A Trip to Dushanbe via Tehran on the First Anniversary of 9/11

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Today, as we mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of 9/11, my thoughts return to a journey I made exactly a year after those attacks. On 11 September 2002 I was travelling from Delhi to Dushanbe in Tajikistan, via Tehran. At the time it seemed merely an inconvenient date on which to undertake an international journey, but looking back after nearly a quarter of a century, the date has become inseparable from my memories of the trip.

We were quite a large academic group. Among my companions were Professor Ishtiaq Ahmad Zilli, our revered teacher; Professor Azhar Ansari; Professor Azermi Dukht Naheed Safavi; several other colleagues from the Persian stream; Dr Iqbal Ghani Khan; Najaf Haider; and myself. There were others whose names, after all these years, I no longer recall with equal certainty. The moment we entered Indira Gandhi International Airport in Delhi, it became apparent that we had chosen the wrong date to travel, because it was the exact first anniversary of the attacks in the United States and the airport was tense, with extra security everywhere. Zilli Sahib surveyed the situation and gave us some very sensible advice: we should be cautious, he said, and under no circumstances do anything that might attract unnecessary attention towards ourselves. We dutifully joined the queue for baggage check-in.

Najaf handed over his luggage before me. I checked in my suitcase, received my boarding pass and had just begun walking away when Zilli Sahib called out to me; he wanted me to wait for him. All hell broke loose. Here was a bearded gentleman in a sherwani, looking every inch a traditional Maulana, calling out to a passenger who had just handed over his luggage, and that too on the first anniversary of 9/11. Security personnel immediately stopped me, my suitcase, which had already disappeared behind the counter, was retrieved, and I was asked to identify it, open it, and submit its contents to a particularly thorough examination. Later, when we reached the security check, I could see that poor Zilli Sahib himself was receiving perhaps the most intensive scrutiny of us all. So much for his excellent advice that we should avoid attracting attention.

Our journey took us first to Tehran, where we had to spend a few days before catching our connecting flight to Dushanbe. As we landed at Mehrabad Airport, those of us from History were rather excited. It was my first visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for some of us Iran was still an unfamiliar world, while our colleagues from the Persian Department were perfectly cool, having travelled there several times before and being quite happy to remind us of the fact. Najaf, I. G. Khan and I decided that we should have coffee. I confidently announced that I possessed Iranian currency, a 500-rial note, which I assumed would comfortably take care of our requirements. It turned out that my great reserve of Iranian currency could buy us precisely one cup of coffee. I. G. Bhai immediately came to our rescue, because he had a few sachets of tea in his carry bag; he walked confidently to the tea shop and asked how much they charged for hot water. “Free,” he was told, and so we obtained our hot water, produced the tea sachets, and sat at Mehrabad Airport enjoying cups of tea which at that particular moment tasted better than anything we might have purchased.

One episode in Tehran has remained particularly vivid in my memory. Najaf and I had to visit Tehran University, for which we needed a taxi, so naturally we turned to Zilli Sahib. He was madrasa educated and had an impressive command of classical Persian, and we asked him to summon a taxi and explain to the driver exactly where we wished to go. Zilli Sahib did what, to Najaf and me, appeared to be an admirable job, speaking at some length in fluent, chaste Persian and carefully explaining our destination. The taxi driver listened patiently, then turned towards me and said, “Āqā, man Hindustāni nemidānam,” which meant, “Sir, I don’t know Hindustani.” For a moment Najaf and I were taken aback, then we realised what had happened. Zilli Sahib was certainly speaking Persian, but it was the Persian of the Indian scholarly tradition, preserved in our madrasas and inherited from the Indo-Persian world of the Sultanate and Mughal periods; its pronunciation, cadence and even aspects of its vocabulary were far removed from the everyday Persian spoken in the streets of contemporary Tehran. To our taxi driver, Zilli Sahib’s magnificent Persian apparently sounded like some variety of Hindustani: and why not? After all it had been the official language in India for a thousand years!

I had already encountered the same linguistic divide in our guest house. Iranian television serials were being shown, but however hard I tried, I could barely follow the dialogue, because the rapid colloquial Persian of ordinary conversation defeated me. Then a Mullah would appear on television and begin delivering a sermon, and suddenly I could understand him. The Mullah had moved into a more formal register, with vocabulary, constructions and rhetorical conventions much closer to the Persian with which we in India, specially those used to majlis tradition, were familiar. I could not understand the lovers quarrelling in an Iranian television serial, but I could understand the cleric telling them how they ought to live.

The taxi ride, however, had another surprise for us. Once the driver realised that I understood at least some Persian, (I having been exposed to Iranians coming home since my childhood and my father conversing with them), he began speaking to me slowly and asked my name. I told him, and he immediately asked, “Shomā Sayyid hastid?”, meaning, “Are you a Saiyid?” I confirmed that I was. “Husaini Saiyid?” I said Rezavi, and he appeared pleased; then he looked into his rear-view mirror at Zilli Sahib, studied our revered teacher for a moment, and delivered his judgement: “Kheyli makrūh!” I had no answer, because the casual sectarian prejudice behind the remark was obvious. In the course of a single taxi ride we had encountered both the linguistic distance separating Indo-Persian from modern spoken Iranian Persian and some of the sectarian assumptions through which strangers could still read one another.

In Tehran we were lodged in a guest house belonging to Danishgah-i Nur, with four or five of us sharing a suite. I. G. Bhai, meanwhile, had a problem of a different sort. On our way to the guest house he expressed a desire for a drink, and we informed him that this was the Islamic Republic of Iran and that his chances were not particularly promising. We had underestimated both I. G. Bhai and the Islamic Republic, because by evening he had somehow managed to discover and wrest a bottle from the university’s PVC, who otherwise appeared to be a bearded and exceedingly pious gentleman. Thus, while some of us were discovering Iran, I. G. Bhai was discovering its exceptions, and he thoroughly enjoyed his stay in the Islamic Republic.

After a few days in Tehran we flew onwards to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. As our plane, an Aeroflot, entered and landed at Dushanbe International Airport, a few quite Russian-looking officers entered the plane and in a very authoritative order barked at us to come with our passports in our hands. As we queued out, our passports were literally snatched from us. Out of the plane, we were made to board a bus and taken to a large iron gate with many military personnel with guns standing there. There was no shade, except a tree which could shelter us from the scorching sun above, and here we were made to stand for what appeared an hour before the gate was clanged opened. Once again a fierce-looking army officer appeared, and this time he would call out a name and the person had to scramble towards him; he would push the passport in his face and bark, “Enter!” It all appeared to be straight from some old Russian war movie. Once one entered the dark iron gate, there was a shed to one side from where we were supposed to claim our baggage from a static belt, but once outside the airport finally, it was then that the natural and the maintained beauty of Dushanbe would hit you.

There were certain things about Dushanbe which struck me almost immediately. The first was its cleanliness: the roads appeared spotlessly clean, and I saw neither beggars nor vagabonds wandering along them. There were covered markets where people could buy and sell their goods with considerable ease and order, but what impressed me most were the children. Every schoolchild appeared to have a uniform, and those uniforms were spotless; during school hours the children were in school, and I do not remember seeing children loitering in the markets or performing odd jobs when they should have been studying. Tajikistan had been independent for only about eleven years, and the destructive civil war that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union had ended only a few years earlier, yet in the ordered streets, the organised markets and, above all, the visible place given to schooling, reminiscences of the old Soviet era still lingered. Of course, a visitor spending a few days in a city sees only its surface, and I could not pretend to know the realities of poverty, employment or education in Tajik society from such a short visit; but these were my impressions of Dushanbe in 2002, and they have stayed with me.

Our accommodation was in what was described as a five-star hotel. It was comfortable enough, but two features of the room have remained fixed in my memory. The first was the plumbing: the toilet seat and the bathtub seemed to depend upon a single water tap, and one simply turned it in whichever direction one required the water. It was ingenious and economical, although not quite what I had expected in a five-star hotel. The second surprise was the television, because among the channels available in the room was an adult channel, accompanied, if my memory serves me correctly, by an indication that a certain kind of room service could also be arranged should the guest so desire. My Maulana companion was quite scandalised.

Dushanbe also solved a historical problem for me. I had, of course, read the Baburnama, and one of the things that repeatedly strikes a reader is Babur’s longing for Central Asia after he had established himself in India. He had conquered Hindustan and acquired an empire, but he continued to pine for the things he had left behind: its climate, its gardens, its fruits and, very particularly, its melons. Sitting in India and reading these passages, one understands Babur intellectually, but one can also wonder why a man who had just conquered an empire should become quite so emotional about a kharbuza. Then I tasted the Central Asian kharbuza and tarbuz, and only then did I understand Babur. They were something else, and their flavour and sweetness have to be experienced before one understands why Babur remembered them so fondly after reaching Hindustan. There are some historical sources, it seems, which require a rather unusual form of fieldwork, because to understand certain passages of the Baburnama one really ought to taste a Central Asian melon. Four and a half centuries after Babur wrote of the fruits he had left behind, there I was in Dushanbe thinking that I now understood why the man complained.

One evening we were invited to a grand official banquet. The gathering seemed to include the entire who’s who of Dushanbe, senior officials, scholars, dignitaries and religious figures, and among them was the Imam-i Juma, who immediately reminded me in appearance of the senior Imam Bukhari of Delhi’s Jama Masjid. The seating arrangements produced very different reactions among members of our group. I. G. Bhai discovered, with considerable satisfaction, that he had been seated safely at some distance from the Imam, while Zilli Sahib, on the other hand, was delighted to find that his seat was beside the revered religious gentleman. He turned towards me with evident satisfaction and said, “Nadeem Miyan, we are sitting next to the revered man. Thus we will be saved from the haram drinks!” His reasoning appeared impeccable, because if there was one table at an official banquet in Muslim Central Asia where alcohol was unlikely to appear, surely it would be the table at which the Imam-i Juma himself was seated. Events proved otherwise. As the banquet progressed, wine began to flow, and indeed, to our increasing astonishment, the table where it seemed to flow most freely was ours. Poor Zilli Sahib remained steadfast, and although glasses were being filled all around him, he would not touch the grape wonder flowing so generously across our table. Eventually the Imam noticed, and he looked at Zilli Sahib, apparently puzzled by this strange Indian Maulana who persistently refused what everyone else around him was happily drinking. Then came the question: “Āqā, shomā Musalmān nist?”, meaning, “Sir, are you not a Muslim?” One had to see Zilli Sahib’s face at that moment to understand his plight, because the man who had happily taken his seat beside the Imam in the confident belief that proximity to a revered religious figure would save him from haram drinks was now being asked by that very Imam whether his refusal to drink meant that he was not a Muslim. There was very little any of us could add, and Dushanbe had once again overturned our assumptions.

Academic conferences have hazards of their own. Unfortunately for I. G. Bhai, I was asked to chair the session in which he was presenting his paper, and before the session began he came to me with a very clear instruction that I was to give him sufficient time. I did, and indeed I gave him as much time as I reasonably could, but eventually the responsibilities of the chair prevailed and I rang the bell signalling that he should conclude. Without pausing, without losing his rhythm and without changing his expression, I. G. Bhai smoothly shifted into Urdu; since apparently nobody else in the room understood the language, he inserted a private communication into his scholarly presentation: “Saaley, waapas chal, bataunga!” Then, just as smoothly, he returned to his paper. It was extraordinarily difficult not to laugh, while the audience remained completely unaware that anything unusual had happened.

The historian in me found his greatest reward during our visit to Qalaʿ-i Hisor, outside Dushanbe. The qalaʿ, or fort, stands upon a hill overlooking the surrounding landscape, and immediately below it are a number of structures, including several tombs associated with Naqshbandi saints and a large sarai. The moment I saw the sarai, I experienced an extraordinary sense of familiarity, because it reminded me immediately of the sarai of Shaikh Chilli at Thanesar in India. The resemblance was remarkable, and indeed my feeling at the time was that if someone familiar with one of the two buildings were blindfolded, taken to the other and then asked where he was, he might genuinely be confused, because they appeared almost like replicas of one another. For me this was much more than an architectural curiosity. As historians of Mughal India, we routinely speak of Central Asian architectural influences, and we use terms such as Timurid, Central Asian and Persianate while tracing the movement of arches, domes, courtyard plans, decorative forms and building techniques; but standing before that sarai at Hisor was different, because here was the architectural relationship between Central Asia and India suddenly made tangible. Of course, architectural influence does not mean that one building was simply copied from another, since forms travelled with craftsmen, merchants, Sufis, soldiers, political elites and patrons, and once they reached India they were adapted to local materials, requirements and aesthetic traditions. India did not merely copy Central Asian architecture, because it absorbed and transformed it, yet the resemblance between the Hisor sarai and that of Shaikh Chilli at Thanesar was so striking that, for me, the Central Asian connection was no longer an abstraction in an architectural history; it stood there in brick and mortar.

But Hisor had another surprise awaiting me. Below the fort gate was a platform associated with a tree and a spring or fountain, known as Shajar-i Sher ʿAli and Chashma-i Sher ʿAli. When I first heard the name Sher ʿAli, I naturally thought of the famous poet and statesman ʿAli Sher Nawaʾi, but I was wrong, because I was informed that Sher ʿAli was none other than Imam ʿAli ibn Abi Talib. The local tradition was extraordinary. Imam ʿAli, I was told, had come personally to this region, and it was at his hands that the Turks here had become Muslims; the spring itself was one of his miracles, because when Imam ʿAli struck the ground with his foot, water gushed forth, and the tree had grown to provide shade for him while he rested. What fascinated me even more was that this was not simply an old story being recounted for the benefit of visitors. People came reverentially to the spot, drank water from the Chashma-i Sher ʿAli, ate a leaf from the Shajar-i Sher ʿAli, and carried away some of the water and leaves as tabarruk. As a historian, I knew that Imam ʿAli had never travelled to Tajikistan and had not personally converted the Turks of Central Asia, but in a sense that was beside the point. What I was witnessing was the historical geography of sacred memory, because here was ʿAli, transported by collective memory hundreds of miles beyond the geographical limits of his actual life, transformed into the miraculous bringer of Islam to Central Asia; a spring, a tree and an entire local landscape had absorbed him into their sacred history.

