The Past on Screen: Cinema, Historical Memory and the Politics of Identity: From K. Asif’s Akbar to the Recasting of Medieval India

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

History and cinema have always maintained an uneasy relationship. Both attempt to reconstruct the past, yet their methods and objectives remain fundamentally different. The historian seeks to understand historical developments through a critical examination of evidence, while the filmmaker strives to create a compelling narrative. Historical accuracy is essential to the former; dramatic effect is frequently the principal concern of the latter. Yet cinema has exercised a far greater influence upon popular historical consciousness than the writings of professional historians. Millions who have never read the Tārikh e Fīruzshāhi, Akbarnāma, the Tuzuk-i Jahāngīrī or a modern work on medieval India nevertheless possess definite images of Akbar, Alauddin Khalji, Aurangzeb, Shivaji and the Rajputs, largely acquired through films and television serials.

This influence makes cinema something more than a medium of entertainment. It can shape public opinion, construct collective memories and influence the manner in which a society understands its identity. Unlike historical scholarship, which usually accommodates competing interpretations, cinema tends to present a single, emotionally persuasive narrative. Alternative explanations are pushed aside, and the interpretation chosen by the filmmaker gradually becomes, in the minds of many viewers, the history of the event itself. The visual image possesses an authority that the printed word seldom enjoys.

The political possibilities of cinema were recognised quite early. During the First World War, governments experimented with films to influence public opinion, but it was Nazi Germany that demonstrated their potential on an extraordinary scale. Joseph Goebbels understood that cinema could communicate ideological messages more effectively than political speeches. Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will (1935), depicting the Nazi Party rally at Nuremberg, transformed a political gathering into a carefully orchestrated spectacle of national unity and unquestioning loyalty to Hitler. Through monumental imagery, music, camera angles and mass formations, it created an impression of irresistible political authority.

Even more disturbing was Veit Harlan’s Jud Süß (Jew Süss, 1940), a historical drama based upon the life of Joseph Süß Oppenheimer, an eighteenth-century Jewish court financier in Württemberg. The film converted a complicated historical episode into an instrument of antisemitic propaganda. Its Jewish protagonist was represented through stereotypes of greed, manipulation and sexual predation, while German society appeared as the innocent victim of his actions. Fritz Hippler’s Der ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew, 1940) employed the apparently authoritative form of a documentary to promote similar prejudices. History, or what purported to be history, was thus used to justify contemporary political hostility.

The significance of these examples lies in the methods employed. A community was glorified, its supposed adversary reduced to a collection of objectionable characteristics, and selected events arranged to support a predetermined conclusion. The audience was encouraged to experience prejudice as historical truth. Although Nazi Germany’s centrally organised propaganda apparatus cannot be equated with the commercial film industries of democratic societies, the techniques through which cinema constructs heroes, enemies and collective identities deserve comparison.

Such possibilities were not confined to totalitarian states. Oliver Stone’s JFK (1991), dealing with the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, demonstrated how dramatic reconstruction could influence public understanding of a controversial event. Closer home, the extraordinary popularity of the Doordarshan serials Ramayan and Mahabharat during the late 1980s showed how visual narratives could shape a common religious and cultural imagination. Their reception coincided with the growing political mobilisation around the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, although the relationship between television and political change cannot be reduced to a simple cause-and-effect explanation. Earlier productions such as Hum Log and Buniyaad had reflected a different concern, emphasising social relationships, national integration and the human consequences of Partition.

The international use of historical television drama offers another instructive comparison. Turkish productions such as Diriliş: Ertuğrul, Payitaht: Abdülhamid and Kuruluş: Osman have contributed to the popular revival of interest in the Ottoman past. Their narratives celebrate Turkish martial traditions, Islamic identity and the political achievements of the Ottoman dynasty. They have also been associated with the cultural and political aspirations of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey, where Ottoman history has acquired renewed public importance.

Yet Ertuğrul demonstrates both the possibilities and limitations of historical reconstruction. Very little reliable contemporary information survives about Ertuğrul himself, and much of the narrative is necessarily fictional. Nevertheless, the depiction of nomadic encampments, yurts, weapons, clothing and aspects of tribal life offers an imaginative reconstruction of the material environment of the frontier societies from which the Ottoman polity emerged. A production may therefore be historically imaginative and culturally illuminating while remaining highly selective in its political message.

An equally revealing example is the Israeli television series Fauda, created by Lior Raz and Avi Issacharoff, which has completed five seasons. Unlike the Turkish historical serials, Fauda deals with the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its significance lies in the sophistication with which it constructs a particular understanding of that conflict. Rather than resorting to crude propaganda, it employs realistic settings, convincing characters, emotional complexity and gripping action to encourage viewers to identify with Israeli undercover operatives. Their violence is generally presented as a reluctant necessity, imposed upon them by dangerous circumstances, while their personal suffering and moral dilemmas receive sustained attention. Palestinian characters are not invariably demonised, but their experiences of occupation, dispossession and violence remain comparatively peripheral. The resulting narrative encourages viewers to see Israeli operatives primarily as victims of circumstances rather than as agents exercising coercive power. This interpretation stands in contrast to accounts that foreground Palestinian suffering and Israeli responsibility for violence. The achievement of Fauda as political storytelling lies precisely in this subtlety: it does not need to deny Palestinian suffering explicitly, for its selective distribution of sympathy can make Israeli actions appear understandable, even unavoidable. It demonstrates how sophisticated entertainment can shape political perceptions without adopting the obvious language or appearance of propaganda.

These international examples provide a useful background for examining Indian historical cinema. They also establish an important methodological point: films must be studied in relation to the circumstances of their production. A film about the sixteenth century may reveal as much about the twentieth or twenty-first century as about the period it claims to portray.

The earliest Indian feature film, Dadasaheb Phalke’s Raja Harishchandra (1913), drew upon a familiar mythological tradition. Mythological and historical subjects remained important in the development of Indian cinema, providing audiences with stories already embedded in popular cultural memory. As filmmaking developed, the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughals, the Rajputs and the Marathas offered an apparently inexhaustible supply of rulers, battles, romances and heroic sacrifices.

The interpretation of these subjects was never independent of the historiography inherited from colonial rule. James Mill’s division of Indian history into Hindu, Muslim and British periods encouraged the identification of political authority with religious communities. Later colonial historians, particularly those who selectively emphasised conquest, temple destruction and religious persecution, reinforced the impression that medieval India represented an age of Muslim domination over a Hindu population. The complexities of political institutions, economic relationships and social interaction were frequently subordinated to this religious division.

Such an understanding was historically misleading. Neither the Delhi Sultanate nor the Mughal Empire functioned simply as a Muslim establishment ruling over a homogeneous Hindu society. Their political structures depended upon alliances with regional elites, military commanders, landholders and administrators drawn from different backgrounds. Religious affiliation did not invariably determine political loyalty, and conflicts between Muslim rulers were as much a part of medieval Indian history as conflicts involving Hindu and Muslim sovereigns.

Indian nationalism produced an alternative to this colonial understanding. The inclusive strand of the freedom movement emphasised the long history of interaction between the peoples and cultures of the subcontinent. Akbar, in particular, came to be regarded as a ruler whose attempts at political accommodation provided a historical precedent for an inclusive Indian nation. Gandhi and Nehru both recognised the importance of Akbar’s policies, while the archaeological discoveries at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro during the 1920s strengthened the nationalist conviction that India possessed a distinguished civilisation long before colonial rule.

It was within this intellectual atmosphere that the early Mughal films acquired their particular significance. Shahenshah Babar (1944), Humayun (1945) and Shahjahan (1946) appeared during the closing years of British rule. They celebrated Mughal rulers as historical personalities belonging to India’s past rather than as representatives of an alien civilisation. The decades following Independence witnessed further productions, including Anarkali (1953), Adl-e-Jahangir (1955), Mughal-e-Azam (1960), Taj Mahal (1963), Jahanara (1964) and Noor Jahan (1967).

One striking feature of these films was their preoccupation with romance. The Mughal emperors were remembered not so much for their administrative achievements, military campaigns or economic policies as for their relationships with women. The love of Shah Jahan and Mumtaz Mahal, the supposed romance of Salim and Anarkali, and the relationship between Jahangir and Nur Jahan became recurring cinematic subjects. The films were frequently musicals, enriched by Urdu poetry, elaborate costumes and representations of a refined courtly culture.

This romanticisation certainly distorted history. Yet it also reflected the aspirations of a society emerging from the trauma of Partition. The Mughal past was represented as part of a shared cultural inheritance, and the relationships between Hindu and Muslim characters generally affirmed the possibility of coexistence.

K. Asif’s Mughal-e-Azam remains the finest example of this tradition. Conceived in 1944, while India was still under colonial rule, it was finally released in 1960, when the ideals of Nehruvian pluralism continued to shape public life. The film presented Akbar as a powerful sovereign whose responsibility towards the empire conflicted with his affection for his son. Its central drama was not a struggle between religious communities but between imperial authority and individual desire.

The historical foundations of the story were nevertheless extremely uncertain. K. Asif drew upon Imtiaz Ali Taj’s Urdu play Anarkali, written in 1922, rather than a contemporary Mughal account. The legend itself had developed through stories recorded by European travellers, including William Finch, who visited India during Jahangir’s reign. Shireen Moosvi has demonstrated how the legend grew out of rumours surrounding the secluded imperial household and acquired a life of its own through repeated retelling.

There is no convincing contemporary evidence for the familiar story of Anarkali being condemned because of her relationship with Prince Salim. Salim did rebel against Akbar, but the rebellion arose from the politics of succession, the prince’s ambitions and his strained relationship with the imperial establishment. The romantic explanation belongs to literature and cinema rather than documented Mughal history.

Nevertheless, the film incorporated genuine historical circumstances. Salim’s rebellion was real, and Akbar’s attempts to establish an inclusive imperial order were important features of his reign. The distinction between the historical event and its fictional explanation is precisely what the historian must establish.

An equally revealing example is Ashutosh Gowariker’s Jodhaa Akbar (2008). Although separated from Mughal-e-Azam by nearly half a century, the two films shared a broad commitment to presenting Akbar as a ruler capable of transcending religious divisions. Their political circumstances, however, were quite different. K. Asif’s film emerged from the nationalist and Nehruvian environment, while Jodhaa Akbar appeared after the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002. Its story of a Muslim emperor and a Rajput princess could therefore also be understood as an attempt to recover the possibility of accommodation in a society increasingly divided by communal politics.

Unlike Mughal-e-Azam, the makers of Jodhaa Akbar consulted professional historians, including Irfan Habib, Satish Chandra and Shireen Moosvi. The film also acknowledged that its narrative was a fictionalised account inspired by historical personalities. Yet scholarly consultation did not eliminate its historical inaccuracies.

Akbar’s marriage to the daughter of Raja Bharamal of Amber in 1562 is well established. The name Jodha Bai, however, does not occur in contemporary Persian sources as that of Akbar’s Rajput wife. Its association with the emperor developed much later, particularly through nineteenth-century historical writing and local traditions surrounding the monuments of Agra and Fathpur Sikri. The familiar identification of a palace at Sikri as the residence of Jodha Bai helped perpetuate a name whose historical foundation remains doubtful. Satish Chandra has drawn attention to the confusion between Akbar’s Rajput consort and the Marwar princess who married Prince Salim.

Here we encounter an interesting historical process. A name popularised through later traditions was reinforced by cinema until the fictionalised character became more familiar than the woman who actually entered the Mughal household. The controversy surrounding the film, including objections raised by sections of the Rajput community, further demonstrated how cinematic representations could become entangled with contemporary questions of caste, community and historical honour.

The film also compresses and rearranges events from Akbar’s early reign. Maham Anaga, Akbar’s foster mother, is portrayed as a scheming woman attempting to undermine his relationship with the Rajput princess. Maham Anaga undoubtedly exercised political influence during the emperor’s early years, particularly following Bairam Khan’s removal. But her influence had effectively ended in 1562, following the downfall and execution of her son Adham Khan. The prolonged intrigues attributed to her in the film therefore distort the chronology and circumstances of Akbar’s marriage.

Other episodes possess genuine historical foundations. Akbar’s daring encounters with unruly elephants are recorded in contemporary sources and depicted in illustrated manuscripts of the Akbarnāma. His early reign also witnessed serious challenges from powerful Turani nobles, while the growing incorporation of Rajputs into imperial service strengthened the Mughal political establishment. The film transforms these developments into a dramatic narrative, but it does not invent them entirely.

The treatment of Akbar’s religious policies requires similar care. Both Mughal-e-Azam and Jodhaa Akbar invoke, directly or indirectly, the principle of sulh-i kul, or universal peace. Historians have differed over the chronology of its development. Iqtidar Alam Khan placed particular emphasis upon the transformation of Akbar’s policies during the later decades of his reign, while Shireen Moosvi drew attention to earlier indications of religious accommodation. Akbar’s Rajput marriage alliance, the abolition of the pilgrimage tax in 1563 and the abolition of jizya in 1564 preceded the more explicit formulation of sulh-i kul as an imperial principle.

The film therefore captures an important historical tendency even while simplifying its development. Akbar’s policy was not merely the consequence of affection for a Rajput wife, as cinematic romance might suggest. It emerged from the political requirements of an expanding empire, the emperor’s changing intellectual outlook and his attempts to establish a more inclusive basis for sovereignty.

There is another aspect of these films that has received insufficient attention: their representation of Mughal architecture. The palaces of Mughal-e-Azam, with their vast enclosed halls, mirrored interiors, marble surfaces and elaborate cusped arches, owe more to the architectural vocabulary of later Mughal periods and cinematic imagination than to Akbar’s actual buildings.

