmad Bakhshi.
In the volume III of Tabaqat-i Akbari while dealing with Bengal, he informs us that in 939 AH / August 1532 to September 1533, Sultan Nusrat Shah of Bengal sent an embassy to Bahadurshah. This reached Bahadurshah when he was in Mandu. It was headed by a confidant khwajasara, Malik Marjan who also brought costly presents for Bahadurshah. He was received very cordially.
Implication of this arrival of Bengali embassy at Mandu is a clear indication of contact between the two – the Gujaratis and the Bengalis. The real aim of this naturally was to make a concerted military moves against the Mughals.
Then we find that Bahadurshah continued to stay at Mandu continually for the next 2 1/2 years – from jan 1531 to mid-1533: He left Mandu only for 2 or 3 months in 1532 when he led a minor expedition in the direction of Asirgarh.
After his brief expedition against Asirgarh, he returned to Mandu and picked up a quarrel with some Rajputs of Raisen, Gagron, Bhilsa & Chanderi in a very deliberate manner. The pretext to start against Salahdi was that Salahdi was having a number of Muslim women in his haram. This was not the real reason – it was a mere pretext. The real reason was to bring under control the vital territory which lay on the southern border of the Mughal control.
After Gagron he could further penetrate in a north-easterly direction and bring in the North-eastern Rajputana as well, i.e., Ranthambore which was controlled by the Mughals. And once he would occupy Ajmer and Nagore in eastern Rajputana, his plan would be complete. His forces on the southern flank of the empire would also be at Ajmer to put pressure on Bayana and Agra.
This was perhaps Bahadurshah’s only aim when he picked quarrel with the Rajput chieftains. Subsequent developments show that he was successful in achieving his aim for which he had started against Raisen, Gagron, Bhilsa & Chanderi. In a very short time, within the first half of 1533, he controlled all these places and had established in the region from where he could put pressure on Kalinjar and Gwalior.
Naturally Humayun would feel concerned at these developments – (a) coming of Bahadurshah to Malwa and annexing it and not only annexing it but also staying at Mandu. (b) He would still be more concerned by the fact that at Malwa he was contacting Humayun’s adversaries like Sher Khan and Nusrat Shah. (c) The Final provocation came in 3 – 4 months with the over throw of Rajput provinces which were a buffer between Malwa and the Mughal Empire.
It was in these circumstances that either towards the end of 1532 or in 1533 Humayun decided to move to Gwalior with his entire army.
This is borne out by a very cryptic evidence furnished by Khwandmir who says that it was in March-April 1533 that the King decided to return from Gwalior to Agra.
This is the only information we have. But it is from a contemporary source. Most modern historians have ignored it on the plea that according to some other information gleaned from later sources like Ain, and Jauhar Aftabchi, Humayun was busy elsewhere.
The information given by a contemporary should be taken at face-value, unless contradicted by some significant source.
Then there is evidence that something else happened during the period Humayun’s counter move had an impact on Bahadurshah who promptly sent an envoy to Humayun with a proposal for settlement of the dispute that was arising between them. Bahadurshah had taken Humayun’s move as an aggressive gesture. Evidence for this comes from Abul Fazl:
“As the echo of HM’s victories and conquests was high sounding in various kingdoms, Sultan Bahadur, the ruler of Gujarat, sent in 940 (=July’33 – July’34) experienced ambassadors bearing valuable presents to him and set in motion the process of friendship. HM received Bahadur’s overtures with Imperial kindness and set his heart at rest by sending him diplomas of amity.”
This indicates that between July 1533-34 Bahadurshah sent an embassy which resulted in a Treaty of Friendship. This could not have happened in 1534 as in that year there was open hostility. In fact this is not even after Nov’33. Hostilities between the two powers had begun in a way. So it is obvious that this is a reference to what happened between July & November 1533.
This impression of amity is also re-inforced by the subsequent correspondence that took place between Humayun and Bahadurshah in 1534.
In fact in the first letter of Humayun to Bahadurshah around March-April 1534, demanding that he should not give shelter to Mughal fugitives, particularly Muhammad Zaman Mirza, contains a clear reference to a same kind of understanding that had been arrived between the two earlier. This cannot but be treated as the understanding hinted in Abul Fazl’s passage.