There was something else which made the experience particularly striking. This was a region deeply associated with Sunni Islam and the Naqshbandi tradition, and we were standing close to the tombs of Naqshbandi saints, yet people were reverentially drinking water and consuming leaves associated with Imam ʿAli, carrying them home as tabarruk. It was a vivid reminder that popular Islam has never observed sectarian boundaries quite as rigidly as theologians, and sometimes historians, would have us imagine, because reverence for ʿAli could travel easily across Sunni and Shiʿi divisions, just as saints, shrines, springs, trees and local sacred landscapes acquired lives of their own. Hisor therefore offered me two very different connections between Central Asia and India. One was material and architectural, embodied in the extraordinary resemblance between its sarai and that of Shaikh Chilli at Thanesar, while the other belonged to sacred memory and popular belief, where stories and forms of devotion had travelled across enormous distances and become thoroughly localised.

There was yet another Central Asia waiting for us in the museum at Dushanbe. Among its attractions were images of the Buddha, votive stupas and remains associated with the Buddhist past of the region. For someone accustomed to thinking about Central Asia principally through its Persianate, Turkic and Islamic history, these objects were a powerful reminder of a much older world. Long before the coming of Islam, Central Asia had formed part of the great networks through which Buddhism travelled from the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan into the regions beyond, and eventually towards China; monks, merchants, pilgrims, texts and artistic forms had moved along these routes for centuries. Within a few days in and around Dushanbe, therefore, one could encounter several Central Asias: Buddhist, Iranian, Turkic, Islamic, Sufi, Soviet and post-Soviet. None had entirely erased what came before it.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since that journey, and oddly enough it is not the formal conference proceedings that I remember most clearly. I remember the tense atmosphere at Delhi airport on 11 September 2002, and Zilli Sahib warning us not to attract attention, only to call out to me moments later and inadvertently ensure that security took a very special interest in my suitcase. I remember arriving at Mehrabad with my magnificent 500 rials and discovering that my fortune would purchase only one cup of coffee, and I remember I. G. Bhai triumphantly producing his tea sachets and discovering that hot water was free. I remember a Tehran taxi driver listening patiently to Zilli Sahib’s chaste Persian before turning to me and saying, “Sir, I don’t know Hindustani.” I remember my discovery that I could not understand an Iranian television serial but could quite comfortably follow the Mullah’s sermon. I remember I. G. Bhai’s remarkable ability to procure a drink in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I remember the spotless roads of Dushanbe, its covered markets and the children going to school in their immaculate uniforms, and in them I could still see something of the old Soviet order lingering in a newly independent country. I remember tasting the melons of Central Asia and finally understanding a complaint Babur had made nearly five hundred years earlier. I remember Zilli Sahib happily sitting beside the Imam-i Juma in the belief that the holy man’s presence would protect him from haram drinks, only to discover that the wine flowed most freely at our table, and I remember the expression on his face when the Imam himself, puzzled by his abstinence, asked, “Āqā, shomā Musalmān nist?” I remember I. G. Bhai’s threat, delivered seamlessly in Urdu in the middle of his academic paper when I had the temerity to ring the chairman’s bell. I remember the peculiar plumbing of our five-star hotel and my Maulana companion’s horror at discovering what other forms of room service were apparently available. But above all, perhaps, I remember Hisor.

I remember standing before a Central Asian sarai and seeing Thanesar in India. I remember a tree and a spring below an old fortress, and people gathering around them because they believed that Imam ʿAli had once rested there. I remember Buddhist remains in a museum reminding me that the Islamic Central Asia I had come to see was itself only one layer of a much older historical landscape. Perhaps that is what travel does to a historian. We travel carrying books in our heads, and places then begin to correct, complicate, illuminate and occasionally laugh at what those books have taught us. Babur’s melons cease to be a literary trope once one has tasted them, and Central Asian influence on Indian architecture ceases to be a textbook phrase when one stands before a sarai at Hisor and sees Shaikh Chilli’s sarai at Thanesar. Indo-Persian reveals the distance it has travelled when a Tehran taxi driver mistakes it for Hindustani, and assumptions about Muslim practice collapse when an Imam asks a teetotal Maulana why he is not drinking. The Soviet past survives not simply in political histories but in a clean street, a covered market and the uniform of a schoolchild, while Imam ʿAli’s presence in Central Asia survives not in a chronicle but in a tree, a spring and the faith of those who still approach them for tabarruk. That was my Dushanbe of September 2002, reached on a journey begun on the first anniversary of 9/11, a trip of scholarship and friendship, anxiety and laughter, history and legend; above all, it was one of those journeys in which history repeatedly escaped from the books and confronted us in the most unexpected places.

The Pathetic Condition of Education in Karnataka: Magnificent Buildings, Empty Classrooms and Universities Without Teachers

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

I recently visited Dr Manmohan Singh Bengaluru City University and, at first sight, there is much to impress. One is dazzled by the magnificent heritage structures of the old Central College campus, reminders of Bangalore’s distinguished educational past. Alongside them stand flashing new multi-storeyed buildings housing departments and faculties, proclaiming expansion and confidence. The physical appearance suggests an institution on the move.

But walk away from the Vice-Chancellor’s office and well-maintained grounds, and another university reveals itself. Most of the corridors I passed through were strangely empty. So were many of the classrooms. Although I was told that it was the first day of the session, which universally remains crowded and bubbling with anticipation. There was little of the noise and movement one normally associates with a functioning campus. Even some students sitting in classrooms appeared listless. One should be cautious about drawing conclusions from a single visit – universities have busy days and quiet days – but the emptiness stayed with me.

Then I saw the statistics, something which the VC had spurted out without my comprehending. And suddenly, when confronted with it, what I had witnessed acquired a context. The entire university has only nine permanent teachers. Not nine professors. Not nine teachers in a particular faculty. Nine permanent teachers in the whole university. Against 161 sanctioned permanent teaching posts, only nine are occupied. There are 152 vacancies, meaning more than 94 per cent of the sanctioned permanent teaching establishment does not exist in practice. The university survives academically because it employs 217 guest lecturers. Its administrative position is almost equally astonishing: against 123 sanctioned permanent non-teaching posts, only six are occupied, with 143 outsourced workers keeping the institution functioning (Bangalore Mirror).

How does one run a university with nine permanent teachers? The answer is that one does not, at least not in the conventional sense. One creates an alternative arrangement where a tiny permanent establishment is surrounded by a much larger body of temporary teachers and outsourced employees who somehow keep classes, examinations and administration going.

I initially thought I had encountered an extreme and perhaps exceptional case. I was wrong. The figures for Karnataka as a whole are even more disturbing because they reveal that Bengaluru City University is not an isolated institutional failure. It is an extreme manifestation of a crisis that has spread through the state’s entire public university system. According to the latest figures placed before the Karnataka legislature, the state’s 32 public universities have 4,483 sanctioned permanent teaching posts. Only 1,477 are filled. No fewer than 3,006 are vacant. In other words, approximately 67 per cent of Karnataka’s sanctioned university teaching positions are empty. To keep the system functioning, universities employ around 3,434 guest lecturers – more than twice as many as permanent university teachers (Bangalore Mirror). The non-teaching establishment is in still worse condition. Of 8,989 sanctioned posts, only 2,604 are filled, with 6,385 vacant. Universities compensate by employing more than 4,000 contractual and outsourced workers (The Times of India).

These figures should cause alarm in any society that takes higher education seriously. Nor can the problem be dismissed as the teething difficulty of recently established universities. Bangalore University, one of the state’s principal institutions, has only 113 permanent teachers against 365 sanctioned positions – 252 vacancies – with 250 guest lecturers engaged to keep teaching going. On the administrative side, 838 of 1,176 sanctioned posts are vacant. The University of Mysore has more than 400 teaching vacancies, while Karnatak University, Dharwad, has nearly 400 (Bangalore Mirror).

At the other end of the spectrum are universities whose situation sounds almost surreal. Recent government data show institutions such as Maharani Cluster University and Nrupathunga University functioning without a single permanent teacher against large sanctioned establishments. In June 2026, Higher Education Department data indicated that eleven public universities in Karnataka had no permanent teacher at all (Deccan Herald). We have consequently arrived at the extraordinary phenomenon of the university without university teachers.

There are Vice-Chancellors and Registrars. There are university statutes, academic councils and syndicates. There are departments, examinations, degrees, convocations, websites, conferences and impressive buildings. Yet the people without whom a university cannot meaningfully exist – its permanent community of teachers and scholars – are steadily disappearing. In their place stands the ubiquitous guest lecturer. The terminology itself conceals the nature of the transformation. A guest is someone who comes temporarily. But when a person teaches the regular syllabus year after year, and when thousands of such people collectively perform much of the routine teaching of the state’s universities, they are hardly guests. They have become the academic workforce of the university without being granted the security, status or institutional role of university teachers. The latest figures make this unmistakable: Karnataka’s public universities have approximately 1,477 permanent teachers and 3,434 guest lecturers. In at least thirteen universities, the number of guest lecturers recently exceeded the entire sanctioned permanent faculty strength (Deccan Herald).

This has consequences far beyond salaries and employment conditions. A university teacher is not simply someone hired to deliver sixteen hours of lectures. Universities require people who build departments over decades, supervise research, train younger scholars, develop libraries and laboratories, revise curricula, organise seminars, undertake fieldwork, participate in academic bodies and acquire an enduring intellectual investment in their institutions. A temporary lecturer may be every bit as intelligent, qualified and committed as a permanent professor. Indeed, many of Karnataka’s guest teachers possess doctorates and have taught for years. Malini, an ad hoc teacher whom I met appeared articulate and enthusiastic. The problem lies not with them but with the conditions under which they are employed. One cannot expect people who are uncertain of employment from one academic year to the next to carry the same long-term institutional responsibilities as a permanent academic community. This is not flexibility. It is casualisation. And the handful of permanent? One of the 9 permanent staff whom we met was reluctant on every count. Why should they tax themselves? They already have the best of the world. Enough on our plate!

How did one of India’s educationally most advanced states reach this point? The easy answer would be to blame the present Congress government. That would be historically unfair. The crisis is much older. In 2023, before the present government had time to create it, reports were already describing vacancy rates of 75 to 90 per cent in some Karnataka universities. The University of Mysore then had 407 of 460 sanctioned teaching positions vacant, while Karnatak University had 386 vacancies out of 600. Several recently established universities had no permanent academic staff. Indeed, the guest-faculty problem had become acute under the previous BJP government. In January 2022, around 14,000 guest lecturers protested over their conditions. By early 2023 it was being reported that guest teachers constituted more than 70 per cent of the faculty in government first-grade colleges and state universities (The New Indian Express).

The proliferation of new universities compounded the problem. Seven new universities were created under the previous BJP government, ostensibly to expand access to higher education. Yet several were created without adequate land, buildings, finance or permanent personnel. The present government has itself acknowledged that some of these institutions are still operating from borrowed or rented premises and largely through guest and outsourced staff (Bangalore Mirror). So the present Congress government inherited a deeply damaged system when it came to power in May 2023. But inheritance cannot remain an explanation indefinitely.

The Congress has now governed Karnataka for more than three years, first under Siddaramaiah and, since June 2026, under D. K. Shivakumar. The legitimate question is therefore no longer whether the Congress created the crisis – it plainly did not – but whether it has acted with sufficient urgency to reverse it. The answer is mixed, but hardly reassuring. There were signs of concern almost immediately. In October 2023, Siddaramaiah instructed the Higher Education Department to fill 3,321 backlog posts and other vacancies, particularly in the Kalyana Karnataka region. His government also proceeded with recruitment initiated earlier for government first-grade colleges. By 2026 Siddaramaiah could point to 1,016 assistant professors appointed during 2024–25 in government first-grade colleges and to a process for filling 2,000 posts across government colleges, engineering colleges and polytechnics (The New Indian Express). These are real measures and should not be ignored.

The 2026 budget went further. The government announced that 1,000 teaching posts in public universities would be filled in phases after rationalisation, while permission had been accorded for filling 2,000 teaching posts in government first-grade colleges, engineering colleges, polytechnics and the University Visvesvaraya College of Engineering (The Tribune). By August 2026, the government stated in the Legislative Council that registrars of all 32 public universities had been asked to identify essential vacancies and submit workload-based proposals, to be examined department by department and subject by subject before recruitment proceeds (Bangalore Mirror). So it would be wrong to say that nothing has been done.

But it would be equally misleading to suggest that Karnataka has begun seriously repairing its universities. Three years after the Congress returned to power, 3,006 sanctioned permanent university teaching positions remain vacant. The government is now speaking of filling 1,000 of them in phases. Even if every one of those appointments is actually made, more than 2,000 existing vacancies would remain, and retirements will continue.