The surviving structures at Fathpur Sikri provide a very different picture. Akbar’s architecture was characterised by extensive use of red sandstone, trabeate construction, open courtyards, pavilions, verandahs and relatively small enclosed chambers. Many permanent structures reflected the spatial organisation of temporary imperial encampments, with their tents, awnings and interconnected open spaces. The white marble tomb of Shaikh Salim Chishti was an exceptional structure within this predominantly sandstone environment.

The great mirrored hall in Mughal-e-Azam, where Anarkali performs before Akbar, may be one of the most memorable settings in Indian cinema, but it belongs to a visual world far removed from the actual architecture of his reign. Jodhaa Akbar came somewhat closer to historical reality, partly because several scenes were filmed in the palaces and forts of Amber and Jaigarh. Even there, however, architectural features belonging to later periods appear alongside structures intended to represent Akbar’s court.

These are not merely questions of architectural detail. Buildings constitute historical evidence. Their plans, construction techniques and spatial arrangements reveal patterns of courtly life, ceremonial practices, domestic organisation and cultural interaction. To replace them with a conventional image of Oriental magnificence is to lose an opportunity to understand the society that produced them.

Language provides another example. Earlier Mughal films frequently assigned highly Persianised Urdu to Muslim characters while Hindu or Rajput figures spoke a more Sanskritised Hindi. This distinction reflected modern linguistic and communal assumptions rather than the actual complexity of language in medieval India. The irony is that Hindi cinema itself owed much of its popularity to Urdu writers, poets, lyricists and dialogue writers. The spoken language of popular films was often Hindustani, a shared idiom that resisted the rigid separation of Hindi and Urdu into religiously exclusive languages.

Mohammad Asim Siddiqui’s Muslim Identity in Hindi Cinema (2025) is particularly useful for understanding these developments. His examination of historical films, Muslim socials, communal violence, gangster narratives, terrorism and the representation of Muslim women reveals how cinematic identity is constructed through recurring cultural signs. Earlier films frequently presented Muslims as poets, musicians, loyal friends or representatives of a refined aristocratic culture. Such portrayals were often sympathetic, but they could also reduce an extraordinarily diverse community to a limited collection of stereotypes.

The films of the 1970s continued to affirm religious coexistence. Amar Akbar Anthony (1977) transformed the religious diversity of three brothers into a celebration of national unity. Garm Hava (1973), set in Agra, offered a more realistic account of the insecurity experienced by an Indian Muslim family after Partition. Its protagonist was not a representative of an alien civilisation but an ordinary Indian whose attachment to his home was tested by communal suspicion.

A different tendency became increasingly visible from the late 1980s and 1990s. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement and the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 brought medieval history into the centre of contemporary political mobilisation. Babur, once represented in cinema as a conqueror, poet and founder of a dynasty, increasingly acquired another identity in public discourse: that of a foreign invader associated with an alleged historical injury.

The changing political atmosphere also affected the representation of contemporary Muslims. In certain genres, Muslim characters increasingly appeared as gangsters, terrorists or individuals whose loyalty to India required special demonstration. The conflict with Pakistan, militancy in Kashmir and the global discourse on terrorism after September 2001 reinforced these tendencies.

Sarfarosh (1999) offers an instructive example. Its Muslim police officer Salim faces suspicion despite his professional commitment and patriotism. Although the film ultimately challenges this prejudice, the necessity of doing so reveals the changing assumptions surrounding Muslim citizenship. In many earlier films, the loyalty of Muslim characters was taken for granted. In later productions, it increasingly became something that had to be established through exceptional conduct or sacrifice.

Siddiqui also draws attention to another development: the disappearance of minorities and poorer communities from the affluent social worlds created by many popular films of the liberalisation era. The elaborate weddings, prosperous households and consumer lifestyles celebrated in several mainstream romances of the 1990s offered little space for artisans, labourers and marginalised groups. Exclusion could therefore occur not only through hostile representation but also through absence.

This transformation was neither uniform nor uncontested. Films such as Bombay (1995), Zakhm (1998), Parzania (2007) and Firaaq (2008) questioned communal violence and explored the predicament of minorities. Shyam Benegal’s Bharat Ek Khoj (1988), drawing upon Nehru’s The Discovery of India, had earlier demonstrated that television could present Indian history as a complex process of social, political and cultural change rather than a succession of religious confrontations.

Nevertheless, the years following 2014 have witnessed a more pronounced tendency in certain historical films to interpret medieval India through the opposition between Hindu heroism and Muslim aggression. Padmaavat (2018), Panipat (2019), Tanhaji: The Unsung Warrior (2020) and Chhaava (2025) provide examples of how conflicts involving medieval and early modern rulers can be framed in strongly religious or civilisational terms.

There is nothing inherently objectionable about celebrating Rajput or Maratha achievements, nor should historians conceal the violence, coercion or religious discrimination practised by particular Muslim rulers. The difficulty arises when complex political conflicts are transformed into a continuous struggle between two supposedly homogeneous religious communities.

In Padmaavat, Alauddin Khalji is portrayed as brutal, uncontrolled and morally repulsive, in sharp contrast to the refinement and honour associated with the Rajput court. This opposition is established through costume, lighting, music, bodily behaviour and the organisation of cinematic space. The Rajput world appears dignified and orderly, while the Sultan’s surroundings suggest excess and barbarism.

The historical foundation of the central narrative is itself uncertain. Malik Muhammad Jayasi composed his Padmāvat in 1540, more than two centuries after Alauddin’s conquest of Chittor in 1303. His composition belongs to the tradition of Sufi romance and allegorical literature, not contemporary political reportage. The transformation of its narrative into an apparently authentic account of the Sultan’s campaign confuses literary imagination with historical evidence.

Equally significant is what disappears from the cinematic portrait. Alauddin’s market regulations, revenue measures, military reforms and attempts to control the nobility were important developments in the history of the Delhi Sultanate. They have little place in a narrative that requires him to function primarily as the embodiment of an alien and threatening civilisation.

A similar problem arises in films dealing with Mughal-Maratha conflicts. Tanhaji presents the struggle for Kondhana fort through a dramatic opposition between Maratha heroism and Mughal authority. Yet Udaybhan Rathod, the Mughal commander opposing Tanaji Malusare, was himself a Rajput. This fact alone complicates the interpretation of the conflict as a straightforward Hindu-Muslim confrontation.

The same caution is necessary when examining representations of Sambhaji and Aurangzeb, including Chhaava. Sambhaji’s capture and execution were brutal historical events, and there is no reason to minimise their violence. But these events belonged to a prolonged struggle involving imperial expansion, regional sovereignty, revenue resources and the political difficulties of Mughal rule in the Deccan. To interpret the entire conflict as an encounter between Hindu patriotism and Muslim tyranny is to impose the categories of modern nationalism upon a very different political world.

The Mughals themselves cannot be regarded as permanently foreign. Babur entered northern India from Central Asia, but the dynasty he founded became deeply rooted in the subcontinent. Its nobility expanded to include Indian Muslims, Rajputs, Marathas and other regional elites. Its institutions, economy, architecture and cultural traditions developed through sustained interaction with Indian society. By Akbar’s reign, the Mughal Empire had become an integral part of India’s political and social order.

The cinematic construction of homogeneous religious communities also obscures distinctions of caste, class, occupation, region and gender. Medieval Hindus did not constitute a single political community with uniform interests, nor did Muslims. Rajput rulers fought one another, entered alliances with the Mughals and competed for political influence. Muslim rulers fought rival Muslim dynasties, while their administrations depended upon cooperation with local landholders and regional elites.

The glorification of jauhar in historical spectacles raises related questions. Collective death is frequently transformed into an expression of unquestioned communal honour, leaving little room for examining the patriarchal structures and coercive circumstances that shaped women’s lives. Their bodies become symbols of territory and collective purity, while their experiences as historical individuals disappear behind the honour of the community.

The political significance of such representations becomes clearer when the Muslim ruler of historical cinema and the Muslim criminal or terrorist of contemporary films are examined together. Although belonging to different genres, they are sometimes constructed through similar visual conventions. Religious symbols, costume, aggression and expressions of masculinity become recurring signs of danger or alienness. The actions of individual medieval rulers can thereby be made to suggest characteristics supposedly belonging to an entire community.

This is where the earlier examples of Nazi propaganda, Turkish historical drama and Fauda acquire their wider relevance. They illustrate different ways in which cinematic narratives can shape collective identities and distribute sympathy, although the political circumstances and intentions of their creators differ substantially. The historian must distinguish deliberate state propaganda from commercial entertainment and contested political storytelling. Nevertheless, the questions remain similar: whose experiences are foregrounded, whose actions are explained, whose suffering is remembered and whose history disappears?

The relationship between cinema and political authority adds another dimension. In contemporary India, certain films dealing with contentious historical or political subjects have received conspicuous official encouragement. Vivek Agnihotri’s The Kashmir Files (2022), dealing with the displacement of Kashmiri Pandits during the insurgency, was declared tax-free by several BJP-governed states, while political leaders publicly recommended it and attended screenings.

The suffering of Kashmiri Pandits was a genuine human tragedy involving targeted killings, intimidation and the loss of homes. It deserves serious historical examination and public remembrance. The controversy surrounding the film concerns the selection and presentation of events, particularly whether the suffering of one community is reconstructed in ways that encourage suspicion towards another.

The Kerala Story (2023), dealing with religious conversion, radicalisation and recruitment into extremist organisations, also received tax concessions in states including Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. Its narrative and numerical claims generated considerable controversy. The existence of extremist recruitment does not automatically establish the accuracy of broader generalisations about a religious community.

Official encouragement has also extended to historical spectacles. Samrat Prithviraj (2022), depicting the conflict between Prithviraj Chauhan and Muhammad Ghori, was declared tax-free in several states. The film belongs to a longer tradition of interpreting medieval political struggles as episodes of indigenous resistance to foreign conquest. Such narratives require particular care when modern notions of national identity are projected onto the political formations of the twelfth century.

The controversy surrounding The Taj Story (2025) illustrates another aspect of the struggle over historical memory. Its narrative raised questions about the accepted history of the Taj Mahal and its construction under Shah Jahan. The monument’s Mughal origin is supported by contemporary textual evidence, architectural history and the documented development of the complex. Claims that it was originally a Hindu temple have not been established through credible historical or archaeological evidence. Although the filmmakers disputed allegations that their production asserted such a theory, the controversy reflected a wider attempt to reinterpret the religious ownership of India’s architectural heritage.

It is important to distinguish the different forms of official involvement. Tax concessions for The Kashmir Files, The Kerala Story and Samrat Prithviraj are documented; The Taj Story should not be placed in the same category without evidence of a comparable concession. Nor does a tax exemption, by itself, prove that a government directed the content of a film. It does, however, raise questions about the relationship between political endorsement and the public authority acquired by particular historical narratives.

The irony is that some contemporary attempts to recover a supposedly authentic Indian past reproduce the very religious division of history inherited from colonial scholarship. The claimed liberation of Indian history from colonial interpretations may thus result in the revival of one of their most enduring assumptions: that medieval India was essentially a struggle between Hindus and Muslims.

The historian’s responsibility is to challenge this reduction without romanticising the past. Religious conflict, temple destruction, political persecution and coercion were historical realities. They must be examined critically and without embarrassment. But the evidence also reveals political alliances across religious boundaries, patronage of diverse religious institutions, cultural exchange and shared economic interests. Temple destruction, for instance, cannot be explained through a single motive applicable to every ruler and period. Political conquest, punishment of rebellion, appropriation of wealth, religious hostility and the symbolic assertion of sovereignty could all play a part, sometimes in combination.

Historical cinema rarely allows sufficient room for such distinctions. Its preference for identifiable heroes and villains encourages simplified explanations. Yet this limitation is not unavoidable. Some of the most valuable possibilities of historical filmmaking remain largely unexplored.

The history of medieval India was not merely the history of battles, rulers and courtly romances. It was also the history of agrarian production, commerce, urban development, craftsmanship, religious movements, intellectual exchanges and technological innovation. The cities of Delhi, Agra, Lahore, Ahmedabad and Fathpur Sikri offer abundant material for reconstructing everyday life. Their architecture, streets, workshops, markets, waterworks and residential spaces reveal social relationships that rarely appear in court-centred cinematic narratives.

The construction of the Taj Mahal, for example, is usually presented as an expression of Shah Jahan’s love for Mumtaz Mahal. Yet it was also an extraordinary achievement of architectural planning, engineering, material procurement and labour organisation. The experiences of the craftsmen who carved its marble screens, the workers who transported its materials and the engineers who planned its foundations could provide compelling stories in their own right.

The written sources are equally rich. The Āʾīn-i Akbarī provides information about occupations, economic production, revenue administration and imperial institutions. The Tuzuk-i Jahāngīrī reveals interests extending from political affairs to painting, natural history and unusual occurrences. The Majālis-i Jahāngīrī offers insights into intellectual exchanges at the imperial court. Travellers’ accounts, regional chronicles, inscriptions and archaeological remains can supplement and sometimes challenge the narratives preserved in official histories.

The possibilities are not confined to the Mughals. The Delhi Sultanate offers equally rich subjects, from the political career of Razia Sultan to the economic policies of Alauddin Khalji, the intellectual world of Amir Khusrau, the experiences of Ibn Battuta and the development of Sufi establishments and urban communities. There is no shortage of dramatic material in these histories. What is required is a willingness to move beyond the assumption that medieval India becomes interesting only when presented as a battlefield between religious civilisations.

I recall a discussion at a seminar in Mumbai where historians and filmmakers debated the relationship between historical accuracy and cinematic storytelling. Shyam Benegal reminded the historians that filmmakers were storytellers whose principal concern was to engage an audience, not to reproduce the arguments of scholarly works. There is considerable truth in this observation. Cinema has its own conventions, and no historian should expect a feature film to function as an academic monograph.