Again, we find that one of the histories written by a Gujarati official, Abu Turab Wali, during Akbar’s reign, specifically refers to an embassy sent by Bahadurshah to Humayun sometime before 1534 in which a Gujarati officer, Khurasan Khan and a theologian, Qazi Abdul Qadir were included. At the occasion of the visit, Humayun had taken a vow on the holy Book that he did not have hostile intentions regarding Bahadurshah.
This is apparently a reference to the same treaty.
Then there are references to this treaty in letters written by Bahadurshah to Humayun after March-April 1534.
This establishes well that some kind of understanding had been arrived towards mid-1533 when Humayun was persuaded to withdraw from Gwalior.
What were the terms of this treaty to which reference is made? Some idea can be had from a letter written by Bahadurshah from Chitor in April 1534:
“In these days, as the necessity of uprooting the foundation of the firangis (Portuguese) appeared pressing, I had to go to Dieu. Your Majesty hearing of this immediately took opportunity to push on as far as Gwalior, dismissing from your mind the Quranic precept: ‘Break not your agreements, after their ratification’.”
This letter is dated March-April 1534. Reference being made, is not the previous visit to Gwalior but of March 1533.
We know that after Bahadurshah withdrew from Mandu in 1533, immediately had to rush as Portuguese were besieging Dieu in October 1533. The siege commenced in September as, we are informed by the Portuguese sources. When he went to Dieu, Humayun again came to Gwalior violating the agreement.
Thus one condition was that Humayun won’t return to Gwalior in the absence of Bahadurshah from Malwa.
Perhaps the other part of the treaty was that if Humayun abides on this obligation, Bahadurshah would also withdraw from Mandu which was treated as a provocation by the Mughals.
It seems that the first phase of Humayun’s relations was over by the middle of 1533, when the treaty to which reference was made, had been concluded.
The overall characterization of the developments of this phase would be that this is the phase of the initial tensions resulting from Bahadurshah’s actions and then of comparative cordiality rsulting from successful negotiations and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty.
The next phase would roughly cover the period from the middle of 1533 down to March-April 1534. The general nature of development of this period seems to be the growing tension which very soon resulted in hostility. Thus the beginning of the conflict which manifested in the invasion of Gujarat.
In March 1535 Chittor fell into the hands of the Gujarát king but near Mandsore his army was shortly afterwards routed by Humáyún. According to one account, the failure of the Gujarát army was due to Bahádur and his nobles being spell-bound by looking at a heap of salt and some cloth soaked in indigo which were mysteriously left before Bahádur’s tent by an unknown elephant. The usual and probably true explanation is that Rúmi Khán the Turk, head of the Gujarát artillery, betrayed Bahádur’s interest. Still though Rúmi Khán’s treachery may have had a share in Bahádur’s defeat it seems probable that in valour, discipline, and tactics the Gujarát army was inferior to the Mughals. Bahádur Sháh, unaccustomed to defeat, lost heart and fled to Mandu, which fortress was speedily taken by Humáyún. From Mándu the king fled to Chámpáner, and finally took refuge in Diu. Chámpáner fell to Humáyún, and the whole of Gujarát, except Sorath, came under his rule.
When Gujarat had fallen to the Mughal Empire, Bahadur Shah was forced to court the Portuguese. On 23 December 1534 while on board the galleon St. Mattheus he signed the Treaty of Bassein. Based on the terms of the agreement, the Portuguese Empire gained control of the city of Bassein (Vasai), as well as its territories, islands, and seas which included Daman and Bombay islands too. He had granted them leave to erect a factory in Diu. Instead of a factory the Portuguese built a Dieu Fort.