There is also something troubling in the language in which the problem has sometimes been discussed. At a Vice-Chancellors’ conference in February 2026, Siddaramaiah acknowledged that irregular recruitment over two decades had left 60 to 70 per cent of teaching posts vacant. But when Vice-Chancellors complained about shortages, he also asked why guest lecturers could not be regarded as part of the workforce and drew a comparison with visiting professors at leading universities internationally (The Times of India). The comparison is difficult to sustain. A visiting professor at Oxford, Harvard or any other major university supplements a large permanent academic establishment. The visitor brings additional expertise to an institution whose departments already possess professors, associate professors and lecturers. A guest lecturer who substitutes for a permanent teacher because the state has left a sanctioned position vacant for ten years performs an entirely different function. One represents academic enrichment. The other represents institutional substitution. Confusing the two risks turning an emergency measure into a philosophy of university governance.

There is also a curious contradiction between the enthusiasm for new educational initiatives and the reluctance to provide the permanent human infrastructure required to sustain existing institutions. Karnataka speaks of artificial intelligence, Centres of Excellence, skill development, innovation hubs and collaboration with industry. These may all be worthwhile. The government has announced a ₹2,500 crore higher-education transformation programme with Asian Development Bank support and ambitious plans for new technology and research initiatives (The Times of India). Yet the basic question remains unanswered: who will teach the students? A university cannot be transformed digitally if it has no professors. Artificial intelligence cannot supervise a doctoral thesis in history, conduct archaeological fieldwork, run a chemistry laboratory, teach a difficult philosophical text or build a school of scholarship over a generation. Technology can assist teachers. It cannot substitute for an academic community.

The problem is therefore larger than Congress or BJP. The present crisis has developed over nearly two decades and through governments of different political colours. Former university administrators themselves describe it as the consequence of a long policy drift in which governments have been reluctant to assume the continuing financial liability involved in permanent appointments. Salaries and pensions cost money. Guest lecturers and outsourced employees are cheaper (Deccan Herald). There lies perhaps the real explanation. What Karnataka is experiencing is not simply a recruitment failure. It is the gradual transformation of the conception of public education. Governments continue to want universities, but appear increasingly reluctant to pay the full cost of maintaining them as universities.

A building is a capital expenditure and produces something visible. A new block can be inaugurated, photographed and named. A new university can be announced in a budget speech. A Centre of Excellence can be launched with banners and publicity. Permanent teachers are different. They represent a commitment extending over decades. The temptation is therefore obvious: build the institution, appoint the senior administration, hire temporary teachers and keep the machinery moving. The institution survives statistically. Students are enrolled. Classes appear on timetables. Examinations are conducted. Degrees are awarded. Convocations take place. Government reports can therefore record that a university exists and that so many thousands of young people are receiving higher education. But education cannot ultimately be measured by the number of students registered or degrees distributed.

This brings me back to those empty corridors I encountered in Bangalore. Perhaps what disturbed me was not simply their physical emptiness. It was the possibility that they symbolised something larger. The buildings were there. The classrooms were there. The departments were there. The students were there. What was disappearing was the permanent academic community that gives all these things meaning.

And the crisis extends below the university. Karnataka has also been confronting enormous vacancies in its school system. In 2026 the government approved recruitment of 15,000 school teachers, an important measure, but this has to be set against more than 50,000 vacancies in primary schools and nearly 10,000 in high schools (Bangalore Mirror). Again, the problem did not originate with the present government. Again, the present government has taken steps. And again, the scale of the response remains smaller than the accumulated deficit.

It would therefore be unfair to turn Karnataka’s educational crisis into a simple indictment of one party. The BJP government created new universities without providing many of them with adequate permanent establishments. Earlier governments had already allowed recruitment to stagnate. The Congress inherited this system in 2023 and has initiated recruitment in colleges and schools and now promises phased university recruitment. But governments must ultimately be judged not merely by whether they are less responsible for creating a problem than their predecessors, but by whether they solve it.

After more than three years of Congress rule and two Chief Ministers, Karnataka’s universities still have roughly two-thirds of their sanctioned permanent teaching posts vacant. Eleven public universities were reported as recently as June 2026 to have no permanent teachers whatsoever. Thousands of guest lecturers remain indispensable to the daily survival of the university system (Deccan Herald). That makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that education remains somewhere on the back burner, irrespective of the political colour of the government in power.

Every political party speaks reverentially of education. Every government celebrates innovation, skill development and the knowledge economy. Politicians compete to establish universities and colleges in their constituencies. But the less glamorous business of maintaining libraries, filling laboratories, recruiting teachers and building durable academic departments receives much less attention. The tragedy is particularly striking in Karnataka because this is not a poor state without intellectual resources. Bengaluru is one of the great technological centres of Asia. Karnataka possesses some of India’s finest scientific and research institutions. The University of Mysore, Bangalore University and Karnatak University have distinguished intellectual histories. The state has produced scholars, scientists, writers and teachers of international standing. It possesses the resources and the intellectual tradition to create one of India’s finest public educational systems.

Instead, we have reached a point where a university with 161 sanctioned teaching posts can function with nine permanent teachers, while others can apparently function with none. There is something profoundly wrong when such figures cease to shock us. The immediate requirement is not another committee or another declaration of intent. Karnataka needs a transparent, academically rigorous and time-bound programme for filling permanent teaching and non-teaching vacancies. Guest lecturers who have kept these institutions alive must be treated with dignity and properly remunerated, but temporary employment cannot remain the permanent solution to permanent academic requirements. Nor should universities continue proliferating until the state demonstrates that it can adequately staff those it already possesses.

Above all, we need to recover an elementary truth that seems to have been lost amid the vocabulary of rankings, skills, innovation, employability and artificial intelligence. Education requires teachers. Magnificent heritage buildings can remind us of a great educational past. Glittering new multi-storeyed blocks can promise an impressive future. But between the heritage building and the glass-and-concrete tower stands the classroom. If the classroom has no teacher, both the past and the promised future become meaningless.

That was perhaps the most unsettling impression I carried away from Bangalore. The crisis of Karnataka’s education is not that it lacks impressive institutions on paper. It is that behind increasingly impressive façades, the human foundations of those institutions are being allowed to disappear. It also explains to me why the VC of Dr Manmohan Singh Bangaluru Central University was so reluctant to go ahead with the organising of the forthcoming session of the IHC which he had initially promised.

Source of Information

· Bangalore Mirror: 25 August 2026 edition. Article: “Staff Shortages Cripple Bengaluru’s Public Universities: Nearly 82% Teaching Posts Vacant”.
· The Times of India: 21 February 2026 edition. Article: “Align recruitment with AI, Siddaramaiah advises universities”.
· Deccan Herald:
· 1 January 2025 edition. Article: “10 public universities in Karnataka do not have any permanent teaching or non-teaching staff”.
· 21 June 2026 edition. Article: “Guest faculty keep public varsities breathing in Karnataka”.
· 4 April 2026 edition. Article: “Faculty Shortage: Karnataka Relies on Guest Lecturers”.
· 6 March 2026 edition. Article: “Karnataka Budget 2026| Student unions, new courses: What it means for higher education”.
· The New Indian Express: 15 January 2022 edition. Article: “Despite hike in honorarium, guest lecturers to continue protest”
· The Tribune: 6 March 2026 edition. Article: “Karnataka Budget 2026” (referenced indirectly via Deccan Herald’s coverage of the budget).

Schools of Indian History: From Colonial Historiography to Marxist, Subaltern, Feminist and Postcolonial Interpretations

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

There is a certain paradox in speaking of “schools” of Indian history. Historians do not ordinarily enrol themselves in schools in quite the manner that the term suggests. D. D. Kosambi, R. S. Sharma and Irfan Habib were all Marxist historians, yet they did not interpret every historical problem in precisely the same way. R. C. Majumdar was a nationalist in one sense, conservative in another, and could adopt positions on medieval India that brought him remarkably close to explicitly communal interpretations. Ranajit Guha began within a broadly Marxist intellectual universe, yet the Subaltern Studies project that he inaugurated eventually moved considerably beyond Marxism. Some of the most influential historians writing today could not easily be accommodated within any single historiographical school.

Yet the idea of schools remains useful because Indian history has never consisted simply of the accumulation of facts. Historians have repeatedly disagreed about the meaning of the same facts. Was British rule fundamentally an agency of modernisation or a structure of colonial exploitation? Was medieval India essentially an age of Hindu-Muslim conflict, or did political and economic divisions cut across religious identities? Was nationalism principally the achievement of an educated middle-class leadership, or did peasants, workers, tribal communities and other subordinated groups possess political histories of their own? Was early Indian society organised primarily through religion and caste ideology, or must caste itself be understood in relation to production, labour and social power?

Behind each of these questions lies another: what makes one interpretation of history more convincing than another?

This was the problem with which Irfan Habib began his Interpreting Indian History, originally delivered as the Zakir Husain Memorial Lectures in 1985. Historical evidence, he argued, cannot resemble the evidence produced in a laboratory. The past cannot be experimentally repeated. Sources are produced by people with their own prejudices and interests, while the survival of evidence is itself accidental and unequal. The historian then performs another act of selection by deciding which surviving facts matter. Objectivity therefore cannot mean the absence of interpretation. A historian who refuses consciously to interpret merely reproduces, often unknowingly, somebody else’s interpretation.

Habib consequently insisted that the rewriting of history is not necessarily evidence of the failure of the discipline. On the contrary, the past must continually be reconsidered as new evidence becomes available, new questions are asked and changes in the present enable historians to recognise processes that earlier generations could not see. Historical interpretation requires, in his formulation, repeated exploration of evidence and the continuous re-questioning of inherited assumptions.

This provides a useful way of understanding the successive schools of Indian historiography. Each arose partly because an earlier interpretation appeared inadequate. Each enlarged the historical field by asking questions that its predecessors had neglected. Yet each also developed assumptions and exclusions of its own.

The Colonial Construction of Indian History

Modern academic Indian historiography developed under colonial rule, and this fact profoundly influenced its earliest organising categories.

James Mill’s History of British India (1817) famously divided India’s past into Hindu, Muslim and British periods. Mill himself had never visited India, but his periodisation proved extraordinarily durable. Ancient India became identified with Hindu civilisation, the centuries of the Sultanates and Mughals with Muslim rule, and British conquest with the beginning of a supposedly rational and progressive order.

This was not innocent chronology. It contained a theory of historical development.

India before British rule was represented as stagnant, despotic, irrational and divided by religion. British rule could therefore be presented not merely as conquest but as historical deliverance. The colonial state supplied law, rational administration, private property, modern education and ultimately political unity to a civilisation supposedly incapable of generating these things itself.

The Orientalists did not always share this contempt. William Jones and other eighteenth-century Orientalists expressed considerable admiration for Sanskrit literature and ancient Indian civilisation. But admiration for India’s antiquity could coexist remarkably easily with assumptions about its subsequent decline. Indeed, the celebration of a glorious ancient India sometimes strengthened the argument that contemporary India had degenerated from its former greatness.

The interpretation became particularly consequential in medieval history. H. M. Elliot announced in 1844 that he intended to extract from Persian chronicles evidence of forced conversions, confiscations, murders and massacres. As Habib pointed out, Elliot’s purpose was explicitly political: to contrast the alleged oppression of earlier Muslim rulers with British government and thereby weaken Indian criticism of colonial rule.

Colonial historiography thus did something whose consequences long survived colonialism. It converted religious identities into the principal actors of Indian history.

Instead of states, ruling classes, peasants, merchants, zamindars, artisans, castes and regional communities interacting within changing political circumstances, there emerged two apparently permanent historical subjects: Hindus and Muslims.

The Communal Schools: Two Narratives, One Historical Structure

From this colonial interpretation emerged what Habib called the two communal schools of Indian history.

Their political sympathies were opposite, but their historical architecture was remarkably similar.

The Hindu communal interpretation regarded medieval India essentially as a period of Muslim domination over Hindus. The Muslim communal interpretation celebrated much the same political order as Muslim achievement and increasingly imagined Indian Muslims as a historically continuous political community.

Habib’s comparison between R. C. Majumdar and I. H. Qureshi is particularly revealing. Majumdar’s account treated Hindus as a subject population under Muslim governments; Qureshi interpreted Muslim political history as a prolonged struggle against Hindu encroachment. Their heroes and villains differed, but both assumed precisely what required demonstration: that Hindus and Muslims existed through the medieval centuries as internally coherent and politically antagonistic communities.

This was history read backwards from nineteenth- and twentieth-century communal politics.

The difficulty is not that religious conflict did not occur. Temples were destroyed; rebellions could acquire religious language; rulers patronised particular religious institutions; discrimination existed. The historiographical question is whether religion provides the principal explanatory structure for medieval Indian history.

Once administrative documents, revenue records, commercial evidence, inscriptions, regional literature and the social composition of ruling elites are examined, the picture becomes considerably more complicated. Muslim rulers fought Muslim rulers; Rajputs served Mughal emperors against other Rajputs; Marathas fought Marathas; zamindars resisted revenue demands irrespective of the religion of the revenue collector; merchants formed networks that crossed religious boundaries; and political alliances repeatedly violated any simple Hindu-Muslim division.

The communal interpretation therefore suffers from precisely the problem against which historians constantly have to guard: it transforms modern political identities into timeless historical communities.

Its continued attraction nevertheless demonstrates that historiographical schools do not necessarily disappear when academically challenged. They may survive, and sometimes become politically more influential outside professional historical scholarship than within it.

The Nationalist School

Nationalist historiography emerged partly as a reply to colonial denigration.

If imperial historians argued that Indians were incapable of political unity, nationalists searched for evidence of unity. If British writers described Indian civilisation as stagnant, nationalists emphasised its intellectual, economic and cultural achievements. If colonialism presented itself as benevolent modernisation, Indian economic nationalists demonstrated its material costs.