Yet Benegal’s own Bharat Ek Khoj demonstrated that historical scholarship and engaging storytelling need not be incompatible. Drawing upon Nehru’s The Discovery of India and benefiting from scholarly consultation, the series situated political events within broader historical developments. Its treatment of the Mughals and the Marathas acknowledged complexities often absent from conventional historical spectacles.

More recently, Nikkhil Advani’s The Empire (2021), based upon the historical novels published under the name Alex Rutherford, offered a fictionalised but relatively human portrayal of Babur. The series acknowledged his Central Asian struggles, his rivalry with Shaibani Khan and the importance of Timurid political traditions. Particularly interesting was its treatment of women, including Aisan Daulat Begum, Babur’s grandmother, and Khanzada Begum, his sister.

Their political influence finds support in contemporary and near-contemporary sources, including the Bāburnāma, the Tārīkh-i Rashīdī and Gulbadan Begum’s Humāyūnnāma. Timurid women were not merely secluded spectators of political events. They advised rulers, negotiated relationships and participated in the management of dynastic affairs.

Yet The Empire also demonstrates the selectivity of cinematic reconstruction. Despite dealing with Babur’s career, its first (and perhaps the only) season omitted his confrontation with Rana Sanga and the Battle of Khanwa, an event of considerable importance in establishing Mughal authority in northern India. The omission is particularly striking when compared with Bharat Ek Khoj, which incorporated the confrontation within its treatment of Babur’s Indian campaigns.

Nevertheless, after years in which Babur had increasingly been represented in public discourse as a symbol of foreign conquest and religious hostility, The Empire offered a recognisably human historical personality. Its Babur was ambitious, vulnerable, politically resourceful and shaped by the uncertainties of his circumstances. The series was far from historically accurate in every respect, but it demonstrated that fictionalisation need not necessarily result in demonisation.

This brings us back to the essential problem. The historian must examine not only what a film says, but also what it leaves unsaid. The selection of events, the choice of protagonists, the treatment of language, costume and architecture, and the distribution of sympathy among characters all contribute to the construction of historical meaning. Films themselves consequently become valuable historical sources, not necessarily for the periods they depict, but for the political and cultural circumstances in which they were made.

Mughal-e-Azam tells us something about the aspirations of Nehruvian India. Jodhaa Akbar reflects an attempt to recover a language of accommodation in a society marked by communal tensions. Padmaavat and other recent historical spectacles reveal how the past can be reorganised around contemporary ideas of religious identity and heroism. The Empire, despite its fictional excesses, demonstrates that alternative representations remain possible.

There is, finally, an important distinction between historical fiction and historical falsification. A filmmaker may invent dialogue, compress events, introduce fictional characters or rearrange incidents to create a coherent narrative. Such liberties are intrinsic to historical drama. But when invention systematically transforms political conflicts into religious wars, attributes collective characteristics to entire communities or presents unsupported claims as established historical facts, its consequences extend beyond artistic freedom.

The responsibility of historians is not to police imagination, but to make historical evidence and its complexities available to a wider public. Filmmakers, in turn, have an opportunity to engage with scholarship, archaeology and material culture in ways that can enrich rather than diminish their work.

The changing representation of medieval India in Hindi cinema ultimately raises a fundamental question about the relationship between history and national identity. Are we interested in understanding how Indian society developed through centuries of conflict, cooperation, migration, accommodation and transformation? Or are we seeking from the past a collection of heroes to celebrate and enemies to condemn?

The Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire were neither ages of uninterrupted harmony nor periods of perpetual religious warfare. They were complex political and social formations whose histories included conquest and accommodation, coercion and cooperation, inequality and cultural creativity. Their rulers must be judged through evidence and historical context, not through the religious loyalties of contemporary audiences.

Cinema has the power to bring these complexities to life. It can recover forgotten experiences, challenge inherited prejudices and introduce audiences to worlds that historical scholarship has painstakingly reconstructed. But it can also reduce the past to emotionally charged images that reinforce the divisions of the present.

The challenge before historians and filmmakers is therefore not merely to make films more accurate. It is to resist the temptation to convert history into an instrument of collective accusation. The past cannot be understood by dividing its inhabitants into the ancestors of today’s patriots and the ancestors of today’s enemies. History seeks to explain how people lived, struggled, governed, worked, believed and interacted within the circumstances of their own times.

If cinema can contribute to that understanding, it offers possibilities far greater than the celebration of dynasties or the glorification of battles. If it merely projects contemporary prejudices backwards, it risks replacing historical knowledge with manufactured memory. The greatest irony would be for a cinema claiming to recover India’s authentic past to reproduce the very colonial categories that once divided that past into Hindu and Muslim ages.

Note: This article draws substantially upon my own paper on films ‘Representations of the Mughals in Present-Day India: From K. Asif’s Akbar to the Babur of Nikkhil Advani’, published in Studies in People’s History (vol. 9, no. 2, 2022, pp. 241–254), as well as Mohammad Asim Siddiqui’s Muslim Identity in Hindi Cinema (2025). The perceptions and conclusions advanced here are, however, entirely my own.

Gender History and Medieval India: Women, Men, Bodies and Power

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Gender history is not simply another name for the history of women, and the distinction between the two is fundamental. Women’s history arose from the necessary effort to recover women who had been rendered almost invisible in conventional histories dominated by kings, dynasties, wars, administrative institutions and economic structures. Gender history builds upon that achievement but asks a broader question: how did a particular society construct the categories of woman and man, femininity and masculinity, and how did those constructions shape relationships of power? It therefore concerns women and men, family and household, sexuality and reproduction, labour and property, honour and violence, religious practice and political authority. Increasingly, it also examines persons who do not fit easily into a simple male-female binary, making the history of eunuchs or khwājasarās particularly important for medieval and early modern India.

Gender, in this sense, is historical. Biological difference alone cannot explain why particular societies associate courage, political authority, warfare or rationality with men, while associating domesticity, modesty, obedience or emotionality with women. Nor are such associations constant. What constituted an ideal man or woman in thirteenth-century Delhi need not have been identical to the ideals prevailing at Akbar’s court, among seventeenth-century Rajputs, within a Sufi household, or among the peasants and artisans of Mughal India. Gender history therefore investigates the historical production of femininities and masculinities rather than assuming either to be timeless.

This distinction considerably alters the questions we ask of medieval Indian history. An older history of women might ask what political role Raziyya Sultan, Chand Bibi, Nur Jahan or Jahanara played. Gender history certainly remains interested in that question, but it goes further. Why did the exercise of sovereignty by a woman appear exceptional? Why did female political authority require particular forms of justification? Was identical political behaviour described differently when performed by a woman rather than a man? Why could the emperor’s reliance upon male relatives, nobles and favourites be treated as ordinary politics, whereas Nur Jahan’s political network could become a “junta”? Such questions take us from biography into the historical construction of political authority itself.

Then there is the question of Gender and Performance. A useful point from which to begin this discussion is Judith Butler’s idea of gender as performance, developed most influentially in her 1990 book, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Butler questions the assumption that categories such as “man” and “woman”, or “masculine” and “feminine”, are simply natural, fixed and self-evident. Gender, she argues, is socially and culturally constituted and is continually reproduced through what she calls “performativity”. By this she does not mean that gender is merely acting or pretence, or that we consciously get up every morning and decide to perform as a man or a woman. Society already possesses certain expectations about how men and women should behave, dress, speak, walk, sit, occupy space, express sexuality or exercise authority. We repeatedly follow, negotiate and sometimes challenge these conventions. It is through their constant repetition that masculinity and femininity acquire the appearance of being natural and permanent. Gender, therefore, is not simply something that we are; it is also something that we continually do.

Such a formulation is immediately useful for medieval Indian history. Take, for example, the Rajput or Mughal warrior. His masculinity was not demonstrated merely by the fact that he was biologically male. It had repeatedly to be made visible through particular forms of conduct: carrying weapons, riding a horse, displaying physical courage, participating in warfare and the hunt, defending honour, maintaining dependants and demonstrating generosity and loyalty. A man who failed to exhibit these expected qualities could have his masculinity questioned. Thus, what appears at first sight to be a natural attribute of the “warrior male” can instead be studied historically as a set of socially recognised practices through which a particular kind of masculinity was continually produced and affirmed. This is where Butler’s formulation becomes useful to the historian: it encourages us to look not simply for men and women in our sources, but for the acts, rituals, gestures and expectations through which societies made them recognisable as particular kinds of men and women.

This becomes still more interesting when we turn to Mughal sovereignty. What did a Mughal emperor have to do to demonstrate that he was both a powerful man and a sovereign? He hunted, rode horses and elephants, fought wars, appeared in the darbār, dispensed justice and publicly displayed courage and authority. These were performances of sovereignty, but they were also performances of masculinity. What, then, do we do with Nur Jahan, who hunted, issued farmāns, had coins struck bearing her name and participated in imperial authority? Was she entering a masculine world, or was she demonstrating that authority itself could be performed differently by a woman? Butler therefore gives the historian not so much a ready-made explanation as a useful way of asking questions. In medieval India, what did one have to do, display or repeatedly enact to be recognised by others as a proper man or a proper woman? And, equally importantly, who decided what was “proper” in the first place?

The earliest scholarship on medieval Indian women was principally concerned with making women visible. Rekha Misra’s Women in Mughal India, 1526–1748, published in 1967, was an important early intervention. It gathered evidence concerning royal women, marriage, education, political activity, cultural accomplishments, privileges and architectural patronage. Its conceptual framework belonged essentially to women’s history rather than the later category of gender history, but such work performed the indispensable task of demonstrating that Mughal women were historical actors.

A second stage involved moving from visibility to agency. Here the work of Ellison Banks Findly has been particularly significant. Her studies of Maryam-uz-Zamānī and Nur Jahan demonstrated that Mughal imperial women could possess considerable economic resources and exercise substantial political and cultural influence. Her celebrated examination of the Portuguese seizure of Maryam-uz-Zamānī’s ship, the Rahīmī, revealed an imperial woman participating in the world of Indian Ocean commerce on a remarkable scale. Her Nur Jahan: Empress of Mughal India similarly explored Nur Jahan’s political authority, cultural patronage and position within Jahangir’s court.

Nur Jahan provides an especially fruitful subject for gender history. Her coins, farmāns, hunting, architectural patronage, control of access and participation in imperial politics are not simply evidence that an exceptional woman acquired power. They raise a larger question about how Mughal sovereignty itself was gendered. The older controversy surrounding the so-called “Nur Jahan junta”, involving Beni Prasad, Nurul Hasan and subsequently Irfan Habib’s critique of such formulations, can therefore be revisited from a gender perspective. The important issue is not merely whether a particular faction existed but why female political agency so easily became the explanatory centre of Jahangir’s later reign.

A major conceptual change came with Ruby Lal’s Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World. Lal challenged the conventional assumption that the haram represented an essentially private female sphere standing outside the public world of politics. The Mughal household was itself political. Marriage created alliances; women transmitted lineage; mothers and foster-mothers acquired influence; marriages and births affected succession; and senior women could mediate conflicts and distribute patronage. This becomes still more interesting when the early Mughal world is considered in relation to its Timurid inheritance. Timur and his descendants belonged to a profoundly peripatetic political culture. Courts moved, households moved and women moved with them. Babur’s world cannot easily be divided into a permanent male court and an architecturally segregated female haram. The increasing organisation and regulation of imperial domestic space under Akbar consequently needs to be understood historically rather than projected backwards upon Babur and Humayun. This has implications for architecture as well. The relationship between gender and space at Fathpur Sikri, Agra, Lahore and Shahjahanabad cannot simply be reduced to identifying “zenāna quarters”. We need to ask who could enter particular spaces, under what circumstances, what degrees of visibility existed, how movement was regulated, and how domestic, ceremonial and administrative spaces intersected. Architecture becomes a source for gender history.

Within Indian scholarship, Shadab Bano deserves particular attention because her work has systematically moved beyond the histories of famous imperial women towards the social structures governing gender relations. Her research on marriage and concubinage in the Mughal imperial family raises questions concerning sexuality, legitimacy, reproduction, status and bondage. Marriage and concubinage were not simply different forms of sexual relationship. They conferred different rights and statuses upon women and their offspring and consequently affected the organisation of the imperial household itself. Her work on women performers and prostitutes in medieval India moves still further away from elite domesticity. Performers, dancers, courtesans and prostitutes occupied complicated social positions. Their histories bring together sexuality, cultural accomplishment, entertainment, patronage, economic independence, social stigma and attempts at moral regulation. The boundaries separating the respectable woman, entertainer and prostitute were neither as obvious nor as stable as later moral categories might suggest. Bano’s studies of laws and norms governing women similarly draw attention to the relationship between normative prescription and actual social practice, while her research on eunuchs, slavery and bondage extends gender history into relations of dependency and unfreedom. Particularly suggestive is her exploration of masculine domesticity, because it questions one of the most persistent assumptions in older historical writing: that domestic space was intrinsically female while public space was intrinsically male. Her recent work on slavery and bondage in medieval North India further demonstrates that gender cannot be separated from status, class and coercion.