When he recovered his kingdom, Bahádur, repenting of his alliance with the Portuguese, went to Sorath to persuade an army of Portuguese, whom he had asked to come to his assistance, to return to Goa. In February 1537, when the Portuguese arrived at Diu, five or six thousand strong, the sultan hoping to get rid of them by stratagem, went to Diu and endeavored to get the viceroy into his power. The viceroy excused himself, and in return invited the king to visit his ship anchored off the coast of Gujarat. Bahádur agreed, and on his way back was attacked and killed by the Portuguese and his body was dumped into the Arabian Sea. He was then thirty one years old and in the eleventh year of his reign. According to the author of the Mirăt-i-Sikandari the reason of Bahádur’s assassination was that a paper from him to the kings of the Deccan, inviting them to join him in an alliance against the Portuguese, had fallen into the hands of the Portuguese viceroy. Whatever may have been the provocation or the intention, the result seems to show that while both sides had treacherous designs neither party was able to carry out his original plan, and the end was unpremeditated, hurried on by mutual suspicions. These events were followed by the 1538 Siege of Diu which resulted in the permanent occupation of Diu by Portuguese which lasted till 1961.
In the same period when the Turani Revolts were taking place that Akbar decided to recruit Rajput Chiefs employed by the previous rulers as well: the difference however between Akbar’s policy and that of the others was that the policy now initiated was a policy of en mass recruitment. This resulted in a basic transformation in the basic character of the Mughal nobility and the empire. In 1562 was recruited Bharamal with his entire Kachhwaha clan.
Akbar wanted to establish a new group to counterbalance the Turani faction in the nobility. Simultaneously, from the āīn-i nuāzdeh sālā, an inference can be drawn that in the 10th RY an attempt was made by the authorities to accomplish a less inflated jama’ by calculating separate price lists for the provinces year by year. Thus, probably, to meet an important problem agitating the nobles, these measures were adopted in 1566-67. But then this is only an inference!
But before we start a discussion on this topic, let us first deal with the concept of the term ‘noble’: the amir (pl. Umara). Generally speaking, a mansabdar holding a mansab of 500 or above was considered a noble. In the contemporary surces, the personnel in the Mughal service are actually divided into two categories: the ordinary mansabdars and the umara. Abul Fazl includes every one holding the rank of 500 or above into the category of the amir. Similarly in other Mughal sources up till the 18th Century as well, we find two terms being applied: umara-i reza and umara-i ‘uzzam. Reza for ordinary and ‘uzzam for higher grades. M. Athar Ali who makes a study of the Mughal nobility [The Apparatus of Empire & Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb] also uses the same criteria.
What were the characteristic features of this class? First, it was not a hereditary class but comprised individuals, many of whom were recruited in the service as mercenaries. Each had to make a start as a fresher from a low rank and would then progress to a high grade. They did not have any hereditary claim, titles, offices, assignments or privileges. But all the same, at the same time the element of continuity within the institution of nobility was quite considerable. This was represented by the presence of khānazāds in the ranks. Khānazāds were those people who were descendants of the nobles. But again, the khānazāds would be accepted in the nobility on an individual basis according to their individual capacity. The element of continuity can be gauged from the fact that towards the end of the reign of Akbar, the khānazāds represented 40 % of the nobility, the list of which is given by Abul Fazl in the Ain. According to Atahr Ali’s calculations for the subsequent period, the khānazāds stood at 60 %. So we see that the element of continuity became stronger with the passage of time.
Another feature of the Mughal nobility was that it was a heterogeneous group in which persons having different kinds of ethnic or racial background, different culture and religious tradition were represented in considerable strong strength.
It is also quite apparent that the norms and notions that governed the behaviour of this group and its relationship with the sovereign was derived from different traditions represented in the heterogeneous body of different racial, religious, cultural and ethnical groups.
In the Mughal Empire, the share of the nobility in the total resources of the Empire was enormous: in fact [according to AJQaisar & Moosvi] around 80 to 85 % or more of the total revenues of the empire were earmarked for payments to nobles for services they rendered, mostly in the form of jagirs and sometimes in cash as well ( naqdis).
Within the category of this group of mansabdars to whom 85 % revenues were actually made available, the share of nobles of higher grade was much larger than the share of a large number of ordinary mansabdars.
For Akbar’s reign, the important question that needs to be discussed at some length with regard to the nobility are as follows:
First is the aspect of the changing composition of the nobility from 1556 to 1594-96; and the corresponding changes that occurred in the notion or principles that governed the behaviour, rights and privileges of the group.
Secondly the question as to what was the exact share of the nobility in the total revenues and resources?
Thirdly, What were the changing forms of the disbursement of the nobility’s share amongst the individuals constituting the group? Which would mean as to what were the stages through which the jagirdari system was evolving under Akbar?