Dadabhai Naoroji’s theory of the drain, R. C. Dutt’s economic history and later studies of deindustrialisation transformed the understanding of British rule. Colonialism could now be studied not merely through administrative reforms and governors-general but through transfers of wealth, taxation, handicraft decline and impoverishment.

Habib regarded this economic critique as one of nationalism’s enduring achievements. He insisted that the drain of wealth was not merely nationalist rhetoric but a proposition requiring serious economic investigation, and argued that colonial economic history could not simply dismiss the cumulative consequences of a sustained transfer of resources from India to Britain.

Nationalist historiography also generated a different understanding of medieval India. Tara Chand’s Influence of Islam on Indian Culture and Mohammad Habib’s work challenged communal assumptions and stressed interaction rather than perpetual religious antagonism. Tara Chand emphasised the composite character of Indian civilisation, while Mohammad Habib subjected figures such as Mahmud of Ghazni to historical rather than communal evaluation.

The Allahabad historians, including R. P. Tripathi and others, carried this approach into detailed institutional history. Their importance lay in demonstrating from sources that the medieval state could not simply be equated with a religious community.

Yet nationalism created problems of its own. In answering colonial assertions that India lacked unity, historians sometimes searched for an Indian nation too far back into the past. Political integration under Ashoka, Akbar or the Mughals could too readily become an anticipation of modern nationalism. The legitimate attempt to recover cultural interaction could occasionally romanticise “composite culture” and underplay conflict, hierarchy and inequality.

Nationalist historiography corrected colonialism, but nationalism itself could become an anachronism when projected into periods before the emergence of modern national consciousness.

Marxism and the Transformation of the Historical Question

The most important methodological transformation in twentieth-century Indian historiography came with Marxist history.

Its significance cannot be reduced to the application of a prefabricated sequence of slavery, feudalism and capitalism. Habib himself explicitly rejected such mechanical Marxism and observed that Marx had been badly served by followers who attempted to impose a rigid universal sequence of social formations.

The more important contribution was a change in the object of historical enquiry.

Kings remained important, but historians increasingly asked what happened beneath the court. How was the agricultural surplus extracted? Who owned or controlled land? What was the relationship between peasant and zamindar? How were artisans organised? What happened to commerce and urbanisation? What was the relationship between technology and production? How did caste interact with the division of labour? What social interests sustained states?

D. D. Kosambi was crucial to this transformation. He combined texts, archaeology, numismatics, anthropology and field observation in attempting to reconstruct social formations rather than dynastic sequences. R. S. Sharma developed the debate over Indian feudalism, land grants and changing relations of production. Romila Thapar transformed the study of early India by treating political institutions, lineage, state formation and ideology historically rather than accepting textual categories as transparent descriptions of society.

For medieval India, Mohammad Habib had already moved towards a social interpretation, but the work of Irfan Habib, Satish Chandra, M. Athar Ali, Nurul Hasan, Tapan Raychaudhuri and others created an especially powerful tradition of economic, social and institutional history.

The so-called Aligarh School became particularly associated with Mughal history. The mansab, jagir, zamindar, revenue system, agrarian production, ruling class, merchant, artisan and peasant replaced the emperor alone as the central subjects of historical enquiry. Athar Ali’s reconstruction of the Mughal nobility demonstrated its changing ethnic and social composition. Satish Chandra connected political crisis with the jagirdari system and agrarian relations. Irfan Habib’s Agrarian System of Mughal India reconstructed the relationship between state, zamindar and peasant through an extraordinary range of Persian sources.

This scholarship also fundamentally weakened communal interpretations of the Mughal Empire. Once the ruling class was examined empirically, the notion of a monolithic Muslim state confronting a Hindu population became difficult to sustain.

The great contribution of Marxist historiography was therefore not simply “class struggle”. It was the insistence that social structures have histories.

Its weakness appeared when economic explanation hardened into economic reductionism. Culture, gender, religion, language, emotion and political imagination could not always be explained adequately as reflections of material relations. The best Marxist historians recognised this; less sophisticated applications sometimes did not.

The Cambridge School and the Attack on Nationalism

During the 1960s and 1970s another interpretation emerged, associated especially with Cambridge historians such as Anil Seal, John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and their associates.

Where nationalist historians saw an anti-colonial movement and Marxists analysed the class basis of nationalism, the Cambridge School concentrated upon political competition, patronage, local networks and elite interests.

Anil Seal’s The Emergence of Indian Nationalism became its emblematic work. Political leaders who spoke the language of nationalism could, from this perspective, also be understood as members of local, caste and regional networks competing for influence and access to the colonial state.

This was a useful corrective to heroic nationalist history. Political leaders were not disembodied embodiments of the nation. They possessed careers, patrons, rivals, caste affiliations and material interests.

But explanation could easily become reduction.

Habib’s criticism was that the Cambridge School’s problem lay less in the facts it uncovered than in the setting into which it placed them. Seal’s emphasis upon competition among elites diminished both the reality of colonial exploitation and the ideological transformation by which individuals could transcend, however incompletely, local loyalties. The nationalist critique of colonial economic policy, elaborated in works such as Bipan Chandra’s Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, could not simply be reduced to competition for offices and patronage.

The larger question was whether nationalism was merely what nationalist politicians did, or whether ideas themselves could become historical forces.

Subaltern Studies: History from Below

The next major challenge came from within the Left.

Beginning with the first volume of Subaltern Studies edited by Ranajit Guha in 1982, historians including Shahid Amin, David Hardiman, Gyanendra Pandey, Gautam Bhadra, Dipesh Chakrabarty and others argued that Indian historiography remained overwhelmingly elitist.

Colonial history attributed political change to British administrators. Nationalist history attributed it to nationalist leaders. Even Marxist history, Subaltern historians argued, could sometimes reduce peasants to social classes whose political consciousness was interpreted through structures formulated by intellectuals.

What about the peasants themselves?

Guha proposed an autonomous domain of subaltern politics. Peasant rebellion possessed its own vocabulary, symbols, rumours, memories and conceptions of authority. Popular politics did not simply reproduce elite nationalism in diluted form.

Habib welcomed the attempt to recover workers, peasants and tribal peoples but disputed the strong claim of autonomous subaltern consciousness. He argued that peasant politics could not be isolated from ideas circulating through wider society and pointed out that Marxist historians had already recognised both spontaneous peasant resistance and tensions between popular movements and nationalist leadership. His deeper objection was that elite and subaltern politics interacted: peasant movements changed nationalism, but nationalism also changed peasant consciousness.

That disagreement remains important.

But Subaltern Studies itself changed. What began partly as radical social history increasingly encountered anthropology, literary theory, Edward Said, Michel Foucault and post-structuralism. Dipesh Chakrabarty has himself described this movement from a project related to Marxist “history from below” towards a wider postcolonial critique of historical knowledge.

The question was no longer simply: where are the peasants in history?

It became: whose categories make historical knowledge possible?

Postcolonial History and the Critique of Europe

This transition produced another influential historiographical formation.

Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe crystallised the problem. Categories such as capitalism, modernity, citizenship, secularism and historical progress emerged from particular European experiences but acquired apparently universal authority. How could Indian history be written without making Europe the implicit standard against which every other society appeared early, late, incomplete or deficient?

This critique produced important insights. Colonialism was not merely political domination or economic extraction; it also created categories of knowledge. Census classifications, ethnography, law, caste enumeration, linguistic categories and notions of religious community did not simply describe Indian society. In certain circumstances they helped reshape it.

The influence of Bernard Cohn, Edward Said and later postcolonial scholarship encouraged historians to interrogate the archive itself. A colonial document was no longer merely a source containing information. Its classifications, vocabulary and silences themselves became historical evidence.

Yet postcolonial history produced its own danger. If discourse becomes overwhelmingly powerful, material structures can disappear. Peasants still paid revenue; workers still received wages; famines killed real people; forests were physically appropriated; wealth actually moved between colony and metropolis. The archive may construct categories, but it does not construct everything that happened outside it.

The strongest subsequent scholarship has therefore tended to combine rather than choose between material and discursive history.

A significant recent intervention is Benjamin Zachariah’s After the Last Post: The Lives of Indian Historiography (2023), which addresses the politics of historical production in India while warning against the pitfalls of postcolonial consciousness itself. Zachariah interrogates how history-writing and history-reading have functioned in public debates, often through processes of memorialisation that serve collective identities. His work exemplifies a growing tendency to treat postcolonial theory not as a final settlement but as another set of assumptions requiring historical scrutiny.

Feminist and Gender History

Another transformation was taking place at roughly the same time.

Women had certainly appeared in older histories, but usually when they became queens, reformers, nationalist leaders or exceptional personalities. Feminist historiography asked a more fundamental question: what happens if gender itself becomes a category of historical analysis?

The work of historians such as Uma Chakravarti, Kumkum Sangari, Sudesh Vaid, Tanika Sarkar, Geraldine Forbes, Gail Minault, Lata Mani and others transformed the field. Recasting Women, edited by Sangari and Vaid, was especially influential in demonstrating that gender could not simply be added to an already completed political or social history. Gender relations helped constitute caste, community, labour, property and nationalism.

The field has subsequently moved beyond the recovery of “women” towards the histories of gender and sexuality. As Charu Gupta has emphasised, neither “woman” nor gender can be treated as a homogeneous or biologically self-explanatory category; both have to be located within changing structures of caste, class, sexuality and power.

This was not simply the creation of another special field called women’s history. It altered the questions asked of Indian history as a whole.

Recent scholarship continues to extend these insights. Janaki Nair’s Women and Colonial Law: A Feminist Social History (2025) introduces students to key colonial moments that have shaped women’s legal status up to the present day, tracking shifts and changes that have occurred over the last thirty years. Lata Singh and Shashank Shekhar Sinha’s edited volume Gender in Modern India: History, Culture, Marginality (2024) brings together pioneering research on themes including social reforms, caste, Adivasis, patriarchy, colonialism, capitalism, political economy, labour, masculinity, sexuality, health and migration. The volume examines the gender question through a multilayered and multi-dimensional frame in which interdisciplinarity and intersectionality play an important role, using case studies from diverse geographies and community locations.

Dalit History and the Challenge to the Older Schools

Perhaps the most important extension of this critique has come from Dalit historiography.

Subaltern history had promised history from below, but “the subaltern” could itself become an abstraction. Caste was not merely another example of subordination. Dalit historians and scholars of anti-caste movements increasingly insisted that caste possessed its own structures of power and historical memory.

The writings of B. R. Ambedkar, Jyotirao Phule and other anti-caste intellectuals consequently came to be read not merely as sources for political history but as works of historical interpretation themselves.

More recent Dalit Studies has explicitly challenged the old colonialism-versus-nationalism binary. Ramnarayan Rawat and K. Satyanarayana’s Dalit Studies, for example, places humiliation, dignity and spatial exclusion at the centre of historical enquiry and asks how Dalit intellectuals themselves conceptualised emancipation.

This intervention has in turn been criticised from within. Shailaja Paik has shown that Dalit history could reproduce a male-centred account of Dalit experience. Dalit women’s history requires the simultaneous examination of caste, class, gender and sexuality rather than treating any one of them as sufficient. Paik’s The Vulgarity of Caste: Dalits, Sexuality, and Humanity in Modern India (2022) offers the first social and intellectual history of Dalit performance of Tamasha, examining how Dalit performers negotiated violence and stigma while struggling to claim human dignity. Drawing on ethnographies, films and untapped archival materials, Paik demonstrates how choices that communities make about culture speak to much larger questions about inclusion, inequality and the structures of caste violence. Her work builds on and departs from Ambedkar-centred historiography by examining the ordinary and everyday in Dalit lives. The development continues: recent scholarship explicitly treats Dalit women not merely as objects whose experiences historians recover but as producers of historical and theoretical knowledge in their own right.

Here the idea of separate historiographical “schools” begins to break down. Feminist, Dalit, labour and subaltern histories intersect without becoming identical.

Environmental History and New Historical Subjects

Another field scarcely visible when Habib delivered his lectures in 1985 has since become substantial: environmental history.

Forests, rivers, animals, climate, irrigation, disease and ecological change were once treated largely as background scenery against which human history occurred. Environmental historians instead asked how relations between human societies and nature changed historically.

Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha’s This Fissured Land, Guha’s The Unquiet Woods, and subsequent work by many scholars connected forest policy, colonialism, communities, resource use and resistance. Environmental history in South Asia has since expanded far beyond colonial forestry to encompass water, animals, climate, disease, urban environments and the ecological history of pre-colonial societies. Michael Fisher describes successive waves in a field that has moved from the study of resistance to state-backed exploitation towards much broader investigations of changing relationships among human beings, other species and the material environment.

Ramachandra Guha’s Speaking with Nature: The Origins of Indian Environmentalism (2024) represents a major recent contribution, challenging the orthodox assumption that countries like India are “too poor to be green” and revealing a virtually unknown prehistory of environmental thought set far outside Europe or America. Guha identifies ten remarkable individuals who wrote with deep insight about environmental abuse from within an Indian context, long before Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and posits the idea of “livelihood environmentalism” in contrast to the “full-stomach environmentalism” of the affluent world.

This development again illustrates Habib’s central insight. Historical significance changes when the historian changes the question.

A forest that appears in an imperial archive as “waste”, in a revenue document as taxable land and in a nationalist history as territory may appear in environmental history as an ecosystem, a livelihood and a contested political resource simultaneously.