The work of Lubna Irfan carries some of these questions in particularly interesting directions. Her research on slavery, servitude, eunuchs, khwājasarās, women’s bodies and violence connects gender history with the histories of marginality and material space. The khwājasarā is particularly significant. Eunuchs occupied a position that destabilises simple assumptions concerning medieval gender. They could be slaves and yet exercise extraordinary authority. They were closely associated with the imperial household but could operate within the wider political world. They might control access to powerful individuals, manage property, perform administrative functions and exercise architectural patronage. Lubna Irfan’s work on the socio-spatial presence of eunuchs is therefore valuable because it uses buildings and material remains to recover people who are often only intermittently visible in chronicles. Her work on women’s bodies as sites of power, honour and violence raises another central question. Gendered violence is not simply violence happening to women. The female body could be made to carry the honour of a family, lineage or community. Control over sexuality, marriage and reproduction therefore became mechanisms through which wider structures of social authority were maintained.

Perhaps the most important conceptual advance after the recovery of women’s history was the realisation that men also have a gender history. Historians had long studied male rulers, nobles, warriors, scholars and saints without treating their maleness as historically significant. Women were gendered; men were simply historical actors. Rosalind O’Hanlon challenged this assumption. Her work on the Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad and particularly her influential study “Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal North India” opened masculinity as a field of historical investigation. Concepts such as javānmardī linked manliness to courage, generosity, loyalty, physical capacity, self-mastery and honour. But Mughal masculinity was not simply martial. O’Hanlon’s discussion of mirzāʾī points towards another masculine ideal: the cultivated gentleman, refined in behaviour, dress, conversation, literature and aesthetic appreciation. A man could therefore establish masculinity through mastery of the sword but also through mastery of manners. This suggests that there were multiple masculinities, not one medieval Indian masculinity. The emperor, mansabdār, Rajput warrior, Afghan chief, ʿālim, Sufi, merchant, artisan and peasant inhabited different social worlds and were subjected to different expectations of male conduct.

Ali Anooshahr has taken this analysis into the sphere of Mughal kingship, particularly in his study of Humayun and the gender roles of the warrior king. Kingship depended partly upon the ruler’s capacity to perform masculinity. Courage and cowardice, physical endurance and softness, maturity and childishness, self-discipline and indulgence could all function as political judgements. This provides a remarkably productive way of rereading the Bāburnāma. Babur repeatedly presents his body to the reader: marching through snow, swimming rivers, fighting, hunting, drinking, abstaining, becoming ill and recovering. But he also writes poetry, loves gardens, records friendships, expresses grief and speaks with extraordinary emotional openness. Rather than dismissing these features as picturesque autobiographical details, gender history can ask what they reveal about Timurid ideals of masculinity. Akbar offers another model. Elephant combats, hunting, physical courage and martial prowess coexist with paternal kingship and increasingly sacral conceptions of sovereignty. Jahangir constructs yet another masculine persona, combining connoisseurship, justice, hunting and intimate autobiography. Aurangzeb’s presentation of the ruler brings warrior kingship into a different relationship with Islamic piety, discipline and patriarchal authority. Masculinity was therefore continually being reconstructed.

Indrani Chatterjee’s work on slavery, household and dependency represents another important development. Gender determined forms of labour, servitude, marriage, sexuality and opportunities available to enslaved people. This approach also reminds us that the household should not be romanticised. It could be a site of affection and kinship but equally of hierarchy, labour, coercion and sexual vulnerability. There is also much to be gained from the documentary tradition of social and economic history. Irfan Habib’s work on women in the Braj region, using Mughal-period documents, is instructive because women appear not merely as subjects of normative discourse but as donors, sellers, property holders and participants in transactions. Such evidence can tell us about actual behaviour rather than simply ideals. The methodological distinction is crucial. The Fatāwā-i ʿĀlamgīrī, other juridical works, Brahmanical normative literature and moral texts can tell us what authorities thought should happen concerning marriage, mahr, divorce, inheritance, widowhood, sexuality and property. They cannot automatically tell us what happened in an Agra neighbourhood or Mathura village. Legal documents, petitions, property transactions, wills and disputes must therefore be placed alongside prescriptive literature.

Gender history also has considerable potential for the study of Sufism and Bhakti. Mirabai and other female devotional voices have naturally attracted attention, but gender history permits broader questions. Did renunciation allow women to escape some structures of patriarchal authority while placing them within others? How was the female saint represented differently from the male saint? How did celibacy, asceticism and control of sexuality contribute to the construction of religious masculinity? The Sufi khanqah, shrine and dargah similarly deserve gendered analysis. The Sufi shaykh embodied a form of spiritual and paternal authority different from that of the warrior or noble. The relationship between biological lineage and spiritual lineage, master and disciple, household and khanqah, and male and female access to sacred space provides a potentially rich field of investigation.

The newer historiography, surveyed usefully by Emma Kalb, has increasingly emphasised the need to move beyond both elite women and simple male-female binaries. Gender must be understood together with class, caste, religion, occupation, age and status. There was never a single entity called “the medieval Indian woman”. A Mughal princess controlling jāgīrs, a Rajput queen, Brahman widow, peasant woman, slave girl, wet nurse, courtesan, craftswoman and agricultural labourer occupied profoundly different social positions. Nor did patriarchy affect them in identical ways. Elite seclusion, for example, could itself be a marker of status. A peasant household dependent upon women’s agricultural labour could hardly reproduce the spatial practices of an imperial haram. The same qualification must be applied to men. Masculinity was profoundly conditioned by class. The aristocratic ideal of generosity presupposed wealth; martial masculinity required access to horses and weapons; literary refinement required education. The masculinity of the landless labourer could therefore not be identical to that of a Mughal mirzā.

Despite considerable advances, medieval Indian gender history remains heavily weighted towards courts, aristocracies and exceptional women. We know vastly more about Nur Jahan and Jahanara than about the women who spun cotton, worked in agricultural fields, sold goods, served elite households or accompanied armies. We know much more about imperial marriage than about marriage among artisans and peasants. Several fields therefore remain comparatively underdeveloped: fatherhood and motherhood, childhood, sexuality, same-sex relationships, emotional history, gendered labour, ageing, disability, dress, the body, domestic violence and everyday relationships between husbands and wives. The gender history of the battlefield and military camp also deserves attention. Armies were not exclusively communities of fighting men; they were moving societies containing servants, artisans, traders, families and women. Material culture offers another underused resource. Paintings can be examined not simply as illustrations of women and men but for bodily posture, clothing, gesture, proximity and the organisation of space. Architecture can reveal patterns of accessibility and segregation. Objects associated with dress, cosmetics, weapons, writing and religious practice can illuminate how gender was physically performed.

The historiography has thus travelled a considerable distance: from recovering women, represented by Rekha Misra; through the exploration of female agency and political power, exemplified by Findly; to household, domesticity and sovereignty in Ruby Lal; marriage, sexuality, prostitution, slavery and social relations in Shadab Bano; eunuchs, bodies and gendered space in Lubna Irfan; masculinity in Rosalind O’Hanlon; warrior kingship in Ali Anooshahr; and slavery, household and dependency in Indrani Chatterjee. The documentary social-history tradition represented by Irfan Habib provides another essential route towards recovering gender relations outside normative texts.

The question with which we began therefore needs reformulation. Asking “What was the position of women in medieval India?” is no longer sufficient. Indeed, the question assumes that “women” constituted a single historical category possessing one identifiable “position”. Gender history asks something much more demanding: how did medieval Indian societies produce women and men as gendered beings, how were femininities and masculinities constructed, and how did those constructions interact with class, caste, religion, sexuality, labour and political power? Once the question is framed in this manner, gender ceases to be a specialised corner of medieval Indian history. It enters virtually every major field. Kingship was gendered; sovereignty was gendered; the household was gendered; labour was gendered; property and inheritance were gendered; religious authority was gendered; warfare was gendered; architecture and space were gendered; even ideas of courage, honour, refinement, piety and self-control were gendered. The history of gender, properly conceived, is therefore not simply about inserting women into an already existing history of medieval India. It requires us to reconsider how that society itself was organised and how power was imagined, exercised and experienced.

Select Bibliography and Essential Readings:

  1. Anooshahr, Ali. ‘The King Who Would Be Man: The Gender Roles of the Warrior King in Early Mughal History’. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3rd series, vol. 18, no. 3 (2008), pp. 327–340.
  2. Bano, Shadab. ‘Marriage and Concubinage in the Mughal Imperial Family’. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 60 (1999), pp. 353–362.
  3. Bano, Shadab. ‘Women Performers and Prostitutes in Medieval India’. Studies in History, vol. 27, no. 1 (2011), pp. 41–53.
  4. Chatterjee, Indrani. Gender, Slavery and Law in Colonial India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
  5. Findly, Ellison Banks. Nur Jahan: Empress of Mughal India. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
  6. Findly, Ellison Banks. ‘The Capture of Maryam-uz-Zamānī’s Ship: Mughal Women and European Traders’. Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 108, no. 2 (1988), pp. 227–238.
  7. Irfan, Lubna. ‘Nature of Slavery and Servitude in Mughal India’. South Asian History and Culture, vol. 13, no. 4 (2022), pp. 466–480.
  8. Irfan, Lubna. ‘Leaving a Lineage in Stone: Eunuchs in Socio-Spatial Setup of Mughal India’. In Sutapa Dutta and Shivangini Tandon (eds), Making the ‘Woman’: Discourses of Gender in 18th–19th Century India. Abingdon: Routledge, 2024, pp. 153–166.
  9. Kalb, Emma. ‘Framing Gender in Mughal South Asia’. History Compass, vol. 19, no. 11 (2021), article e12691.
  10. Lal, Ruby. Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  11. Misra, Rekha. Women in Mughal India, 1526–1748 A.D. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967.
  12. Moosvi, Shireen. ‘Work and Gender in Mughal India’. In People, Taxation and Trade in Mughal India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 135–158.
  13. O’Hanlon, Rosalind. ‘Issues of Masculinity in North Indian History: The Bangash Nawabs of Farrukhabad’. Indian Journal of Gender Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (1997).
  14. O’Hanlon, Rosalind. ‘Manliness and Imperial Service in Mughal North India’. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 42, no. 1 (1999), pp. 47–93.
  15. O’Hanlon, Rosalind. ‘Kingdom, Household and Body: History, Gender and Imperial Service under Akbar’. Modern Asian Studies, vol. 41, no. 5 (2007), pp. 889–923.
  16. Orr, Leslie C. Donors, Devotees, and Daughters of God: Temple Women in Medieval Tamilnadu. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
  17. Scott, Joan Wallach. ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’. The American Historical Review, vol. 91, no. 5 (1986), pp. 1053–1075.

Hazards of Firing the Crackers: When the Festival of Lights Becomes a Festival of Smoke

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

In two previous blogs, we discussed the history of the festival of lights, and the introduction of pyrotechnics in India. Today we come to more contemporary times.

Today Diwali, the festival of lights, has acquired another distinction. It is now also a festival of noise, smoke, sleepless nights and breathlessness. What was once associated with the triumph of light over darkness has, in many neighbourhoods, become a competition to determine who can produce the loudest explosion and the greatest discomfort to his neighbours.

One wonders what Lord Rama would have thought of this development. According to tradition, Ayodhya celebrated his return with lamps and rejoicing. There is no mention of citizens assembling outside their neighbours’ houses at midnight to detonate explosives, nor can one imagine Hanuman arriving with a sack of crackers and insisting that the festivities would remain incomplete without a few deafening explosions. Somewhere along the way, the diya has been overshadowed by the bomb, and illumination has surrendered to detonation.

The problem, of course, is not Diwali. It is what we have increasingly chosen to do in its name. We burst crackers as children too. They were never entirely harmless, but today the enthusiasm for increasingly powerful explosives has acquired an additional dimension. For some, the louder the explosion, the greater the devotion; a quiet Diwali is almost an admission of insufficient religious commitment. Should someone complain, the response is immediate: “Why are you attacking our religion?” Apparently, the Almighty has become extraordinarily sensitive to the absence of gunpowder.

The consequences are considerably less amusing. Firecrackers release fine particulate matter, toxic gases and metallic compounds. Their smoke aggravates respiratory and cardiac conditions, particularly among children and the elderly. Then there are burns, injuries, accidental fires and the distress caused to animals by sudden explosions. Dogs disappear under beds, birds flee in panic, and infants are introduced rather abruptly to the sounds of warfare. All this is described as celebration.

Delhi provides perhaps the most spectacular illustration of this annual absurdity. Every winter, the capital descends into a poisonous haze. The air deteriorates, hospitals see more respiratory complaints, and the government discovers, with remarkable regularity, that pollution is a serious problem. Then comes Diwali, and everyone suddenly discovers the neighbour. He has burst crackers, polluted the atmosphere, endangered children and possibly contributed to the decline of civilisation. Social media erupts with accusations and photographs of smoke-filled streets. Meanwhile, the government can sit back, sip its tea and watch the public quarrel.

This is politically convenient. The more exclusively we blame Diwali, the easier it becomes to overlook the structural causes of Delhi’s pollution. Vehicular emissions, industrial activity, construction dust, waste burning, agricultural fires and winter weather all contribute to a crisis that begins well before the festival and continues long afterwards. Firecrackers make an already dangerous situation considerably worse, but they do not explain why Delhi’s atmosphere is unhealthy for so much of the year.

This year’s Diwali provided a particularly disturbing illustration. As crackers exploded across the capital, concentrations of fine particulate matter rose to extraordinary levels. At some monitoring locations, reported PM2.5 concentrations ran into thousands of micrograms per cubic metre. These were pollutant concentrations rather than AQI readings, but they were alarming enough. And just when the public most desperately needed reliable information, something curious happened. Numerous air-quality monitoring stations stopped reporting readings during the worst hours of the night. Reports indicated that 29 of Delhi’s 59 stations were not reporting data at midnight, rising to 36 by 1 a.m. Investigations also highlighted missing particulate readings and discrepancies between public displays and official dashboards. The pollution was rising, but the figures were disappearing.