Lastly the question of the organization of this nobility under Akbar: this is to be seen in the perspective of the changes made in this system – the origin and the growth of the mansabdari system under Akbar.
Of these four questions, we would here deal with the first issue, while the rest would be dealt in the unit II. The question which concerns us here is what were the changes in the composition of the nobility and the corresponding changes in the theoretical framework determining the position of the groups within the polity? [See Afzal Husain, Iqtidar A Khan, Muzaffar Alam]
To begin with, the Mughal Nobility was predominantly a Turani concern. This can be gauged if one examines the racial and cultural background of individual nobles whose names are found in Abul Fazl’s list of officers who were with Humayun in 1555 on his expedition to Hindustan as given in the Akbarnama.
As a result of this examination as done by Iqtidar Alam Khan it can be established that on the eve of Akbar’s accession to the throne, out of a total number of highly placed nobles serving in Hindustan, 52.9 % were Turanis and 31.37 % were Iranis.
From these figures it is obvious that in the nobility which Akbar inherited from his father, Turanis were in a predominant position, but the Iranis were also represented in a sizeable strength. These Iranis were officers who had been recruited during Humayun’s stay in Persia between 1542-45; but most of them were holding minor positions as compared to their Turani counterparts.
But then the list we are analysing does not include a number of officers who were left behind by Humayun at Kabul to serve there under the command of Munim Khan. Names of such officers are mentioned by Bayazid Bayat. Their acknowledged position at Kabul goes to indicate that most of these nobles at Kabul were Turanis. It is quite understandable also as the governor of Kabul was a senior Turani noble. His sub-ordinates were naturally belonging to the same racial group.
Perhaps the strength of the Turanis in absolute number would thus be much greater than what is indicated by the percentage worked out basing on Abul Fazl’s list. This factor naturally influenced the norms that governed the position of the nobility or their relations with the sovereign.
Turanis had a great attachment, being Chaghtais who had served the Chaghtai ruler and had a great regard for the Mongol tradition of kingship.
We find that in the Mongol tradition of Kingship, the position of the noble was very different from that of the Turkish theory of Kingship, in the sense that unlike Turkish nobles, a noble serving in the Mongol polity would be regarded as a free person having a legal claim to property. This means, that, the notion of banda-i dargah would not carry much force within the nobility. So institution of bureaucracy would be absent from a typically Mongol polity.
We find that under Humayun, there was no scope of considering a noble as banda-i dargah. In 1542 when Humayun had taken a small loan from one Mughal officer, he was very anxious that this be written off in the presence of two formal witnesses. The right of the noble to his property had religious sanctity. Or for that matter, we find that the Mughal nobles under Humayun continued to assert independence, a thing which was inconceivable during the subsequent period when the Chaghtai tradition underlining the privileges of nobles were tending to disappear from Mughal polity.
Just before Humayun marched to Punjab in 1553, nobles en mass defied orders to march to Kashmir, as according to them, it was not a practical proposition. Again, in 1551, when Humayun was defeated in the Battle of Kipchaq by Mirza Kamran, the nobles forced Humayun to take an oath that he would not act or take significant steps without obtaining the consent of the nobles. This was being done to ensure that the king would always act according to the wishes of the nobles.
Firishta observes that each one of the Turani noble serving under Akbar during the period of regency considered himself as important as the ancient Sassanid rulers Kaikaus and Kaiqubad: that is Turanis had the eye to assert independence and it was difficult to manage them as they were granted privileges by Chaghtai traditions in the Timurid state.
Then we find that in the course of the struggle that took place between Akbar and the dominant groups of his nobility who were mainly Turanis, between 1560-67 there came about a radical change in the composition of the nobility. At the same time a time a significant change took place in the general composition of the nobility as well.
There are two specific features of these changes as a result of this struggle of Akbar and his Turani nobles which continued for around four years:
One factor of change was that Irani nobles emerged at par with the Turanis in the higher echelons of the nobility.
Secondly, there entered into the nobility Indian elements, the Rajputs and the Indian Shaikhzadas in considerable strength which resulted in the decrease and retrogression in both Turani and Iranis in absolute numbers and absolute strength of the nobility.