Global and Connected Histories

A further transformation has been the turn towards global and connected histories. Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s concept of “connected histories”, first advanced in 1997, has been accepted, contested and modified by many since. His Across the Green Sea: Histories from the Western Indian Ocean, 1440-1640 (2024) exemplifies this approach, scanning the intricate links between trade, politics and cultural exchange across the western Indian Ocean. Subrahmanyam supplements the heavy reliance on early Portuguese texts to recover a history with a far greater variety of actors and interests, written from a diversity of perspectives. This scholarship places India within movements of people, commodities, technologies, texts and ideas across the Indian Ocean, Central Asia and Eurasia, challenging the nation-state as the natural container of historical enquiry.

New Directions: Masculinity and Gender

One of the most significant developments in recent Indian historiography has been the emergence of masculinity as a distinct field of historical enquiry. The earliest writings on masculinity in the context of India were within the discipline of history, and works on modern history effectively demonstrated that masculinity and femininity were important nodes for the organisation of power in the colonial context. Mrinalini Sinha’s Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century (1995) was pioneering in this regard. Sinha argued that the emerging dynamics between colonial and nationalist politics in the 1880s and 1890s in India is best captured in the logic of colonial masculinity. The figures of the “manly Englishman” and the “effeminate Bengali” were constituted in relation to colonial Indian society as well as to aspects of late nineteenth-century British society, including the emergence of the “New Woman”, the remaking of the working class and the anti-feminist backlash of the 1880s and 1890s. Sinha traced the impact of colonial masculinity through four specific controversies: the “white mutiny” against the Ilbert Bill in 1883, the official response to the Native Volunteer movement in 1885, the recommendations of the Public Service Commission of 1886, and the Indian opposition to the Age of Consent Bill in 1891.

The historiography of colonial India has thus played a significant role in early studies of masculinities, taking interest in understanding the dynamic of Indian nationalism and the gender discourse in India. As one scholar put it, the question of “what is involved in writing a history of masculinity” finds important contributions from the historiography of colonial India.

In nineteenth-century Bengal, the recovery of lost manhood became a dominant aspect of the Hindu nationalist project, with the single aim of metamorphosing the effeminate Hindu Bengali into a virile citizen. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee’s essays challenged longstanding Victorian gender binaries and participated in broader historiographical debates on the construction of colonial masculinity and virility in Anglophone discourses. This concern with masculinity was not confined to Bengal. In early twentieth-century North India, masculinity became a site of power, hierarchy and resistance, articulated through Hindi vernacular print. Charu Gupta’s recent work on “Performing Masculinities” (2025) examines three key narratives: upper-caste Hindu masculinity in the shuddhi and sangathan movements, ascetic celibacy in the writings of Satyadev Parivrajak, and representations of Dalit manhood. While dominant Hindu masculinities reinforced caste and gender norms, Dalit men redefined manhood as a mode of assertion and dignity. The study highlights masculinity’s dual role as both a hegemonic tool and a medium for subaltern dissent and egalitarian aspirations.

The intersection of masculinity with caste has become an increasingly important area of enquiry. Dalit masculinity has largely been studied as a footnote to two larger conversations: Brahmanical patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity. Yet the Dalit male body disturbs the idea of masculinity in colonial India in ways that have not always been readily recognised. The physical violence enacted upon Dalit men, their simultaneous hypersexualisation and debasement, and the weaponisation of the masculine imperative itself by Brahmanical patriarchy have all emerged as subjects of sustained investigation.

Recent scholarship has also explored masculinity in relation to militarisation and conflict. In Kashmir, Amya Agarwal’s Contesting Masculinities and Women’s Agency in Kashmir (2022) unearths a “mosaic of masculinities”, showing how different forms of masculinity coexist and conflict within a securitised and militarised environment, complicating the narrative of a singular, dominant masculinity. In Assam, Uddipana Goswami’s Gendering Peace in Violent Peripheries (2022) highlights the role of “hegemonic masculinity”, where hypermasculine ideals tied to ethnic identity and militarisation exacerbate ongoing violence and suppress alternative forms of agency. Both works explore how militarisation, ethnic fragmentation and state violence construct and reinforce patriarchal power through the performance of masculinities. The study of masculinities in conflict zones has been further extended by research on civilian men in India’s “disturbed areas”, which argues that amid the extreme and violent forms of masculinities of military and militant groups, civilian men reconfigure a new form of masculinity: “lesser” but more humanistic.

The domestic sphere has also emerged as a crucial site for the study of masculinity. Gyanendra Pandey’s Men at Home: Imagining Liberation in Colonial and Postcolonial India (2025) offers a detailed exploration of men’s comportment and conduct in the home and the implications of their ambiguous commitment to this critical part of their lives. Pandey draws on autobiographies, memoirs, fiction and ethnographies to situate Indian men firmly in the domestic world, underlining their dependence on the family and home. He investigates how men negotiate marriage, intimacy and conjugality, and focuses on the effects of the humiliating and constant assertion of gender, caste and class power in familial interactions. As much as it is a book about masculinity and conjugality, it is also a book about Indian modernity, nationalism and society as seen from the location of men in the home.

Popular culture, particularly Bollywood, has become another important arena for the study of masculinity. The image of the “angry young man” of the 1970s and 1980s gave way to the “creative young man” of subsequent decades, which in turn led to the “metrosexual male”. The image of the muscular hero gained prominence around the 1990s, when socialist goals were replaced by economic liberalisation. Interpretations of manhood have unfolded within a middle-class cultural milieu shaped by assertive self-confidence fuelled by liberalisation and the prominence of Hindutva politics. The desire for muscular masculinity, intertwined with nationalism during the colonial era, is now being re-enacted in contemporary India with neoliberal influence.

The relationship between masculinity and Hindu nationalism has been the subject of sustained enquiry. Prem Kumar Vijayan’s Gender and Hindu Nationalism: Understanding Masculine Hegemony (2019) argues that Hindu nationalist thought and predilections emerge out of and in turn feed pre-existing gendered tendencies, specifically Brahmanical masculine hegemony. The image of an aggressive male warrior is central to certain versions of Hindu nationalism, embedded within a political narrative that declares its affinity for ideas of resolute masculinity. This has been described as “Hindu muscular nationalism”, fusing the concept of a Hindu India with armed masculinity.

Queer and non-normative masculinities have also begun to receive historical attention. The study of “female masculinity” in India embodies what has been described as a double failure: that of a racialised, postcolonial subjectivity perpetually one step outside of modernity, and that of queer masculinity seen only as a failed copy of dominant, Hindu nationalist masculinity. Queer masculinity in Indian cinema has never been only about identity but about how men learn to live within, and sometimes disrupt, the script of masculinity imposed on them.

The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) and Nirantar conducted a comprehensive literature review on men, masculinities and feminist theorisation in 2024, bringing together theoretical, historical and programmatic insights to examine how masculinities are constructed and contested in India. The review traces the evolution of masculinity studies globally and contextualises them within India’s complex socio-political and historical realities, ranging from colonial legacies and caste hierarchies to nationalism, religion and sexual identities. It calls for a deeper, feminist-rooted understanding of masculinity as a social, intersectional and power-laden construct.

From Schools to Multiple Histories

Indian historiography today is therefore considerably more plural than the historiographical world Habib surveyed four decades ago.

The old schools have not vanished. Marxist history continues to produce important work on class, labour, agrarian relations and political economy. Subaltern history has permanently altered the treatment of popular politics. Feminist history has made gender indispensable. Dalit and Adivasi scholarship has challenged the social location from which historical knowledge itself is produced. Environmental history has enlarged the very category of historical agency. Postcolonial scholarship has made historians more suspicious of apparently neutral categories. Global and connected histories have increasingly placed India within wider frameworks. The study of masculinity has added yet another dimension, demonstrating that gender is not merely a matter of women’s history but a structuring principle of power, hierarchy and resistance across the entire historical record.

Nor has the older historiography simply been superseded. Many questions raised by Kosambi, Sharma, Athar Ali, Satish Chandra or Habib remain unresolved. The debate over Indian feudalism, for example, may no longer be conducted in precisely the language of the 1960s and 1970s, but the underlying questions about land rights, political decentralisation, urbanisation, monetisation and agrarian surplus remain historical problems. Habib himself warned against treating a universal sequence of social formations mechanically and insisted instead upon comparison of economic relationships across periods.

The same applies to Mughal history. The Aligarh School’s reconstruction of institutions and material structures has not been rendered obsolete by newer cultural history. Scholarship on Persianate culture, gender, literary production, courtly knowledge, regionality and connected histories has enlarged the picture. It need not require abandoning what we know about the mansabdari system, revenue extraction, agrarian relations or the composition of the nobility. The more productive question is how these dimensions interacted.

This may be the most important historiographical development of recent decades. The strongest historical scholarship increasingly occurs between schools rather than within them.

A historian may employ quantitative evidence without being an economic determinist, analyse discourse without denying material reality, recover subaltern agency without assuming complete autonomy, investigate religion without accepting communal categories, write gender history while simultaneously examining caste and class, and study masculinity without losing sight of femininity or queer subjectivities.

The Return of an Older Problem

There is, however, another reason why the history of historiographical schools matters today.

Interpretations that professional historical research had substantially challenged have returned with considerable force in public culture. The colonial division of India’s past into Hindu, Muslim and British epochs survives in altered form. Medieval history is again frequently reduced to a ledger of temples destroyed and rulers classified according to religion. Historical individuals are recruited into contemporary political identities that would have been incomprehensible to them.

The irony is considerable. A history presented as a recovery of an indigenous Indian past can reproduce one of the most enduring intellectual constructions of colonial historiography: the assumption that religion supplies the fundamental division of Indian history.

Recent controversies over school textbooks illustrate the stakes. The NCERT’s revised history curriculum for 2025-26 has reduced entire chapters on the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal dynasty to passing references, effectively erasing centuries of cultural, political and architectural contribution. Critics have charged that this promotes a narrow, majoritarian political narrative. The new textbooks have also been accused of applying different standards of “truth-telling” to Hindu and Muslim rulers alike. As one commentator put it, the sophisticated productions of three generations of post-Independence historians have been thrust into the dubious category of being dishonest. The old colonial division of Indian history into Hindu, Muslim and British periods, which professional historians had largely displaced through re-periodisations such as “Early India” and “Early Modern”, has returned in altered form.

This does not mean that historians should construct a comforting past in response. The answer to communal history cannot be nationalist mythology. Evidence of conflict cannot be suppressed in the name of composite culture any more than evidence of collaboration can be suppressed in the name of religious conflict.

The historian’s obligation is harder.

New Directions: Beyond Established Binaries

Recent scholarship has also begun to challenge some of the foundational binaries that have structured Indian historiography. Shonaleeka Kaul’s Bharata Before the British and Other Essays: Towards a New Indology (2024) argues that colonial prisms have been widely used to view the country, and that Indian literary sources have been viewed through a lens that the West used to see non-western societies as the Other. Kaul breaks with much of the extant academic commonsense by seeking to tease out new ways of sourcing the Indian past. She argues that myths are “communitarian mechanisms by which societies make sense of themselves and their world”, and that scientific historiography that ignored myths in the search for scientific past truths became an “agent of Empire” in India. Her work calls for an approach where myths are reclaimed as “modes of territorial becoming and belonging” rather than dismissed as ahistorical.

Kaul’s project, which she terms a “New Indology”, might focus less on oppositional binaries such as colonial versus native or Western versus Indic, and more on evolving integrative models that foreground shared intellectual inheritances. This represents a significant departure from the postcolonial critique that has dominated Indian historiography for the past three decades, suggesting that the discipline may be entering a phase in which the very frameworks of opposition are themselves subjected to historical scrutiny.

There Is No Final School

Perhaps, then, we should ultimately abandon the expectation that one school will defeat all the others and produce the definitive history of India.

Historiography advances differently.

Colonial historians assembled enormous bodies of information while embedding them within imperial assumptions. Nationalist historians exposed colonial prejudice and discovered the economic critique of empire, but sometimes projected the nation backwards. Marxists transformed dynastic history into social history but could occasionally privilege structure at the expense of culture and consciousness. Cambridge historians exposed patronage and local political networks but frequently diminished ideology and colonial exploitation. Subaltern historians recovered forms of popular politics neglected by elite history but sometimes exaggerated their autonomy. Postcolonial historians exposed the power embedded in historical categories but could allow discourse to overwhelm material relationships. Feminist historians demonstrated that gender structured apparently gender-neutral institutions. Dalit historians revealed that caste could not simply be dissolved into class or an undifferentiated category of subalternity. Environmental historians showed that the human world itself cannot be understood independently of the material and ecological worlds within which it exists. Historians of masculinity have shown that power is gendered in ways that affect everyone, not only women.

Each intervention has therefore altered what historians are capable of seeing.

That returns us to Irfan Habib’s starting point. The historian cannot escape selection and interpretation. Pretending otherwise merely conceals the assumptions through which selection has already occurred. The real defence against arbitrary history lies not in abandoning interpretation but in making interpretation answerable to evidence.

Habib concluded that an authentic historical interpretation demands repeated exploration of evidence and a continuous re-questioning of previous assumptions. That proposition has aged remarkably well.

The history of Indian historiography demonstrates precisely why.

Schools of history are necessary because inherited explanations have to be challenged. But no school should become a faith. The moment an interpretation becomes immune to inconvenient evidence, it ceases to function as historical explanation and begins to become ideology.

The historian’s task is therefore neither to possess the past nor to defend it. It is to interrogate it. And because every generation asks questions that earlier generations could not ask, Indian history will continue to be rewritten.

That is not a weakness of History.

It is the condition of its vitality.

Reading List

General Surveys and Historiography

Habib, Irfan. Interpreting Indian History. Shillong: North-Eastern Hill University Publications, 1988. The Zakir Husain Memorial Lectures, offering a lucid and rigorous defence of historical method and materialist interpretation.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. A foundational text arguing that European categories of historical thought cannot claim universal validity in non-Western contexts.