There were allegations of manipulation, including claims that water was being sprayed near monitoring stations to influence readings. Whether these accusations are true requires independent investigation, for technical failures and deliberate concealment are not the same thing. But the government owes the public an explanation for why crucial information became unavailable precisely when it was most needed. One is reminded of a doctor discovering that his patient’s temperature has reached 105 degrees and promptly hiding the thermometer. The fever, unfortunately, remains unimpressed.

And this brings us to the larger failure. Delhi’s pollution crisis did not arrive with the first Diwali cracker. It has developed over decades, while successive governments have offered promises, programmes, committees and emergency measures. Every winter brings fresh restrictions, inspections and assurances. Roads are sprinkled with water, dust is temporarily suppressed, and press conferences inform us that the situation is being closely monitored. The National Clean Air Programme and related initiatives have yet to deliver the transformation citizens need. The contrast with Delhi’s earlier transition towards CNG-based public transport is instructive. Undertaken following judicial directions and implemented during Sheila Dikshit’s government, it demonstrated that sustained administrative action could reduce important categories of vehicular pollution. It was not a complete solution, but it was a structural intervention rather than another seasonal announcement.

Today, after more than a decade of the Modi government at the Centre, Delhi continues to struggle for breathable air. Responsibility is shared by governments at the Centre, in Delhi and in neighbouring states, but the Centre cannot escape accountability for a national public-health crisis, nor can politicians endlessly blame one another while citizens are left coughing in the smog. Yet government failure cannot become an excuse for individual irresponsibility. Consider a patient suffering from advanced lung disease who insists on smoking another packet of cigarettes. The additional cigarettes will undoubtedly worsen his condition. But imagine a hospital that has neglected his treatment for years and now announces that its entire medical strategy consists of confiscating the packet. The patient needs to stop smoking; equally, the hospital needs to start treating him. Our governments have become rather accomplished at confiscating the packet.

This brings us to another annual ritual. Whenever the harmful effects of crackers are discussed, someone inevitably asks: “What about Bakrid? Why don’t you complain about animal sacrifice?” The question is usually presented as a devastating argument. In reality, it often serves to change the subject. Animal sacrifice and firecrackers raise different ethical questions. The former concerns animal welfare, religious practice and food consumption; the latter concerns the release of smoke, noise and harmful substances into a shared environment. Both practices can legitimately be questioned, and neither deserves immunity merely because religion is involved. And even if, for the sake of argument, animal sacrifice is as objectionable as its critics make it out to be, how does that justify another harmful practice? One vice cannot become a virtue merely because another vice exists. Two wrongs do not make a right, however loudly one chooses to celebrate them, so please spare us the whataboutery. It neither purifies the air nor strengthens the argument.

There is, of course, a broader philosophical question about the taking of life. Human existence depends upon other forms of life, whether animals, plants or microorganisms. Plants respond to injury and environmental threats, although this does not establish that they experience pain as animals do. But whatever one’s views on food, sacrifice or the ethics of living creatures, none of these questions justifies filling the neighbourhood with smoke. The central issue with crackers is that their effects are imposed upon people who have made no choice to participate. A person may decide what food to eat or whether to attend a religious ceremony, but a child suffering from asthma cannot choose not to breathe the smoke entering his bedroom, nor can an elderly cardiac patient opt out of the atmosphere surrounding his house. Air, unfortunately, cannot be reserved for private use.

And here lies perhaps the most disturbing development. For some people, bursting crackers has ceased to be merely an expression of festivity. It has become an assertion of identity, a demonstration of defiance and, occasionally, an exercise in intimidation: “I will burst crackers because nobody can stop me!” One wonders whether this expresses religious devotion or merely an adolescent dislike of being told what to do. Religion surely deserves a more dignified defence than the right to disturb a sleeping infant.

Nor are the hazards of firecrackers peculiar to Delhi. Smoke does not acquire toxic properties only after entering Ghaziabad or Noida. A cracker is not harmless in Lucknow, Jaipur or Mumbai and suddenly dangerous upon crossing the Delhi border. The same principles apply to fireworks in London, New York and elsewhere. If firecrackers pose risks to health, public awareness must be national rather than selectively seasonal. Education, sensible regulation and encouragement of safer celebrations should become part of a sustained effort to reduce unnecessary harm.

None of this requires abandoning Diwali. Homes illuminated with lamps, streets decorated with lights, families exchanging sweets and communities coming together can preserve the beauty of the occasion without making breathing a hazardous occupation. Unfortunately, our public discussions increasingly turn every practical problem into a contest of religious loyalties. A suggestion to reduce firecrackers becomes an attack on Hinduism; a discussion of animal welfare becomes an attack on Islam. Environmental concerns are interpreted through communal identities while the actual problems remain unresolved. Politicians benefit, television studios acquire another evening of shouting, social media warriors collect their applause, and ordinary citizens continue to inhale the consequences.

Perhaps the time has come to recover a little common sense. Governments must be held accountable for long-term air pollution through effective transport policies, industrial regulation, construction controls, waste management and regional coordination. Citizens, in turn, must recognise that government failure does not entitle them to worsen the situation. A polluted city does not become less polluted because the smoke has been produced in the name of faith.

Diwali is, after all, a celebration of light, hope and renewal. Its beauty lies in the warmth of lamps, the gathering of families and the symbolic triumph of knowledge over ignorance. Surely these are values worth preserving. We might even discover that a festival can be joyous without making the neighbourhood resemble a battlefield, and that children can enjoy Diwali without being introduced prematurely to the services of a pulmonologist. Until then, the annual spectacle will continue. Citizens will burst crackers, neighbours will curse them, politicians will issue statements, and the government will assure us that everything is under control. The following morning, everyone will look towards the sky and wonder why it has disappeared.

And if Lord Rama were to return to Ayodhya today, perhaps his first request would not be for a throne, a palace or a grand welcome. It might simply be for a good-quality air purifier. As for the government, perhaps it would reassure him that the pollution-monitoring display has been switched off.

The instinct to dress up harmful traditions as ancient wisdom, however, is not confined to the laity. This past week, West Bengal BJP MLA Papiya Adhikari informed a Kali Puja gathering that bursting firecrackers could cure several diseases, a claim she later attributed to an old saying from our ancestors. When the inevitable ridicule followed, she clarified that she had meant lamps and rituals, acknowledged that science has advanced somewhat since the era of grandmotherly germ theory, apologised to anyone hurt, and declared the remark retracted . One admires the speed of the withdrawal. One merely notes that the original sentiment, voiced at a festival already choking the city, suggests the message has not quite travelled from the podium to the pulmonology ward. The ancestors, one suspects, would have prescribed a diya and a quiet evening, not a course of antibiotics administered by explosion.‌‌

From China to India: The Origins of Pyrotechny and the Role of Muslims in its Transmission and Development

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Today let us discuss the history of pyrotechny which is, in many ways, a history of the movement of knowledge across civilisations. Few technologies illustrate this process as clearly as gunpowder and the various devices that came to be associated with it. What began as experiments with combustible substances in China gradually travelled across Central Asia and the Islamic world before reaching India, where it acquired military, ceremonial and eventually popular applications. Fireworks, rockets, incendiary devices and firearms were all products of this long process of experimentation and adaptation. Their history cannot be attributed to any one people or civilisation, although the contribution of each can be identified at different stages of their development.

The role of Muslims in the introduction and spread of pyrotechny in India was particularly significant. Yet this contribution can only be properly understood if we recognise that the original discovery of gunpowder took place in China. Muslim military specialists, merchants, scholars and artisans were among those who helped transmit and develop the technology as it travelled westwards and southwards. In India, the courts of the Delhi Sultans and, subsequently, the Mughals provided important settings for its adoption and refinement. Over time, however, pyrotechny moved beyond the confines of royal establishments and became part of the cultural practices of different communities.

The researches of P. K. Gode, Iqtidar Alam Khan and Irfan Habib are particularly useful in reconstructing this history. While Khan has examined the introduction and development of gunpowder weapons in medieval India, Gode’s pioneering studies drew attention to references to fireworks in Sanskrit and Marathi literature, demonstrating how widely the technology had spread beyond military establishments. Their work helps us understand not merely when pyrotechny reached India, but also how it became part of Indian society.

The story begins in China, where the earliest known formulations of gunpowder emerged from experiments undertaken by alchemists associated with Daoist traditions. Their immediate concerns were quite different from those of later military engineers. They were interested in medicinal preparations and in substances believed to prolong life or possess extraordinary powers. In the course of these experiments, they discovered that certain combinations of saltpetre, sulphur and other combustible materials could produce intense flames and violent reactions.

By the ninth century, Chinese writings were already warning against the dangers of such preparations. The Zhenyuan miaodao yaolüe, generally associated with this period, refers to mixtures that could cause serious fires and injuries. These observations suggest that Chinese alchemists had begun to recognise the properties of substances that would eventually form the basis of gunpowder. It was an extraordinary development, even if those responsible for the early experiments could scarcely have anticipated its future consequences.

During the Song dynasty, this knowledge began to acquire military applications. The Wujing zongyao, a military compendium completed in 1044, contains formulations for incendiary and explosive preparations. It provides some of the earliest surviving evidence of the deliberate use of gunpowder in warfare. Chinese military specialists experimented with fire arrows, incendiary bombs and devices capable of producing flames, smoke and explosions. These were not yet firearms in the modern sense, but they represented important stages in the development of gunpowder technology.

Over the following centuries, Chinese engineers devised increasingly sophisticated weapons. The fire lance, initially a tube through which flames and combustible substances were projected, gradually developed into a weapon capable of discharging solid projectiles. Improvements in gunpowder compositions and in the manufacture of suitable barrels eventually led to the appearance of early guns. By the thirteenth century, China had developed a range of gunpowder weapons that would profoundly influence military technology elsewhere.

It is important to emphasise this Chinese origin because the history of gunpowder is sometimes confused with the history of firearms in particular regions. The fact that cannon or muskets appeared relatively late in India does not mean that gunpowder itself was unknown before their arrival. Nor should the use of incendiary substances in ancient warfare be treated as evidence of gunpowder. These distinctions are essential if we are to reconstruct the chronology of pyrotechny with any degree of accuracy.

The movement of this technology beyond China was facilitated by the extensive networks of communication that connected East Asia with Central and western Asia. The routes along which silk, porcelain, horses and other commodities travelled also carried technical knowledge, medicinal substances and skilled craftsmen. The Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century accelerated these exchanges. Their armies drew upon engineers and military specialists from different regions, including China, and the movement of such personnel helped spread knowledge of gunpowder-based devices across Asia.

The Islamic world was already familiar with several forms of incendiary warfare. Muslim armies had long employed preparations generally described as naft, a term commonly associated with petroleum and other inflammable substances. Specialists known as naffāṭūn were trained in their manufacture and use, particularly during sieges and attacks upon fortified positions. Such preparations could be extremely destructive, but they should not be confused with gunpowder. The distinction is important because early Arabic and Persian references to fire weapons do not necessarily indicate knowledge of saltpetre-based explosive compositions.

By the thirteenth century, however, Muslim military specialists had begun to record more sophisticated pyrotechnic preparations. An important figure in this development was Ḥasan al-Rammāḥ, whose treatise on military technology discusses incendiary mixtures, rockets and other devices. His writings reveal that saltpetre-based compositions had become part of the technical knowledge available in the Islamic world. They also indicate that this knowledge was being adapted to existing military practices rather than merely reproduced in the form in which it had arrived.

The contribution of Muslim military specialists therefore lay partly in the adaptation and practical application of techniques acquired through wider Asian contacts. The Islamic world possessed established traditions of military engineering, chemical experimentation and specialised craftsmanship. New knowledge could be incorporated into these traditions and transmitted further through the movement of soldiers, artisans and merchants.

India was closely connected with these developments. The establishment of the Delhi Sultanate strengthened its links with Central Asia and the Persianate world. Soldiers, administrators, scholars, merchants and craftsmen moved between these regions and the subcontinent. The Mongol invasions, despite the destruction they caused, also encouraged the migration of refugees and specialists into India. Such movements created opportunities for the introduction of new technologies, including pyrotechnic devices.

Iqtidar Alam Khan’s researches have been particularly important in establishing the chronology of these developments. In his Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India, he argued that gunpowder probably reached northern India during the later thirteenth century, largely through contacts with the Mongols. He also demonstrated that the early appearance of pyrotechnic devices must be distinguished from the later introduction of cannon and muskets. This distinction is fundamental, for it places the history of gunpowder in India well before the establishment of Mughal power.

One of the earliest references suggesting familiarity with pyrotechnic devices occurs in the writings of Amir Khusrau. In a poem composed in praise of Jalaluddin Firuz Khalji, who ruled between 1290 and 1296, Khusrau refers to a hawā’ī, generally interpreted as a rocket or a device propelled through the air. Khan regarded this passage as significant evidence for the presence of pyrotechnic knowledge in northern India towards the end of the thirteenth century. Since the reference occurs in a poetic composition, however, its precise technical meaning remains uncertain. It is best treated as an indication of familiarity with such devices rather than as a detailed description of a particular weapon.

More substantial evidence becomes available during the reign of Firuz Shah Tughluq (1351–1388). Shams-i Siraj Afif, in his Tārīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī, describes the use of fireworks during the celebrations of Shab-i Barāt. His account refers to devices that produced spectacular effects, including the scattering of flowers and fragrant substances. The description suggests that pyrotechnic entertainment had become part of the ceremonial life of the Delhi court.

This is an important development. It indicates that the knowledge of combustible preparations was not confined to warfare. The Sultanate court provided patronage to craftsmen capable of manufacturing and displaying fireworks, and such entertainments became associated with royal magnificence and public celebration. The Persian term ātishbāzī, literally suggesting the playing of fire, eventually became a familiar expression for fireworks in India.