This is borne out by an analysis of the list of the nobles who were serving the Empire during the period of eight years from 1567-75 (by putting together occasional lists in Akbarnama together) and then by singling out persons in higher echelons by ascertaining their mansabs held at the time.
Analysis of this list indicates that (a) there was considerable improvement in the position of the Irani nobles who came in the higher grades particularly at par with the Turani nobles; and (b) there emerged two entirely new groups, both of Indian origin: the Indian shaikhzadas and the Rajputs.
If previously in 1555 Turanis: 52.9 % and Iranis: 31.37 %. Now in 1567-75 the figures were:
From this tabulation we see that the Iranis were getting higher promotions but there was no influx in their total strength, which in fact fell from 31.37 % to 27.27 %. The Indian shaikhzadas and the Rajputs, however, appear to maintain parity with each other. Akbar was thinking in terms of an Indian ruling group and not just about Rajputs as a counter weight against the foreign elements as a whole.
Then there is yet another shift in the situation. This shift is borne out by an analysis of the list of nobles from the period 1575 to 1595. The list of this period was again prepared by Iqtidar Alam Khan. He prepared it on the following manner: he takes Abul Fazl’s list in the Ain as the basis in which names of all nobles who served during this period are included. But this list as such is not a very faithful list for the study of the composition as it includes names of large number of those nobles was well who had either died or were eliminated from the nobility for some other reason before 1575. This list would become a good sample if we alienate all those names who had been removed from the ranks of nobility for one reason or the other before 1575. As Iqtidar is not sure how many were exactly excluded, he takes into account those who held the position of 1000 or above.
Compare this now: the strength of the Turanis is further reduced in the Total list and in nobles of higher grades. In case of Iranis an interesting phenomenon is witnessed: Slight decline in total list again indicated here. The recruitment of Iranis is not seen keeping pace with others, particularly the Indian elements. In the higher grades, the strength of the Iranis undergoes a steep fall – as radical as the improvement witnessed in their position in the preceding period. It was in 1567-68 that the Iranis were promoted out of turn. But now there is a change in position. In case of the Indian elements, parity between the Indian Shaikhzadas and Rajputs in the higher position is strictly maintained. The Indian Shaikhzadas however almost double their strength. In the total numbers, however, the increase is there but not as radical as in the earlier phase. This indicates that the process of recruitment of Indian elements was growing, in the initial stages very rapidly, and continued even later.
Now let us look at the figures for 1580:
In 1580 we find Iranis position affected. Along with the Turanis they were present in the rebellions and thus their position is low. It is however significant that the participation of the Indian elements in these revolts is very nominal and they continued to play the same role in 1580 as the Iranis in 1560-67.
According to Afzal Husain this trend continued up till the end of Akbar’s reign. There was a some fall in the total position of the Iranis, Turanis and the Rajput, although the later in fact rose in percentage. The only significant change was in a sharp decline in the numerical strength of the Indian Shaikhzadas.
What kind of corresponding changes were occurring in the norms and principles governing the privileges of the nobles and their relationship with the king?
One basic fact and trend growing towards this time was the gradual erosion of the influence of the Mongol traditions in the Mughal polity due to the dwindling strength of the Turanis. As the Turanis were getting less and less, the influence of the Tura-i chaghtai was also getting less.
Let us mention one case to illustrate this point. It dates back to 1575. Badauni tells us that when the Chaghtai prince of Badakhshan, Mirza Sulaiman visited Akbar’s court, Akbar tried to revive many of the customs and court etiquettes prescribed by the tura that had gone into disuse. That such customs were being tried to be revived shows that the Chaghtai customs were declining. Badauni tells us that they remained in vogue only till Mirza Sulaiman was there and after he left, they disappeared like ‘naqsh bar āb’, painting over water.
Thus we see that the racial composition underwent a great change on account of political compulsion and measures adopted by Akbar to check the recalcitrant nobles. Akbr gave a fair degree of representation to not only Iranis but also to Indian elements to counter the old nobility. However, according to Afzal Husain, each group of nobles or more properly speaking – family groups – continued to enjoy a pre-eminent position as long as they remained loyal to the emperor. The temporary setback which these families experienced was usually the outcome of their own political conduct.