Zachariah, Benjamin. After the Last Post: The Lives of Indian Historiography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. An interrogation of how history-writing and history-reading have functioned in public debates in India.

Kaul, Shonaleeka. Bharata Before the British and Other Essays: Towards a New Indology. Delhi: Vitasta Publishing, 2024. An argument for reclaiming myth and indigenous categories as sources of historical understanding.

Colonial and Nationalist Historiography

Mill, James. The History of British India. London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1817. The seminal colonial text that established the Hindu-Muslim-British periodisation of Indian history.

Naoroji, Dadabhai. Poverty and Un-British Rule in India. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901. The foundational economic critique of colonial rule, introducing the theory of the drain of wealth.

Chandra, Bipan. The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of Indian National Leadership, 1880-1905. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1966. A detailed examination of the economic critique developed by Indian nationalists.

Tara Chand. Influence of Islam on Indian Culture. Allahabad: The Indian Press, 1936. A nationalist intervention challenging communal interpretations and emphasising cultural interaction.

Marxist and Social History

Kosambi, D. D. An Introduction to the Study of Indian History. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1956. The foundational text of Marxist historiography in India.

Habib, Irfan. The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963. A magisterial reconstruction of Mughal agrarian relations; revised edition New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Sharma, R. S. Indian Feudalism, c. 300-1200. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1965. The classic formulation of the Indian feudalism thesis.

Thapar, Romila. From Lineage to State: Social Formations in the Mid-First Millennium B.C. in the Ganga Valley. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1984. A transformed approach to early Indian history.

Chandra, Satish. Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740. Aligarh: Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University, 1959. A landmark study connecting political crisis to agrarian and jagirdari relations.

Subaltern Studies

Guha, Ranajit, ed. Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. The inaugural volume of the Subaltern Studies project.

Guha, Ranajit. Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983. A seminal work recovering the political consciousness of peasant rebels.

Pandey, Gyanendra. The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990. An influential demonstration of how communal identities were historically constructed.

Amin, Shahid. Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. An exploration of how a single event was remembered and interpreted.

Feminist and Gender History

Sangari, Kumkum and Sudesh Vaid, eds. Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990. A field-defining collection.

Sinha, Mrinalini. Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate Bengali’ in the Late Nineteenth Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. The pioneering work on masculinity in colonial India.

Chakravarti, Uma. Gendering Caste Through a Feminist Lens. Calcutta: Stree, 2003. A sustained analysis of the intersection of caste and gender.

Gupta, Charu. “Performing Masculinities: Hindu Reform, Ascetic Celibacy, and Dalit Manhood in Colonial North India.” Studies in People’s History 12, no. 2 (2025): 215-34. An examination of how masculinities were constructed and contested in early twentieth-century North India.

Pandey, Gyanendra. Men at Home: Imagining Liberation in Colonial and Postcolonial India. New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2025. An exploration of men’s comportment and conduct in the domestic sphere.

Singh, Lata and Shashank Shekhar Sinha, eds. Gender in Modern India: History, Culture, Marginality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. An intersectional collection.

Nair, Janaki. Women and Colonial Law: A Feminist Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025. A comprehensive introduction to colonial moments shaping women’s legal status.

Dalit and Anti-Caste Historiography

Rawat, Ramnarayan and K. Satyanarayana, eds. Dalit Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 2016. A collection placing humiliation, dignity and spatial exclusion at the centre of historical enquiry.

Paik, Shailaja. The Vulgarity of Caste: Dalits, Sexuality, and Humanity in Modern India. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022. An examination of Dalit performance of Tamasha, analysing caste, gender and sexuality.

Ambedkar, B. R. Annihilation of Caste. Bombay: 1936. The classic anti-caste text.

Environmental History

Gadgil, Madhav and Ramachandra Guha. This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992. A foundational text of Indian environmental history.

Guha, Ramachandra. The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. A classic study connecting environmental change to popular resistance.

Guha, Ramachandra. Speaking with Nature: The Origins of Indian Environmentalism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2024. A recovery of pre-modern Indian environmental thought.

Global and Connected Histories

Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. Across the Green Sea: Histories from the Western Indian Ocean, 1440-1640. Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2024. A connected history of the western Indian Ocean.

Recent Contributions on Masculinity and Conflict

Agarwal, Amya. Contesting Masculinities and Women’s Agency in Kashmir. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022. An exploration of masculinities in a securitised environment.

Goswami, Uddipana. Gendering Peace in Violent Peripheries: Marginality, Masculinity, and Feminist Agency. London: Routledge, 2022. An examination of hegemonic masculinity in conflict zones.

Vijayan, Prem Kumar. Gender and Hindu Nationalism: Understanding Masculine Hegemony. New York: Routledge, 2019. An argument that Hindu nationalist thought emerges from masculine hegemony.

Other Significant Works

Cohn, Bernard. Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. A foundational examination of how colonial knowledge reshaped Indian society.

Trautmann, Thomas. Languages and Nations: The Dravidian Proof in Colonial Madras. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. A study of how linguistic and racial categories were constructed.

Dirks, Nicholas. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. A demonstration of how colonial ethnography reshaped caste.

Fisher, Michael. An Environmental History of India: From Earliest Times to the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. A comprehensive survey of South Asian environmental history.

What Is a Reliable Source? Evidence, Primary Sources and the Writing of Sultanate and Mughal History

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

The expression “reliable source” is frequently used in historical writing, but it is also frequently misunderstood. A reliable source is not simply an old source, an official source, a famous source, or even a source written by someone who witnessed the events being described. Nor does reliability mean that everything contained in a particular text must be accepted as true. In professional historical practice, reliability is established through a process of source criticism: the historian asks who produced the evidence, when it was produced, for what purpose, for whom, under what circumstances, from what information, and whether its claims can be tested against other independent evidence. This distinction is fundamental because historians do not have direct access to the past. The Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire no longer exist as observable realities. What survives are their traces: manuscripts, chronicles, administrative documents, royal orders, revenue records, inscriptions, coins, buildings, paintings, objects, letters, literary compositions and descriptions written by travellers. The historian reconstructs the past by interrogating these surviving traces.

A source is therefore not reliable merely because it says something confidently. Indeed, some of the most valuable historical sources are deeply partisan. Ziya al-Din Barani’s Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, Abu’l Fazl’s Akbarnama, Badauni’s Muntakhab al-Tawarikh and Bhimsen’s Nuskha-i Dilkusha were written by authors with very different intellectual commitments, political positions and personal experiences. None should be treated as a neutral recording instrument. Yet all are indispensable historical sources precisely because the historian can investigate the circumstances in which they were produced and compare their testimony with other evidence. The question that should be asked, therefore, is not simply “Is this source reliable?” but “Reliable for what?” A court chronicle may be unreliable about the number of soldiers in an enemy army but extremely valuable for understanding the political ideology of the court. A royal inscription exaggerating a ruler’s victory may tell us little about the actual scale of that victory but much about how kingship wished to represent itself. A European traveller may misunderstand an Indian social practice while nevertheless recording valuable observations about prices, roads, urban life or commercial activity. Reliability belongs not automatically to the source as a whole but to particular claims made by that source and to the questions historians ask of it.

This is why corroboration lies at the heart of historical method. If a chronicler describes a famine, the historian may compare the account with other chronicles, revenue documents, letters, price information and evidence of demographic or agrarian disturbance. If a text claims that an emperor destroyed or constructed a particular building, the historian should examine inscriptions, architectural remains, contemporary administrative records and independent narrative sources. Historical knowledge becomes stronger when evidence produced independently and for different purposes converges upon the same conclusion.

Primary and Secondary Sources

The distinction between primary and secondary sources follows from this understanding of evidence. A primary source is evidence originating from, or directly connected with, the historical period, institution, event or process being investigated. A farman issued by Shah Jahan is a primary source for Mughal government. An inscription placed upon a mosque during the reign of Sikandar Lodi is a primary source for the circumstances of its construction. A revenue document from Aurangzeb’s reign is primary evidence for seventeenth-century administration. A coin of Muhammad bin Tughluq is primary evidence for his monetary system and his claims to sovereignty. Primary does not, however, mean true. Abu’l Fazl was a contemporary of Akbar, but this does not mean that everything in the Akbarnama must be accepted literally. Badauni was also Akbar’s contemporary, yet his hostility towards many of Akbar’s religious and intellectual experiments shaped his account. The historian cannot resolve the disagreement merely by declaring one “reliable” and the other “unreliable”. Their accounts must be placed within their respective intellectual and political contexts and tested against other evidence.

A secondary source, by contrast, is a later scholarly reconstruction or interpretation based upon primary sources and usually upon previous historical scholarship as well. Modern works by historians such as Mohammad Habib, K. A. Nizami, Satish Chandra, Iqtidar Alam Khan, M. Athar Ali, Irfan Habib, Shireen Moosvi, Simon Digby, Muzaffar Alam or Catherine Asher are secondary sources for the Sultanate and Mughal periods. They do not become primary sources merely because they are authoritative works of history. The distinction nevertheless depends partly upon the question being asked. A twentieth-century historian’s book is a secondary source for the Mughal Empire, but the same book becomes a primary source if one is studying the development of Mughal historiography in twentieth-century India. “Primary” and “secondary” describe the relationship of evidence to a historical question; they are not permanent qualities inherent in a document.

Nor should primary sources automatically be regarded as superior to secondary sources. A contemporary witness may possess very limited information, whereas a modern historian can compare hundreds of documents scattered across different archives and languages. Primary sources supply the evidence from which historical reconstruction begins; secondary scholarship subjects that evidence to criticism, comparison and interpretation. For the history of the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal India, the range of primary evidence is exceptionally rich and can broadly be organised into several overlapping categories.

Narrative and Chronicle Literature

The most familiar primary sources are chronicles and narrative histories, especially those written in Persian, the principal language of administration and high literary culture under much of the Sultanate and Mughal periods. For the Sultanate, works such as Minhaj-i Siraj Juzjani’s Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Amir Khusrau’s historical compositions, Ziya al-Din Barani’s Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, Shams-i Siraj Afif’s work of the same title, and Isami’s Futuh al-Salatin provide indispensable evidence. They record political events, court conflicts, campaigns, rebellions, appointments, ideas of sovereignty and relations among rulers and elites. But these texts must never be treated as newspapers from the Middle Ages. Barani was not simply describing the Sultanate: he possessed definite ideas about monarchy, social hierarchy, religion and political order. His Fatawa-i Jahandari makes his normative political concerns especially clear. Amir Khusrau wrote within structures of courtly patronage. Afif looked back upon Firuz Shah Tughluq from a particular political and emotional context. The historian must therefore distinguish between description, prescription, literary convention and political argument.

Mughal narrative sources are even more extensive. Babur’s Baburnama, Gulbadan Begum’s Humayun Nama, Abu’l Fazl’s Akbarnama, Badauni’s Muntakhab al-Tawarikh, Jahangir’s Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, Abdul Hamid Lahori’s Padshahnama, Muhammad Kazim’s Alamgirnama, Saqi Musta’id Khan’s Ma’asir-i Alamgiri and numerous regional and biographical works provide different windows upon the empire. Their disagreements are themselves historically significant. Abu’l Fazl and Badauni, for example, were observing substantially the same court but understood Akbar’s policies through radically different intellectual frameworks. Their disagreement is not an inconvenience that the historian must eliminate; it is evidence for the contested intellectual world of Akbar’s reign.

Administrative and Documentary Sources

A second and in many respects even more important category consists of administrative documents. These include farmans, nishans, parwanas, sanads, dastaks, arzdashts, waqfnamas, revenue documents, appointment orders, grants, petitions, deeds of sale and other records produced through the activities of government and society. Such documents allow historians to move beyond the spectacular world of emperors, battles and court politics. They reveal how authority actually operated: how land was assigned, revenue collected, officials appointed, religious establishments supported, merchants regulated, property transferred and disputes negotiated. The Mughal administrative system generated an especially rich documentary culture. Records connected with mansabs, jagirs, madad-i ma’ash grants, zamindars, revenue assessment and provincial administration permit historians to reconstruct the institutional structure of the empire. The Ain-i Akbari, although part of Abu’l Fazl’s larger literary enterprise, occupies a distinctive position because it systematically records information concerning administration, revenue, prices, salaries, military organisation, provinces, social groups and imperial institutions. Here again caution is necessary. An administrative regulation tells us what the state ordered; it does not necessarily tell us what actually happened. A farman prohibiting a practice is evidence that the prohibition existed, not proof that the practice immediately disappeared. Norm and implementation must be distinguished.

Epigraphic and Numismatic Evidence

A third category is inscriptions, which survive on mosques, tombs, forts, gateways, stepwells, bridges, temples, sarais and other structures, as well as on individual objects. Inscriptions may supply dates, names of patrons, architects, officials or builders, religious formulae, royal titles and information concerning construction and repair. They can sometimes correct literary chronicles or establish facts not mentioned in narrative sources. Epigraphy is particularly important because inscriptions frequently survive in situ. Their physical relationship to a building can help establish chronology and patronage. But inscriptions too are rhetorical objects. A royal inscription was often designed to proclaim legitimacy, piety or conquest. Its claims therefore require the same critical scrutiny as those of a chronicle.