The movement from military technology to ceremonial entertainment was probably not as abrupt as it might appear. The preparation of rockets and incendiary devices required knowledge that could also be employed in the manufacture of fireworks. Craftsmen could adapt their techniques to produce different effects, whether flames, sparks, smoke or explosive sounds. Pyrotechny was therefore a field in which military and recreational applications could develop alongside one another.

The researches of P. K. Gode provide a particularly valuable insight into the subsequent history of fireworks in India. In his study The History of Fireworks in India between A.D. 1400 and 1900, first published in 1953, and in related essays on gunpowder and firearms, Gode assembled evidence from Sanskrit and Marathi literature, travellers’ accounts and historical chronicles. His contribution was to show that fireworks gradually became familiar in different regions of India and were incorporated into royal ceremonies, weddings and religious celebrations. His findings complement those of Iqtidar Alam Khan, whose principal concern was the development of military technology.

Gode was also interested in the Chinese antecedents of pyrotechny. He examined the possibility that Chinese techniques had reached India through different routes and were subsequently modified by Indian craftsmen. He suggested that some Chinese pyrotechnic formulations may have reached India around the beginning of the fifteenth century. This should not be understood as establishing the first arrival of gunpowder in the subcontinent, since the evidence from the Delhi Sultanate points towards an earlier acquaintance with pyrotechnic devices. Rather, it raises the possibility that different forms of technical knowledge continued to arrive and circulate over several centuries.

One of the important accounts discussed by Gode is that of Abd al-Razzaq Samarqandi, the Persian ambassador who visited Vijayanagara in 1443 during the reign of Devaraya II. Describing the magnificent Mahanavami celebrations, Abd al-Razzaq referred to elaborate fireworks and other pyrotechnic entertainments. His observations indicate that by the middle of the fifteenth century, fireworks had become part of the ceremonial culture of one of the most powerful Hindu kingdoms of southern India.

The significance of this account extends beyond the spectacle itself. It demonstrates how a technology that had travelled through international networks could be adopted by societies with different political and religious traditions. Fireworks were not regarded as belonging exclusively to the communities through which they had been transmitted. They were valued for the splendour they added to royal celebrations and for the technical skill displayed by the craftsmen who produced them.

Gode also examined the Kautukacintāmaṇi, associated with the court of Gajapati Prataparudradeva of Odisha in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This Sanskrit work contains descriptions of pyrotechnic preparations and provides evidence that the manufacture of fireworks had become a subject of technical knowledge recorded in an Indian literary tradition. Its importance lies in showing that pyrotechny was no longer confined to the Persianate world of military and courtly specialists. It had entered Sanskrit technical literature and was being adapted to local requirements.

Another source discussed by Gode was the Ākāśabhairavakalpa, a Sanskrit text preserved in manuscript form at Thanjavur. It contains references to firearms and to arrangements for pyrotechnic displays organised before kings. Gode drew attention to descriptions of structures apparently intended for launching rockets or bāṇas, which produced spectacular effects. Such references suggest that fireworks had become an elaborate form of courtly entertainment, requiring specialised knowledge and careful preparation. The precise dating of this material, however, requires caution, since the age of a manuscript or its individual passages cannot always be established with certainty.

Evidence from Gujarat further illustrates the spread of fireworks beyond royal establishments. The Portuguese traveller Duarte Barbosa, writing in the early sixteenth century, described the use of fireworks during a Brahmin wedding. His account refers to rockets and explosive devices employed as part of the festivities. This suggests that pyrotechnic entertainments were becoming available to prosperous sections of urban society and were no longer restricted to the courts of rulers.

Gode’s examination of Marathi literature adds another dimension to this history. In Eknath’s Rukmini Svayamvara, composed during the sixteenth century, fireworks appear in the description of the marriage of Krishna and Rukmini. Such references are particularly revealing because they introduce practices familiar to contemporary audiences into narratives of a mythological past. Their presence suggests that fireworks had become sufficiently well known in western India to be employed as recognisable elements of festive celebration.

References in the writings associated with Ramdas during the seventeenth century similarly suggest that pyrotechnic entertainments were becoming familiar in regional cultural traditions. These literary sources do not necessarily provide detailed information about the manufacture of fireworks, but they are valuable evidence of their place in the social imagination of the period.

The development of gunpowder technology in India was, meanwhile, proceeding along military lines. The Deccan kingdoms maintained extensive commercial and political connections with Iran, the Persian Gulf and other parts of western Asia. These contacts facilitated the movement of military specialists and technical knowledge. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gunpowder weapons were becoming increasingly important in the military establishments of the Bahmani kingdom and its successor states.

The establishment of Mughal power in northern India marked another significant stage. Babur’s victory over Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in 1526 demonstrated the effectiveness of combining field artillery and matchlockmen with carefully organised defensive positions. His artillery specialists, Ustad Ali Quli and Mustafa Rumi, brought expertise associated with the Ottoman military tradition.

It would, however, be misleading to suggest that Babur introduced gunpowder or firearms into India. Both were already known in different parts of the subcontinent. Duarte Barbosa and Garcia da Orta mention this in their respective accounts, as does Mirāt e Sikandari. His achievement lay in their systematic organisation and effective employment within a coordinated military strategy. Panipat demonstrated the potential of gunpowder weapons when combined with appropriate tactics, rather than marking their first appearance in India.

Under Akbar, the manufacture of firearms and artillery became an important concern of the imperial establishment. Abu’l Fazl’s Ā’īn-i Akbarī provides descriptions of the imperial workshops and the attention devoted to the production of weapons. The Mughal court employed skilled metalworkers, carpenters and other specialists whose expertise contributed to improvements in military equipment.

The production of gunpowder also had important economic implications. India possessed considerable resources of saltpetre, particularly in the Gangetic plains, and its extraction and refinement became important occupations. The manufacture of firearms and fireworks created demand for raw materials, specialised labour and technical knowledge. These activities formed part of the wider world of crafts and professions in Mughal India, connecting military requirements with artisanal production and commercial networks.

At the same time, fireworks continued to occupy an important place in courtly celebrations. Mughal weddings, royal festivities and other ceremonial occasions were frequently accompanied by illuminations and spectacular displays. The marriage celebrations of Prince Dara Shikoh in 1633, for example, were associated with elaborate festivities, while Mughal and later Indian paintings provide visual evidence of fireworks as an element of courtly entertainment.

The Deccan courts were equally enthusiastic patrons of such displays. Accounts of celebrations under Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur refer to lavish expenditure upon fireworks. These spectacles were not merely diversions. They formed part of the visual expression of kingship, intended to impress spectators and demonstrate the wealth and magnificence of the ruler.

The growing popularity of fireworks also encouraged specialised craftsmanship. Their manufacture required practical familiarity with combustible materials, their preparation and the techniques necessary to produce different effects. Such knowledge was often transmitted through apprenticeship and experience, sometimes within families and occupational communities. Fireworks thus became part of the expanding artisanal economy of Indian towns.

The association of fireworks with Diwali is particularly interesting in this context. The festival itself, with its emphasis upon lamps and illumination, is much older than the discovery of gunpowder. Firecrackers and other pyrotechnic devices were later additions. It would therefore be historically inaccurate to assume that fireworks had always formed part of Diwali celebrations.

Gode’s research helps trace this gradual development. He drew attention to descriptions in later Marathi historical literature, including the Peshwayanchi Bakhar, which refers to elaborate Diwali celebrations at Kota involving large numbers of lamps and displays of fireworks. By the eighteenth century, pyrotechnic entertainment had become an established feature of Diwali celebrations in at least some royal and urban settings.

This development illustrates how an existing religious festival could absorb new forms of entertainment without losing its older significance. Fireworks did not create Diwali, nor did they determine its religious meaning. They added a new dimension of spectacle to celebrations already associated with light, prosperity and rejoicing. A technology whose earliest known origins lay in Chinese alchemy had, through centuries of transmission and adaptation, become part of Indian festive culture.

The later history of military rockets provides another striking example of indigenous innovation. During the eighteenth century, Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore employed iron-cased rockets with considerable effectiveness against British forces. Their construction represented an important technological improvement, since the iron casing enabled greater pressure to develop during combustion. The British subsequently studied captured Mysorean rockets, and these contributed to the development of the Congreve rocket in the early nineteenth century.

This episode reminds us that technological knowledge did not always travel in one direction. India was not merely a recipient of techniques developed elsewhere. Indian military specialists could modify existing technologies and produce innovations that subsequently influenced developments in Europe.

The combined researches of P. K. Gode, Iqtidar Alam Khan and Irfan Habib help us appreciate the complexity of this history. Khan’s work establishes the importance of the Mongol and Islamic worlds in the transmission of gunpowder and clarifies the chronology of its military applications. Gode demonstrates how pyrotechnic knowledge gradually entered Sanskrit technical literature, Marathi poetry, royal ceremonies, weddings and religious festivals. Habib’s work places these developments within the broader history of technological change in medieval India and reminds us that different routes of transmission, including maritime connections with China, must also be considered.

The contribution of Muslims to the introduction and development of pyrotechny in India was therefore substantial, but it was neither exclusive nor confined to warfare. The Delhi Sultanate provided an early setting for the employment of pyrotechnic devices, while Muslim military specialists and artisans helped transmit and adapt technical knowledge acquired through wider Asian contacts. The courts of the Sultans and Mughals provided patronage that encouraged the manufacture and use of gunpowder weapons and fireworks.

At the same time, the evidence from Vijayanagara, Odisha, Gujarat and Maharashtra demonstrates that the technology was adopted and developed by different communities. Once introduced, it crossed religious and political boundaries, acquiring new applications in courtly entertainment, weddings and festivals. The craftsmen who manufactured fireworks belonged to a world in which practical knowledge could circulate independently of the religious identities of rulers and patrons.

The history of pyrotechny thus offers a useful corrective to attempts to explain technological developments through narrowly religious or national narratives. The Chinese discovery of gunpowder provided the essential foundation. Mongol and Islamic networks facilitated its transmission across Asia, while Indian rulers, military specialists and artisans contributed to its subsequent development. The technology was repeatedly adapted to different circumstances, acquiring meanings that its earliest inventors could scarcely have imagined.

What began as experiments with combustible substances in China eventually reached the courts and battlefields of medieval India and became a familiar element of the country’s festive culture. The history of pyrotechny is therefore not simply a story of invention or technological diffusion. It illustrates the wider process through which societies exchange knowledge, adapt techniques and incorporate new practices into their own traditions. In that sense, the role of Muslims in its transmission to India forms an important chapter in a much larger history of cultural interaction and shared technological achievement.

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources

Abu’l Fazl, Ā’īn-i Akbarī, Persian text and English translation by H. Blochmann and H. S. Jarrett.

Abd al-Razzaq Samarqandi, Maṭlaʿ al-Saʿdayn wa-Majmaʿ al-Baḥrayn, Persian text, various editions.

Amir Khusrau, poems composed during the reign of Jalaluddin Firuz Khalji.

Babur, Bāburnāma, translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge, London, 1922.

Barbosa, Duarte, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, translated by Mansel Longworth Dames, London: Hakluyt Society, 1918–1921.

Shams-i Siraj Afif, Tārīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī, Persian text, various editions.

Secondary Works

Gode, P. K., The History of Fireworks in India between A.D. 1400 and 1900. Bangalore: Indian Institute of Culture, 1953.

Gode, P. K., Studies in Indian Cultural History, vol. II. Poona: Professor P. K. Gode Collected Works Publication Committee, 1960. Particularly relevant are his essays on the use of guns and gunpowder, the manufacture of firearms and the history of fireworks in India.

Habib, Irfan, Medieval Indian Technology. Aligarh: Aligarh Historians Society, 2008.

Khan, Iqtidar Alam, ‘Origin and Development of Gunpowder Technology in India: A.D. 1250–1500’. Indian Historical Review, vol. 4 (1977–78).

Khan, Iqtidar Alam, ‘The Coming of Gunpowder to the Islamic World and North India: Spotlight on the Role of the Mongols’. Journal of Asian History, vol. 30 (1996).

Khan, Iqtidar Alam, Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Needham, Joseph, et al., Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 7, Military Technology: The Gunpowder Epic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Partington, J. R., A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1960.

Diwali under the Mughals: The Festival of Lights in Imperial and Popular Culture

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

The celebration of Diwāli under the Mughal emperors offers a revealing glimpse into the cultural history of medieval India. Although the Mughals were Muslims, their court remained closely connected to the religious and social traditions of the people they ruled. Hindu festivals, particularly Holi, Diwali, Basant and Raksha Bandhan, became familiar features of the imperial cultural environment. Their observance reflected the interaction between the ruling elite and wider society, though the degree of imperial participation varied from one reign to another.

Diwali, with its associations of light, prosperity and renewal, occupied a distinctive position among these festivals. Its celebration was not confined to religious rituals. It was also an important social and commercial occasion, particularly among merchants, bankers and other urban communities. At the Mughal court, the festival became associated with illuminations, festive gatherings and, in later periods, fireworks. Its history therefore reveals how a festival rooted in Hindu religious tradition became part of the broader cultural life of Mughal India.

The reign of Akbar (1556–1605) marked an important stage in the accommodation of Indian festivals within imperial culture. His policy of ṣulḥ-i kul, or universal peace, encouraged an atmosphere in which the customs of different religious communities could receive recognition at court. Abu’l Fazl, in the Ā’īn-i Akbarī and Akbarnāma, describes Akbar’s interest in Indian religious practices, auspicious occasions and the symbolism of light. His reverence for the sun and fire as manifestations of divine illumination is particularly significant in understanding the cultural environment in which festivals associated with light could acquire an imperial presence.

Harbans Mukhia, in The Mughals of India (2004), has emphasised the importance of cultural accommodation in the development of Mughal kingship. Akbar’s willingness to engage with the traditions of his subjects was closely connected with his conception of sovereignty. The recognition of festivals such as Diwali formed part of this larger process, although the precise arrangements for its celebration during Akbar’s reign are not described in sufficient detail to reconstruct the festivities with certainty.

Under Jahangir (1605–1627), Diwali continued to be recognised at the imperial court. His memoirs, the Jahāngīrnāma, contain references to the festival and its association with the commercial communities of India. Jahangir was familiar with the practice of merchants settling accounts and commencing new financial transactions on this auspicious occasion. He also referred to the custom of gambling during Diwali, which was regarded by some participants as a means of inviting good fortune.

These observations are important because they demonstrate that Diwali was not merely a religious celebration. It was also closely connected with the commercial calendar of Mughal India. In cities such as Agra, Lahore, Ahmedabad, Surat and Delhi, merchants and bankers marked the occasion by opening new account books, worshipping Lakshmi and seeking prosperity for the coming year. Irfan Habib’s studies of the Mughal economy and Shireen Moosvi’s work on its commercial and financial structure provide a useful background to understanding the importance of these communities. The festival’s association with commercial renewal helped ensure its continued observance irrespective of changes in imperial policy.

During the reign of Shah Jahan (1628–1658), Diwali became associated with the elaborate culture of illuminations and festivities that characterised the Mughal court. The palaces and courtyards of the imperial establishment provided impressive settings for ceremonial displays. Lamps, candles and fireworks were already familiar features of Mughal celebrations, and Diwali offered a particularly appropriate occasion for such illuminations.

The construction of Shahjahanabad and the Red Fort created a magnificent architectural setting for royal festivities. Later accounts associate Diwali with the lighting of palace buildings and public spaces, although it is necessary to distinguish these recollections from contemporary evidence specifically relating to Shah Jahan’s reign. Ebba Koch, in Mughal Art and Imperial Ideology (2001), has demonstrated the importance of architecture and ceremonial display in the representation of Mughal sovereignty. Her observations help explain the significance of the illuminated palace as a setting for imperial celebration, even though her work does not specifically document Diwali festivities.

The Mughal imperial household also played an important part in the ceremonial life of the court. Ruby Lal, in Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World (2005), has shown that the domestic establishment of the Mughal dynasty was closely connected with its political and cultural activities. Her work too offers a useful perspective from which to consider the participation of women and other members of the imperial household in courtly celebrations. The presence of women holding sparklers and participating in festive gatherings in Mughal paintings suggests the importance of such occasions within elite domestic culture. These images, however, cannot invariably be identified as depictions of Diwali, since fireworks were also used during other celebrations.

Under Aurangzeb (1658–1707), the official attitude towards certain public festivities became more restrictive. Contemporary evidence refers to limitations imposed upon illuminations in particular places, including an order concerning Diwali lighting in the bazaars of Ahmedabad in 1665. Such measures indicate that imperial policy could affect the public celebration of the festival. They do not, however, establish that Diwali was prohibited throughout the empire. Hindu merchants, nobles, officials and ordinary subjects continued to observe their religious and social customs. The distinction between restrictions imposed in particular circumstances and a general prohibition is important in assessing the history of the festival during Aurangzeb’s reign.

Diwali appears prominently in accounts of the later Mughal court, particularly during the eighteenth century. Under Muhammad Shah (1719–1748), a ruler remembered for his patronage of music, painting and festive culture, illuminations and fireworks became important features of courtly entertainment. The festival is associated in later traditions with Jashn-i Chirāghān, or the celebration of lights.

The Red Fort at Shahjahanabad became particularly associated with these festivities. Descriptions of Diwali celebrations speak of rows of lamps illuminating the palaces and courtyards, while fireworks added to the spectacle. One of the more striking features mentioned in later accounts was the ākāsh dīyā, an elevated lamp placed upon a tall pole so that its light could be seen from a distance. The precise arrangements and dimensions described in popular recollections require verification, but the tradition itself reflects the importance attached to illumination in the festive culture of Mughal Delhi.

The organisation of fireworks also involved specialised craftsmen. The Mughal court possessed considerable expertise in pyrotechnics, and the mīr-i ātish, associated primarily with the imperial artillery establishment, belonged to the administrative world in which knowledge of gunpowder and related technologies was maintained. Fireworks were used on several ceremonial occasions, and their association with Diwali formed part of a wider tradition of spectacular courtly displays.

The paintings produced during the later Mughal period provide further glimpses of this festive atmosphere. Scenes showing women with sparklers, illuminated courtyards and gatherings accompanied by fireworks suggest the popularity of such entertainments. These visual representations are particularly valuable when read alongside written accounts, although their identification with particular festivals must be made cautiously.

The tradition of Diwali celebrations continued into the nineteenth century, when the political authority of the Mughal emperors had been greatly diminished. During the reign of Bahadur Shah Zafar (1837–1857), the Red Fort remained an important centre of Delhi’s ceremonial and cultural life. Diwali was celebrated throughout Shahjahanabad, particularly in its bazaars and residential neighbourhoods, while the imperial household continued to be associated with the festive traditions of the city.

Stephen P. Blake’s Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639–1739 (1991) provides a useful understanding of the relationship between the Mughal court and the urban society surrounding it. The festivities of the palace were closely connected with the commercial and social life of the city. Diwali was therefore not simply a celebration confined to the emperor and his nobles. It was equally a festival of merchants, shopkeepers, artisans and ordinary households.

What is particularly striking about the history of Diwali under the Mughals is the continuity of its celebration despite changes in the religious outlook and political priorities of successive emperors. Akbar’s accommodation of Indian religious traditions, Jahangir’s familiarity with the commercial customs associated with the festival, the culture of illumination under Shah Jahan and the later Mughals, and the continuation of celebrations in nineteenth-century Delhi all reveal different aspects of this history.

It would be an exaggeration to suggest that every Mughal emperor celebrated Diwali with equal enthusiasm or that the festival enjoyed uninterrupted imperial patronage. The evidence does not support such a generalisation. Yet it is equally difficult to sustain the notion that Hindu religious festivals remained entirely outside the cultural world of the Mughal court.

The history of Diwali under the Mughals reminds us that religious identity and cultural participation were not necessarily mutually exclusive. A Muslim emperor could acknowledge or participate in a Hindu festival without abandoning his own religious beliefs. Similarly, the celebration of Diwali by Hindu merchants, officials and nobles formed part of the everyday social and economic life of an empire in which communities were connected through numerous relationships.

The festival thus offers an important example of the cultural interactions that characterised Mughal India. Its lamps illuminated not only temples and private homes, but also, at different moments, the palaces and public spaces associated with the imperial establishment. The history of Diwali under the Mughals is therefore not merely a story of emperors celebrating a Hindu festival. It is also a reminder of the shared cultural practices that developed in India over centuries, without necessarily erasing the distinct religious identities of those who participated in them.

Select References

Abu’l Fazl, The Ain-i Akbari, translated by H. Blochmann and H. S. Jarrett, 3 vols. (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1873–1894).

Jahangir, The Jahangirnama: Memoirs of Jahangir, Emperor of India, translated and edited by Wheeler M. Thackston (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Mukhia, Harbans, The Mughals of India (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

Lal, Ruby, Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Blake, Stephen P., Shahjahanabad: The Sovereign City in Mughal India, 1639–1739 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Counting the Mughal Economy: Shireen Moosvi and a Lifetime of Economic History

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Shireen Moosvi, Economic History of Mughal India: Collected Essays, Vols. I–II. New Delhi: Primus Books, 2026.

The publication of the first two volumes of Shireen Moosvi’s Economic History of Mughal India: Collected Essays provides an appropriate occasion to assess not merely the essays now brought together but the larger scholarly achievement of one of India’s foremost economic historians. Volume I contains nineteen essays extending across numismatics, trade, shipping, regional economic profiles and the problem of capitalism; Volume II brings together seventeen essays dealing with imperial revenue administration, monetary systems, land revenue and rights, and urban economic development under Akbar, Shahjahan and Aurangzeb. They form the first two instalments of a projected four-volume collection of Moosvi’s writings.

Read alongside The Economy of the Mughal Empire, c. 1595: A Statistical Study, Episodes in the Life of Akbar: Contemporary Records and Reminiscences, and People, Taxation, and Trade in Mughal India, these volumes reveal something more significant than the range of an individual historian. They document the development of a particular conception of economic history: one in which Persian textual scholarship, quantitative analysis and a materialist understanding of social relations are brought together in an attempt to reconstruct the workings of a pre-modern economy.

Moosvi belongs unmistakably to the intellectual tradition associated with the Centre of Advanced Study in History at Aligarh Muslim University. Mohammad Habib, S. Nurul Hasan, Irfan Habib, M. Athar Ali and Iqtidar Alam Khan had, in different ways, helped shift Mughal history away from dynastic narrative towards the investigation of institutions, agrarian relations, social classes and structures of power. But intellectual traditions become historically important not because succeeding generations merely reproduce them, but because individual scholars find within them new questions and methods. Moosvi did precisely that.

Her distinctive contribution arose partly from an unusual intellectual formation. She came to history not through the conventional path of a humanities scholar but as a trained statistician, having completed her MSc from Lucknow University. This background equipped her with a mathematical rigour and a scepticism towards unsupported generalisations that few historians of pre-colonial India possessed. Later, a fellowship at Bellagio allowed her to study counterfactual history under leading practitioners, which sharpened her sensitivity to alternative possibilities and the contingent nature of economic outcomes. These twin influences – statistical precision and counterfactual reasoning – gave her work a methodological edge that distinguished it from both orthodox economic history and purely narrative accounts.

If Irfan Habib’s The Agrarian System of Mughal India demonstrated what could be recovered about production, agrarian relations, revenue extraction and rural society through an intensive interrogation of Persian sources, Moosvi pushed the enquiry in a direction few had attempted systematically: could the Mughal economy actually be measured?

From the Āʾīn-i Akbarī to an Economy

The fullest expression of this ambition was The Economy of the Mughal Empire, c. 1595, first published in 1987 and substantially revised for its second edition. Oxford University Press rightly describes it as a pioneering attempt to apply quantitative analysis to the pre-colonial Indian economy; the revised edition added, among other things, an estimate of GDP. The ambition of the original book was extraordinary. Its chapters moved from an examination of the statistics and their sources through the extent of cultivation and agricultural productivity to land-revenue demand and realisation; revenue grants and the zamindars’ share of agrarian surplus; imperial income, mansabdar salaries, military and household expenditure and the diffusion of surplus; and finally urbanisation, prices, wages, money, credit, foreign trade and population.

The importance of the work did not lie simply in producing numbers. Its methodological achievement lay in demonstrating how difficult it was to produce numbers that possessed historical meaning. The Āʾīn-i Akbarī was not a modern statistical abstract. Moosvi therefore subjected its quantitative material to the same kind of source criticism that historians normally apply to narrative evidence. She examined manuscript readings, recalculated totals, identified chronological inconsistencies and investigated precisely what administrative categories represented. Against Moreland’s description of the Āʾīn as essentially a hastily assembled collection of official material, she drew attention to Abu’l Fazl’s care in presenting quantitative information. At the same time, she refused simply to accept all the figures at face value.

Where manuscript figures differed substantially, she acknowledged the uncertainty and restricted the conclusions that could be drawn from them. She also insisted that the Āʾīn could not be understood in isolation. The Akbarnāma, Bayazid Bayat, Nizamuddin Ahmad, Badauni, Mutamad Khan and European testimony were required to clarify institutions, administrative terminology and the meaning of particular statistics. This combination of philology and statistics became one of the distinguishing features of Moosvi’s scholarship.

It also enabled her to ask questions of an order rarely attempted for sixteenth-century India. What proportion of the agrarian surplus was appropriated? How much reached the ruling class? What proportion was consumed through the imperial establishment? How large might the urban population have been? What relationships existed between money supply, prices and credit? What impact did overseas trade have upon internal production? Some calculations inevitably required assumptions. Yet Moosvi normally exposed those assumptions to scrutiny. The historian could therefore disagree with the multiplier or estimate without having to reject the entire enterprise. That remains an important virtue of her work.

From Structures to People

If The Economy of the Mughal Empire established the quantitative foundations of Moosvi’s scholarship, People, Taxation, and Trade in Mughal India demonstrated how widely those methods and questions could subsequently be extended. The collection is divided across a striking range of subjects: economic experience; silver influx, money supply, prices and interest rates; ecology, demography and gender; revenue administration and imperial finance; the economic consequences of Mughal expansion into the Deccan; agrarian crisis; and finally shipping, ports and the commercial world of Gujarat.

The title itself is revealing: people, taxation and trade. Economic history here is not simply the history of the state’s revenue. Nor is it reduced to merchants and markets. Moosvi continually attempts to connect economic structures with the lives of the people inhabiting them. Population and settlement matter; so do women’s work and labour. Fiscal policies matter, but so do scarcity, prices and exploitation. Ports matter not simply as nodes in international trade but as communities inhabited by merchants, sailors, artisans and others.

Her essay on work and gender is especially important in demonstrating how far her economic history could travel beyond the conventional subjects of revenue and currency. The visual material itself is revealing: women fetching water, spinning, breaking stones and sieving material for lime-making, carrying bitumen during the construction of Agra Fort, and a girl at school all form part of the evidence assembled for understanding work and gender. Such investigations complicate the stereotype of an older Marxist historiography concerned exclusively with impersonal structures. For Moosvi, structure ultimately consists of relationships among people.