Coins constitute another major category of primary evidence. Sultanate and Mughal coins reveal much more than monetary history. Their metals, weights, denominations, mint places, dates, inscriptions and calligraphy provide evidence for political authority, territorial control, economic change and concepts of sovereignty. A ruler’s coinage was itself an assertion of power. The appearance of a ruler’s name at a particular mint may help establish political control over a region. Changes in weight standards or metallic composition can illuminate monetary policy and economic conditions. Muhammad bin Tughluq’s experiments with currency, Sher Shah’s monetary reforms and the elaborate coinage of Akbar and his successors cannot adequately be studied from chronicles alone. Coins have an additional methodological value: they may contradict narrative traditions. When textual and numismatic evidence disagree, the disagreement forces the historian to reconsider the chronology or political claims preserved in literary accounts.

Architecture, Archaeology and Material Culture

Buildings and archaeological remains constitute primary sources in their own right. Architecture is not merely an illustration placed beside textual history; it is historical evidence. The Qutb complex, Tughluqabad, Firuz Shah Kotla, the Lodi tombs, Fathpur Sikri, Agra Fort, the Taj Mahal, Shahjahanabad, provincial forts, mosques, temples, tombs, gardens, bridges, sarais and ordinary domestic structures contain information that no chronicle can fully provide. Plans, construction techniques, masonry, reused architectural material, water systems, spatial organisation, alterations and building sequences can reveal patterns of technology, patronage, labour, ritual practice and social organisation. Archaeological excavation and architectural survey may establish that a structure underwent several phases even when literary sources attribute it simply to a single ruler. Material evidence is especially important because textual sources disproportionately represent literate elites. Pottery, tools, domestic architecture, settlement remains, craft debris and ordinary objects can provide access to aspects of everyday life largely absent from court chronicles.

Literary, Religious and Intellectual Texts

Another large body of primary evidence consists of texts that were not written as histories. Poetry, Sufi malfuzat, tazkiras, theological works, legal compilations, religious polemics, philosophical writings and vernacular literature can all serve as historical sources. Works such as Amir Hasan Sijzi’s Fawa’id al-Fu’ad, recording the conversations of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, reveal dimensions of Sultanate society that political chronicles barely notice. Sufi literature can illuminate urban life, charity, social relationships, religious practice and interactions across social boundaries. Similarly, the Fatawa-i Alamgiri is primarily a compilation of Hanafi jurisprudence rather than a narrative history of Aurangzeb’s reign. It therefore cannot simply be read as a description of how law actually operated throughout Mughal India. Yet it is indispensable for studying Islamic jurisprudential culture, legal reasoning and the intellectual environment in which Mughal legal institutions functioned. Vernacular works in Sanskrit, Hindi, Braj, Bengali, Marathi, Punjabi, Rajasthani and other languages further broaden the historian’s field of vision. They allow the history of medieval India to escape the artificial assumption that Persian court literature alone represents the period.

Biographies, Memoirs, Letters and Foreign Accounts

Memoirs and autobiographical writings provide another particularly revealing category. Babur and Jahangir wrote about themselves in ways unusual within the larger tradition of Persianate court historiography. Gulbadan Begum’s Humayun Nama provides perspectives upon the Mughal household and the experiences of imperial women that cannot be recovered from official chronicles alone. Collections of letters and correspondence can be even more revealing because they bring historians closer to the everyday operation of politics and administration. Letters between rulers, nobles, officials, scholars, merchants and religious figures illuminate patronage, political negotiation, personal networks and administrative practice. Yet personal testimony requires caution. Memory is selective, autobiography is self-fashioning, and letters are written for particular recipients. Their apparent intimacy does not make them automatically truthful.

The accounts of foreign visitors form another major body of evidence. For the Sultanate period, Ibn Battuta’s Rihla provides an extraordinary description of Muhammad bin Tughluq’s India. For the Mughal period, travellers and merchants such as François Bernier, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Niccolao Manucci, Peter Mundy, Thomas Roe and numerous Portuguese, Dutch and English observers provide accounts of court life, commerce, cities, roads, manufacturing, agriculture, customs and social practices. These sources are invaluable partly because outsiders noticed things that indigenous court historians took for granted. But foreignness does not produce objectivity. Travellers arrived with their own cultural assumptions and often possessed limited knowledge of Indian languages and institutions. Bernier’s interpretation of Mughal landholding, for example, profoundly influenced later European representations of India, but historians have demonstrated that his understanding of property and agrarian relations was shaped partly by European political debates and comparisons with France. The traveller’s account must therefore be read both as evidence about India and as evidence about the observer.

Visual and Regional Sources

Mughal India provides another remarkable category of evidence: paintings, illustrated manuscripts, maps, drawings and other visual representations. Mughal miniature painting can illuminate court ceremony, clothing, weapons, technologies, animals, buildings, gardens, occupations and material objects. Portraiture can help reconstruct the visual culture of nobility and sovereignty. Illustrated manuscripts demonstrate the relationship between literature, artistic patronage and imperial ideology. Yet paintings cannot simply be treated as photographs. They obey artistic conventions and were often carefully constructed representations of authority. An imperial audience scene shows not simply what a court looked like but how hierarchy and kingship were intended to be visualised.

Finally, the history of the Sultanate and Mughal periods cannot be reconstructed solely from sources produced at Delhi, Agra or Lahore. Regional archives and local traditions are indispensable. Rajasthani records, Marathi documents, Sikh sources, Jain writings, regional Persian chronicles, temple records, merchant papers, genealogies, inscriptions and local revenue documents reveal negotiations between imperial power and regional society. They are particularly important for studying zamindars, merchants, bankers, local elites, religious institutions and social groups whose activities may scarcely appear in imperial chronicles. This widening of the evidentiary field has profoundly changed the writing of medieval Indian history. Once historians move beyond dynastic chronicles, the Sultanate and Mughal periods cease to appear merely as sequences of rulers and wars. They emerge instead as complex histories of states, agrarian systems, cities, markets, technologies, religious communities, intellectual networks, families, artisans, merchants, peasants and everyday social relationships.

From Sources to History

The central methodological lesson is therefore that no category of evidence is inherently self-sufficient. Chronicles, documents, inscriptions, coins, architecture, archaeology, literature, paintings and travellers’ accounts answer different kinds of historical questions. The strongest historical reconstruction usually emerges from their combination. Suppose a historian wishes to reconstruct the reign of Akbar. Abu’l Fazl provides one perspective; Badauni another. Jesuit writings provide yet another. The Ain-i Akbari supplies administrative and statistical information. Farmans reveal particular acts of government. Coins illuminate sovereignty and monetary policy. Inscriptions establish patronage and chronology. Surviving buildings at Fathpur Sikri and elsewhere provide architectural and archaeological evidence. Paintings reveal the visual construction of the court. Regional documents show how imperial authority interacted with local societies. No single one of these is “the truth”. Historical knowledge emerges through their critical confrontation with one another.

This also explains why the historian must resist two opposite errors. The first is credulity: believing a source merely because it is contemporary. The second is arbitrary scepticism: rejecting evidence simply because it is inconvenient or because every source possesses some form of bias. Bias does not make a source useless. Indeed, bias itself is historical evidence. If Barani disliked certain social groups, the historian must not simply discard Barani; one must ask why he disliked them and what his hostility reveals about the political and social assumptions of his world. If Abu’l Fazl idealised Akbar’s sovereignty, that idealisation itself becomes evidence for the political theory being constructed around the Mughal emperor.

The historian’s task consequently resembles neither that of a believer nor that of a prosecutor. It is an act of disciplined interrogation. Who produced this evidence? When? Why? For whom? What did the author or maker know? What did they wish others to believe? What could they not have known? What have they omitted? Can their claims be corroborated? Does material evidence support them? Do independent sources disagree? Only after these questions have been asked can the historian decide how much weight a particular piece of evidence deserves. A reliable source, then, is not necessarily an unbiased source, because completely unbiased historical sources scarcely exist. It is a source whose provenance can be established, whose circumstances of production can be investigated, whose claims can be critically tested and whose evidentiary value can be assessed in relation to a particular historical question.

That understanding is especially important for the history of the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal India. The period has left an exceptionally diverse archive, extending from royal chronicles and imperial farmans to coins, inscriptions, buildings, paintings, legal texts, Sufi conversations, travellers’ accounts and archaeological remains. To privilege one category while ignoring the others produces a distorted history. The historian therefore does not merely collect sources. The historian interrogates them, compares them, contextualises them and makes them speak to one another. It is through this critical conversation among different forms of surviving evidence that the fragments of the past are transformed into history.

A Thread of Protection: Raksha Bandhan in Mughal India

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Among the Hindu festivals and ritual practices encountered by the Mughal emperors in India, Raksha Bandhan occupies a particularly interesting place. It is tempting to view the festival entirely through its modern form, in which a sister ties a rakhi around her brother’s wrist and the ceremony affirms a relationship of affection and protection between them. The evidence from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, points towards a considerably wider range of meanings. The rakhi was certainly connected with protection, but the person tying it did not necessarily have to be a sister, nor did the recipient have to be a brother. Brahmins tied protective threads upon patrons and rulers, and the ceremony could express blessing, auspiciousness, protection and reciprocal obligation. It was principally in this wider sense that Raksha Bandhan found a place within the ceremonial world of the Mughal court.

This distinction is important because the history of Raksha Bandhan under the Mughals has often become entangled with the celebrated story of Rani Karnavati of Mewar sending a rakhi to the emperor Humayun and appealing to him for protection against Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. The story has acquired enormous popularity and has frequently been presented as one of the earliest examples of Hindu-Muslim fraternity under the Mughals. Unfortunately, contemporary evidence for the episode is extremely uncertain. There is, however, no need to depend upon this attractive but problematic story to establish a Mughal connection with Raksha Bandhan. The evidence from the reigns of Akbar and Jahangir is both contemporary and much more revealing. Abu’l Fazl knew of the festival and described its place within Hindu ritual life, while Jahangir himself recorded the practice of tying rakhis upon Akbar and described his own participation in the ceremony. The documented history is consequently more interesting than the legend.

The Sanskrit expression rakṣā-bandhana itself provides a useful point of departure. Literally a ‘bond of protection’, it belongs to an older body of ritual practices in which a consecrated thread, cord or amulet was tied to the body as a means of invoking protection and auspiciousness. Such practices were by no means restricted to relations between brothers and sisters. The full moon of Shravana, which usually falls in July or August, possessed particular ritual importance for Brahmins and was associated with Shravani, Upakarma and the renewal or performance of Brahmanical rites. One element within this ritual world was the tying of a protective thread upon another person, including a patron or ruler.

This older meaning helps explain what otherwise appears rather curious in the Mughal sources. Brahmins could approach a Muslim emperor and tie a rakhi around his wrist without either party imagining that they were thereby establishing a literal relationship of brother and sister. The Brahmin offered an auspicious and protective object; the ruler accepted the blessing and, through gifts and patronage, acknowledged the social relationship that the ceremony represented. Protection in this context could operate in both directions. The ritual specialist offered sacred protection to the ruler, while the ruler provided material and political protection to those who acknowledged his authority. Raksha Bandhan therefore possessed a symbolic vocabulary particularly well suited to kingship.

The Festival in Mughal Records

Abu’l Fazl’s Āʾīn-i Akbarī is particularly useful for recovering this older character of the festival. His discussion of Hindu beliefs, calendars and practices was part of a much larger intellectual enterprise through which the Mughal court attempted to understand the society over which it ruled. In discussing the full moon of Shravana, Abu’l Fazl refers to the practice of fastening the raksha-bandhan upon the right wrist of important persons. The thread could be made of silk, and among people of wealth and status the object could assume a more elaborate form. What Abu’l Fazl describes is therefore recognisably connected with the modern rakhi, but its social meaning was broader. The emphasis falls upon the protective thread and the relationship between Brahmin and patron rather than exclusively upon sibling affection.

It was under Akbar that this practice became incorporated into the ceremonial life of the Mughal court. This should not be regarded as an isolated eccentricity on the emperor’s part. Akbar’s reign witnessed a profound enlargement of the cultural vocabulary of Mughal sovereignty. The dynasty had entered India with a Timurid political inheritance and a court culture strongly shaped by Persianate traditions, but the empire that Akbar created could not remain culturally detached from the society over which it ruled. Rajputs and other Hindu groups entered the Mughal nobility in increasing numbers, while Indian languages, customs, festivals, intellectual traditions and forms of ritual gradually became familiar at court. The political integration of India was accompanied, though never completely or uniformly, by processes of cultural accommodation.

Akbar’s engagement with Hindu festivals has to be understood within this setting. Holi, Diwali, Dussehra and other Indian celebrations became known at the Mughal court, just as Indian astrology, calendrical practices, modes of dress and forms of ceremonial entered imperial life. Participation did not necessarily imply acceptance of the theological foundations of a particular festival. A ruler might acknowledge a religious or cultural practice because it possessed political, social or ceremonial meanings that extended beyond doctrine. Akbar’s willingness to participate in such practices was closely related to the changing conception of sovereignty articulated most systematically by Abu’l Fazl. The emperor was increasingly represented as the ruler of all his subjects rather than as the political representative of one religious community alone.

The principle of ṣulḥ-i kul, usually translated as ‘universal peace’ or ‘peace with all’, supplied an intellectual framework for this conception of government. It did not require the disappearance of religious differences. On the contrary, those differences continued to exist and were frequently quite pronounced. What it attempted to establish was the political superiority of justice and imperial loyalty over sectarian affiliation. Within such a conception of kingship, the emperor could receive a Hindu ritual object without becoming Hindu, just as a Hindu noble could serve a Muslim sovereign without necessarily abandoning his own religious and social world. The Mughal court became one of the spaces in which these identities met, negotiated and occasionally borrowed from one another.