Money, Markets and the Wider World

Another major strand running through the older collections and now particularly visible in the Primus volumes concerns money. Coins for Moosvi are not merely numismatic objects. Mint output can become evidence for monetary circulation; changes in precious-metal flows can illuminate movements in prices; interest rates can provide clues to credit conditions; imported bullion can be related to India’s position within international commerce. This necessarily carries Mughal history beyond the territorial boundaries of the empire.

The silver arriving in India originated in global circuits. European trading companies provide some of the documentation, but Moosvi is careful not to allow the abundance of European records to distort the historical picture. Her work on Gujarat, for example, recognises that English and Dutch bullion imports represented only part of the precious metals entering India, with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf trades remaining important. Her treatment of foreign commerce in The Economy similarly attempts to calculate its relationship with domestic production. In the revised reconstruction, foreign trade generated a significant proportion of the value added by urban manufactures, with textiles forming the principal export and bullion and horses among the major imports.

Yet Moosvi never permits commercial expansion automatically to become evidence of an impending capitalist transformation. That distinction is fundamental to her economic history. The existence of prosperous merchants, extensive markets, sophisticated credit and substantial commodity production demonstrates commercialisation. For Moosvi, it does not by itself establish capitalism. The crucial questions concern the organisation of production, the appropriation and deployment of surplus, labour relations and whether accumulated wealth was systematically converted into productive capital.

Her attempt to reconstruct the consumption of the Mughal ruling class is especially interesting in this respect. She asks whether the enormous rural surplus appropriated by the state and nobility generated demand for manufactured commodities or primarily sustained a large service sector. The conclusion bears directly upon the question of why commercial expansion did not necessarily produce a transition towards capitalism. The Primus volumes consequently place Moosvi within one of the largest historiographical debates concerning early-modern India: whether the subcontinent before colonial rule possessed tendencies towards autonomous capitalist development. Her answers may be debated. The importance lies equally in the precision with which the problem is formulated.

Land and Sea

Moosvi’s interests in trade also enabled her to challenge another inherited assumption: that the Mughal Empire, being overwhelmingly dependent upon agrarian revenue, was essentially indifferent to maritime activity. Her essay on shipping under Akbar begins precisely with this historiographical proposition. She does not deny the fundamentally continental character of Mughal power. Instead she asks whether that generalisation adequately describes the actual behaviour of Akbar and his nobility.

The evidence complicates the conventional picture. Akbar personally encountered the maritime world after the conquest of Gujarat, visited Cambay, travelled on a vessel and personally directed the reduction of Surat. Moosvi then investigates Mughal shipping and imperial attitudes towards navigation rather than assuming that dependence upon agrarian revenue necessarily implied indifference to maritime commerce. The method is characteristic. A large historical generalisation is neither casually rejected nor respectfully repeated. It is tested against evidence.

Another Moosvi: Episodes in the Life of Akbar

The danger in describing Moosvi principally as a quantitative economic historian is that another important dimension of her scholarship disappears. Episodes in the Life of Akbar offers perhaps the best corrective. It is an unusual book. Rather than write another continuous biography of Akbar, Moosvi selected contemporary descriptions, reminiscences and eyewitness accounts, predominantly from Persian sources, translated or revised their translations, and supplied the historical context necessary to understand them.

Her Preface explains the conception succinctly. Because Akbar was unusually accessible and because of his own interest in history, he became one of the most intimately documented individuals in pre-modern India. Moosvi therefore preferred eyewitness testimony wherever possible so that readers might encounter not only Akbar himself but something of what the times were like. This book reveals the historian behind the statistician.

Consider her treatment of Akbar’s administrative measures of 1574-75. Rather than supply a synthetic account alone, she places Abu’l Fazl’s official interpretation alongside Badauni’s hostile version. Both required fresh translation because technical administrative terminology could materially alter their meaning. The result is not an uncomplicated celebration of Akbar. When Abu’l Fazl is biased, Moosvi says so. When Badauni is hostile, that hostility becomes part of the evaluation of his evidence. When earlier translations obscure technical meanings, she revises them. And when competing witnesses disagree, the reader is permitted to see the disagreement.

The selections themselves range from Akbar’s childhood, hunting and elephant fights to the consolidation of central authority, administrative experiments, religious debates, encounters with Jesuits, translations of Sanskrit works and reflections attributed to the emperor. At the end, Moosvi presents a checked and corrected selection of Akbar’s sayings preserved by Abu’l Fazl. Among them appear striking affirmations of reason and demands for evidence rather than credulous acceptance of extraordinary claims. Episodes consequently tells us something important about Moosvi’s historical method. Numbers never displaced texts. Indeed, her ability to quantify the Āʾīn-i Akbarī depended upon precisely the textual sensitivity displayed in Episodes.

The State and the Surplus

Across these works, one concept repeatedly binds together apparently disparate subjects: surplus. Agricultural production generates it; revenue institutions appropriate it; zamindars claim portions of it; mansabdars receive it; imperial households consume it; towns absorb it; artisans benefit from some forms of elite demand; and merchants participate in the movement of commodities produced within the economy. The Mughal state is therefore neither simply a political superstructure nor merely a revenue-collecting machine. It occupies a central position in the circulation and redistribution of economic resources.

This is where Moosvi’s Marxist inheritance is clearest. But her Marxism operates most effectively as a set of questions rather than a substitute for evidence. Who produces? Who appropriates? How much? Through what institutions? Where does the appropriated surplus go? What economic activities does its expenditure encourage? These questions convert abstractions about class into empirically investigable historical relationships.

The Problem of Precision

The most obvious criticism of Moosvi’s work also arises from its greatest methodological innovation. Can sixteenth- and seventeenth-century evidence really sustain calculations of population, agricultural output, urbanisation, sectoral distribution or income with the precision sometimes suggested by quantitative reconstruction? There must inevitably be doubts. The evidence is incomplete, uneven and produced for purposes entirely different from those of modern economic statistics. A figure generated from several assumptions may acquire, when placed in a table, an appearance of certainty that the original evidence does not possess.

But two qualifications are necessary. First, Moosvi is unusually alert to the problem. She identifies manuscript discrepancies, recalculates figures and explicitly limits the uses to which particularly uncertain data can be put. Secondly, an estimate whose assumptions are visible is intellectually preferable to an impression whose assumptions remain concealed. One can dispute Moosvi’s population estimate, alter a conversion factor or challenge a calculation of surplus. Precisely because the reasoning has been made explicit, the argument can be tested. That is a major scholarly achievement.

The Primus Volumes and a Career Seen Whole

This is where the publication of Economic History of Mughal India acquires significance beyond republication. An article written decades ago inevitably belongs initially to a particular controversy. Gathered together, such articles reveal patterns that may not have been apparent when they first appeared. Volume I‘s juxtaposition of numismatics, trade, shipping, regional economies and capitalism makes visible Moosvi’s continuing concern with the relationship between money, markets and production. Volume II‘s essays on revenue administration, monetary systems, landed rights and urban economies reveal the complementary relationship between state, surplus and society.

And People, Taxation, and Trade supplies the bridge between these two worlds. Its seventeen essays range from quantitative economic experience, silver and interest rates through ecology, population and women’s work to Todar Mal, Shahjahan’s financial policies, Aurangzeb, the Deccan, agrarian crisis, shipping and Surat. What initially looks like remarkable diversity therefore possesses an underlying coherence. Moosvi has spent much of her career asking how resources moved through Mughal society. They moved from cultivator to zamindar and state; from treasury to mansabdar and imperial establishment; from countryside to town; from merchant to artisan; from overseas bullion flows into Indian mints; from elite consumption into craft production and services. Economic history, in this conception, is ultimately the history of these movements and of the social relationships governing them.

Shireen Moosvi and the Aligarh Tradition

The new collections also permit a more precise assessment of Moosvi’s relationship with what has conventionally been called the Aligarh School. There is an obvious intellectual genealogy. Mohammad Habib’s concern with social formations, Nurul Hasan’s work on agrarian relations, Athar Ali’s reconstruction of the Mughal nobility and Irfan Habib’s analysis of the agrarian system collectively transformed the questions asked about medieval India. Moosvi belongs to this transformation. But she should not simply be placed in Irfan Habib’s shadow. If Habib’s Agrarian System reconstructed the relations surrounding agricultural production and extraction, Moosvi attempted something somewhat different: to estimate the dimensions and proportions of the economy generated by those relations.

That required a methodological apparatus distinctly her own. Statistics, cartography, numismatics, fiscal documents, Persian chronicles, European commercial records and later comparative material could all become evidence within the same investigation. The result was neither conventional economic history nor simply an extension of agrarian history. It was an attempt at a quantitative social history of a pre-modern empire. There is also a quality shared with the best scholarship of the Aligarh tradition that deserves emphasis: an unwillingness to allow the scale of the argument to reduce the density of the evidence. The questions may be very large (capitalism, economic growth, imperial crisis, population), but the argument repeatedly returns to a coin hoard, manuscript variant, revenue figure, Persian technical term or shipping record.

Why These Essays Matter Now

The publication of these collected essays comes at an interesting historiographical moment. Over recent decades Mughal studies have expanded enormously. Historians have investigated kingship and political culture, gender, household, literature, language, emotions, art, architecture, religious identities, courtly practices, environmental history and the representation of sovereignty. Much of this scholarship has transformed our understanding of Mughal India. But historiographical expansion should not become historiographical substitution.

The questions posed by Moosvi have not disappeared. How much agricultural surplus was extracted from the countryside? How was it distributed? What were the living conditions of producers? What happened to wages and prices? How extensive was monetisation? How large were India’s towns? How important was overseas commerce to domestic production? What kinds of labour sustained manufacturing and construction? What was women’s contribution to production? How were commercial wealth and political power related? Why did an extraordinarily sophisticated commercial economy not necessarily generate capitalist relations of production? These are not old questions simply because they were asked several decades ago. Nor can they be answered solely through the study of discourse and representation. Empires require resources. Courts require revenues. Armies have to be paid. Buildings require labour. Cities require food. Artisans require markets. Merchants require credit. Peasants confront demands upon their produce. Moosvi’s scholarship continually reminds us of this material foundation of historical life.

An Achievement in Perspective

It would nevertheless be inappropriate to turn the publication of collected writings into an exercise in commemoration alone. Moosvi’s interpretations should continue to be questioned. The increasingly sophisticated literature on early-modern global economic history has changed some of the contexts in which questions about Indian commercialisation and capitalism are posed. Regional studies have complicated any single model of the Mughal economy. Environmental history has drawn attention to ecological variables insufficiently integrated into earlier economic models. Histories of labour have uncovered relationships difficult to capture through aggregate calculations. Comparative work on standards of living and the Great Divergence has generated new methods as well as new controversies.

Moosvi’s own work, however, anticipated some of these directions more than is sometimes recognised. Ecology, population, women’s work, regional variation and global bullion movements were already part of her economic history. And the proper measure of an important historian is not whether every conclusion survives unchanged. It is whether subsequent scholarship must continue to confront the questions and evidence that historian placed before it. By that standard, Moosvi’s achievement is considerable.

The Economy of the Mughal Empire, c. 1595 demonstrated that the pre-colonial Indian economy could be subjected to quantitative investigation of remarkable ambition. The book explicitly set out to test received impressions against quantified data and ranged from population and agricultural production to class expenditure, urbanisation, consumption, prices, interest and foreign commerce. Episodes in the Life of Akbar demonstrated that the same historian was capable of handling narrative evidence with sensitivity to language, authorship, bias and contradiction. People, Taxation, and Trade widened the enquiry from a reconstruction centred upon c.1595 towards economic processes operating across the seventeenth century and beyond, incorporating people, gender, environment, regions and maritime commerce. The new Primus volumes now enable these investigations to be viewed retrospectively as components of a single, remarkably sustained intellectual enterprise.

The Measure of Moosvi

Perhaps the most appropriate word with which to characterise Shireen Moosvi’s scholarship is measure. She measures in the literal sense: acreage, revenue, population, wages, prices, silver, expenditure, urbanisation and trade. But she also measures evidence. How reliable is Abu’l Fazl? What does a particular Persian administrative term actually signify? Can two manuscript readings be reconciled? Does a European traveller’s figure correspond with indigenous evidence? Can a generalisation inherited from Moreland survive comparison with new data? Does the existence of extensive commerce justify speaking of capitalism?

That second kind of measurement is ultimately more important than the first. It explains why her scholarship cannot adequately be characterised simply as statistical history. The numbers are instruments for recovering relationships among people, resources and institutions. The publication of Economic History of Mughal India: Collected Essays therefore performs an important service. It makes available a substantial body of scholarship, but more importantly it allows us to see the contours of a historian’s intellectual life.

Within the larger Aligarh tradition, Shireen Moosvi developed a recognisable historical practice of her own: empirically exacting, quantitatively adventurous, materialist in explanation, sceptical of easy generalisation and remarkably willing to extract historical meaning from evidence that initially appears incapable of answering the questions being put to it. Not every estimate will endure. Nor should it. Economic history advances through recalculation as much as reinterpretation. But after The Economy of the Mughal Empire, it became considerably harder to speak about the Mughal economy without asking how much. After People, Taxation, and Trade, it became harder to discuss those quantities without asking who produced, paid, worked, traded and benefited. And Episodes in the Life of Akbar reminds us that behind both questions lies another: what does the evidence actually permit us to say?

The first two Primus volumes bring these strands together. They are therefore more than collections of previously scattered essays. They provide an opportunity to recognise the cumulative achievement of Shireen Moosvi as one of the major historians of the economy and society of Mughal India, a scholar who taught us not simply to describe that economy, but to attempt to measure it, and then to ask what those measurements tell us about the people who lived within it.