The Evidence from Jahangir

Our most striking evidence for the rakhi at Akbar’s court comes, interestingly enough, from Jahangir. In the Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, Jahangir recalled that during his father’s reign Hindu nobles and other important persons had taken to presenting and tying rakhis upon the emperor. As frequently happened when a relatively simple custom entered the intensely competitive ceremonial environment of the Mughal court, the offerings became increasingly magnificent. The rakhis could incorporate precious stones, pearls and other valuable materials. What had begun as a protective thread was thus transformed into an object of imperial display.

Akbar appears eventually to have become uncomfortable with this extravagance. His objection, however, was not necessarily to the ceremony itself. Jahangir’s account distinguishes between the increasingly costly rakhis offered by wealthy men and the simpler cotton or silk threads traditionally tied by Brahmins. Akbar curtailed the former while permitting the latter. The distinction is revealing because it suggests that the emperor recognised a difference between an established Indian custom and the competitive display of wealth that had grown around it at court. He was willing to accept the protective thread, but apparently saw little reason why it should become another occasion for nobles to demonstrate their wealth through jewels and precious objects.

Jahangir continued the practice in his own reign. His memoirs record an occasion in 1613 when he permitted Hindu nobles and leading men to fasten rakhis upon his arms and allowed Brahmins to tie their traditional cotton and silk threads. The passage is particularly valuable because it removes the subject from the realm of later anecdote. Here we have a Mughal emperor himself describing his participation in a ceremony that he understood to be associated with Hindu custom. He neither disguises its origins nor appears embarrassed by his participation in it. At the same time, there is no suggestion that he had adopted the religious beliefs of those performing the ceremony. The rakhi could enter Mughal imperial culture precisely because its meanings were capable of extending beyond a narrowly defined confessional boundary.

The role of Hindu nobles in this process deserves particular emphasis. By Jahangir’s reign, Rajputs occupied an established position within the Mughal ruling class. Their incorporation had not required them to erase their cultural identities. They retained dynastic traditions, marriage networks, religious affiliations and connections with their ancestral territories while simultaneously participating in the political and ceremonial life of the Mughal Empire. Court culture consequently could not remain exclusively Central Asian or Persianate. It became increasingly Indian without ceasing to be Mughal. The presence of the rakhi upon the emperor’s wrist is one small but revealing manifestation of this transformation.

Beyond Binary Categories

The ceremony also demonstrates why the cultural history of the Mughal period cannot satisfactorily be understood through a simple opposition between ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’. Such categories were obviously important, and religious differences were real. They could generate argument, conflict and exclusion. Yet the existence of boundaries did not prevent people from crossing them in particular contexts. Political service, patronage, music, literature, architecture, language, food, clothing and ceremonial all created spaces in which cultural practices circulated between communities. The interesting historical question is therefore not whether Mughal India was either completely ‘syncretic’ or permanently divided, but how particular practices travelled, what meanings they acquired in new settings, and where the limits of such accommodation lay.

Raksha Bandhan provides an especially good example because the ritual itself was concerned with the creation of a relationship. The thread established a bond, but that bond was capable of several interpretations. It might convey a Brahmin’s blessing to his patron, express the loyalty of a noble to his sovereign, invoke protection, or become part of an exchange of gifts and honours. In later social practice the brother-sister relationship became particularly prominent, but the Mughal evidence reminds us that the semantic world of the rakhi was once considerably wider.

This brings us back to the famous story of Humayun and Rani Karnavati. According to the familiar narrative, Karnavati, the widowed queen of Mewar, sent a rakhi to Humayun when Chittor was threatened by Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Humayun accepted her as his sister and attempted to come to her assistance. The story has acquired such currency that it is frequently repeated as established fact. Yet it is not securely supported by contemporary Mughal or Rajput evidence, and its development owes much to later traditions concerning Rajasthan. The political events surrounding Bahadur Shah’s attack on Chittor and Humayun’s subsequent intervention in Gujarat certainly occurred, but the rakhi episode cannot be placed on the same evidentiary footing as Jahangir’s description of the ceremony.

Historical caution in this instance does not diminish the larger story of cultural interaction. It strengthens it. The temptation to retain the Karnavati episode arises partly because it appears to provide such an attractive symbol of Hindu-Muslim fraternity. Yet the actual historical evidence is richer. We do not need to imagine a Rajput queen sending a rakhi to Humayun when we possess the testimony of Jahangir that Hindu nobles tied rakhis upon Akbar and subsequently upon Jahangir himself. The latter evidence tells us not about an exceptional gesture during a political crisis, but about a practice sufficiently familiar to have become part of the ceremonial experience of two successive Mughal emperors.

The Later Mughal Period

For the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb the evidence is less explicit, and caution is again necessary. It would be misleading to assume that every practice associated with Akbar and Jahangir continued unchanged throughout the seventeenth century. Mughal court ceremonial evolved considerably from one reign to another. Shah Jahan developed his own highly formalised language of imperial sovereignty, while Aurangzeb altered or discontinued a number of practices that he considered inconsistent with his conception of kingship and religion. The absence of equally vivid imperial references to Raksha Bandhan in their reigns should therefore not be filled by conjecture.

At the same time, imperial participation and social observance must not be confused. A Hindu festival did not cease to be celebrated in Mughal India merely because the reigning emperor chose not to participate in it personally. The empire contained millions of Hindu subjects, as well as Rajput rulers, zamindars, merchants, officials and soldiers whose religious and social calendars continued to structure their lives. Festivals belonged to society before they belonged to the court. The remarkable feature of the Akbar and Jahangir evidence is therefore not that Raksha Bandhan existed under Muslim rule, which is hardly surprising, but that the ceremony travelled from Hindu ritual life into the highest ceremonial space of the Mughal Empire.

Nor should this be romanticised into an uncomplicated story of communal harmony. Mughal society contained tensions, inequalities and conflicts, just as it contained accommodation and exchange. The significance of the rakhi lies precisely in the fact that cultural interaction did not require religious identities to disappear. A Brahmin tying a protective thread upon Akbar’s wrist remained a Brahmin, while Akbar remained the Muslim-born descendant of Timur and Chinggis Khan who ruled through a political culture deeply indebted to Persian and Islamic traditions. Yet the two could participate in a ceremony whose meanings both could understand. Cultural accommodation worked not because differences ceased to matter, but because people sometimes found languages through which those differences could be negotiated.

A Thread Through Time

Raksha Bandhan therefore offers a useful corrective to the tendency to write Mughal history exclusively through battles, dynastic politics and administrative institutions. Empires are also sustained through gestures, symbols and ceremonies. The Mughal state had to make its sovereignty intelligible to the many communities that inhabited India, and Akbar in particular proved remarkably receptive to political languages that had not originated within the Timurid or Islamic traditions of his ancestors. The incorporation of Rajputs into the nobility, the translation of Sanskrit texts into Persian, participation in Indian festivals and the development of ṣulḥ-i kul were different aspects of this broader attempt to construct an imperial order capable of embracing diversity without demanding cultural uniformity.

Seen from this perspective, the rakhi tied upon the Mughal emperor’s wrist was a small object carrying a surprisingly large historical meaning. Its thread connected an ancient idea of ritual protection with the political language of patronage and sovereignty. In the hands of Brahmins it could confer blessing; in the hands of Hindu nobles it could express attachment to the sovereign; within the spectacular world of the Mughal court it could even become an object embellished with pearls and precious stones. Akbar accepted the older ceremony while attempting to restrain its ostentation, and Jahangir consciously continued the practice.

The history of Raksha Bandhan in Mughal India is therefore more interesting than the familiar legend of Humayun and Karnavati. It reveals something of the manner in which the Mughal Empire became Indian, not by surrendering every element of its earlier inheritance, nor by dissolving religious distinctions, but through a prolonged process of encounter and accommodation. Hindu and Muslim, Persianate and Indic practices could remain recognisably distinct while nevertheless entering a shared political and cultural world. Few objects illustrate that process more simply or more eloquently than the protective thread tied around the wrist of the emperor.

Sources and Further Reading

Primary Sources

· Abu’l Fazl. Āʾīn-i Akbarī. Translated by H. Blochmann and H.S. Jarrett. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1867–1877. The most important contemporary account of Akbar’s administration, including his discussion of Hindu festivals, calendars and ritual practices. Of particular relevance is the section dealing with the month of Shravana and Brahmanical observances.
· Abu’l Fazl. Akbarnāma. Translated by H. Beveridge. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1897–1921. The official chronicle of Akbar’s reign, providing the broader political and ideological context for his evolving conception of sovereignty and his engagement with non-Islamic religious and ceremonial practices.
· Jahangir. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri or Jahangirnama. Translated by A. Rogers and edited by H. Beveridge. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1909–1914. Jahangir’s memoirs are the most valuable source for the rakhi ceremony itself, containing his recollection of the practice under Akbar and his own description of continuing it during his reign.
· ʿAbd al-Qadir Badauni. Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh. Translated by W.H. Lowe. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1884–1925. An important contemporary source offering a frequently hostile perspective on Akbar’s engagement with non-Islamic religious and ceremonial practices, valuable as a counterpoint to Abu’l Fazl’s more sympathetic accounts.

Secondary Sources

· Ali, M. Athar. The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966; revised edition, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. An essential study of the composition and character of the Mughal ruling class, including the place of Rajputs and other Hindu groups within imperial service.
· Ali, M. Athar. Mughal India: Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society and Culture. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006. A collection of essays exploring Mughal political culture, including analyses of cultural accommodation and the ideological foundations of imperial rule.
· Chandra, Satish. Mughal Religious Policies, the Rajputs and the Deccan. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1993. Examines the relationship between Mughal religious policies and the incorporation of Rajput elites into the imperial system.
· Flores, Jorge. The Mughal Empire at War: Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, 1500–1605. London: Routledge, 2018. Provides context for the political and military environment in which Mughal cultural policies developed.
· Habib, Irfan. The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556–1707. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963; revised edition, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999. The foundational study of Mughal agrarian society, essential for understanding the social and economic context within which Hindu festivals and practices were observed.
· Kinra, Rajeev. Writing Self, Writing Empire: Chandar Bhan Brahman and the Cultural World of the Indo-Persian State Secretary. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. Explores the intellectual and cultural world of Mughal India through the life and works of a Hindu secretary at the Mughal court, illuminating the intersection of Hindu and Persianate traditions.
· Koch, Ebba. Mughal Art and Imperial Ideology: Collected Essays. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001. Addresses the visual and material dimensions of Mughal sovereignty, including the ceremonial use of objects.
· Lefèvre, Corinne. Pouvoir impérial et élites dans l’Inde moghole: Les Sayyids de Barha (1556–1748). Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 2020. Translated into English, Consolidating Empire, Power and Elites in Jahangir’s India. Permanent Black, 2022. Provides detailed analysis of court dynamics and ceremonial politics.
· Mukhia, Harbans. The Mughals of India. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. A comprehensive introduction to Mughal history that emphasises the processes of cultural interaction and the formation of an imperial society.
· Richards, John F. The Mughal Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. The standard political history of the Mughal Empire, providing essential background for understanding the context of Akbar’s and Jahangir’s ceremonial practices.
· Sangari, Kumkum. The Politics of the Possible: Essays on Gender, History, Narratives, Colonial English. New Delhi: Tulika, 1999. Offers insights into the interplay between textual traditions and social practices.
· Sharma, Sunil. Mughal Arcadia: Persian Literature in an Indian Court. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Examines the Persian literary culture of the Mughal court and its relationship to Indian cultural traditions.
· Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. Mughals and Franks: Explorations in Connected History. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005. Contains essays that contextualise Mughal cultural and political practices within broader early modern global connections.
· Suvorova, Anna. Muslim Saints of South Asia: The Eleventh to Fifteenth Centuries. London: Routledge, 2004. Provides background on Sufi traditions that mediated between Islamic and Indic religious cultures.
· Truschke, Audrey. Culture of Encounters: Sanskrit at the Mughal Court. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. An illuminating study of Sanskrit intellectual traditions at the Mughal court, demonstrating the depth of cultural exchange between Hindu learned traditions and Mughal patronage networks.
· Wink, André. Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World. 3 volumes. Leiden: Brill, 1990–2004. A sweeping examination of the interaction between Islamic and Indian civilisations that provides crucial background for understanding cultural accommodation under the Mughals.

Why History Is Not a Science: Evidence, Interpretation and the Unrepeatable Past

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

The question whether history is a science has troubled historians for a very long time, and at first sight the answer might appear simple. Historians collect evidence, formulate arguments, test propositions and revise their conclusions when new evidence becomes available, and in all these respects their practice shares common ground with scientific inquiry. Yet a fundamental difference persists. The historian studies a world that no longer exists; the past cannot be placed in a laboratory, observed repeatedly or reproduced under controlled conditions. Historical events occur once and are irreversible, and for this reason history cannot be a science in the same sense as physics, chemistry or the experimental branches of biology. This does not reduce history to mere opinion, for it remains a disciplined and evidence‑based form of knowledge with its own rigorous methods for determining what may reasonably be asserted about the past. The significant distinction is therefore not between science and imagination, but between different ways of establishing knowledge.

The natural scientist can ordinarily observe phenomena that continue to exist: an experiment can be repeated, variables can sometimes be isolated and another researcher can attempt to reproduce the results. The historian possesses no comparable possibility. The Revolt of 1857 cannot be rerun; we cannot reconstruct Akbar’s court, remove Abul Fazl from it and discover whether sulh‑i kul would still have developed in the same manner; nor can we repeat the Partition of India while altering one political decision in 1946 to see whether Partition would still have occurred. What the historian possesses is not the past itself but the traces left behind by it, chronicles, letters, administrative documents, inscriptions, coins, buildings, archaeological remains, paintings, memoirs, newspapers, photographs, oral traditions and many other kinds of evidence. The historian begins with these surviving traces and attempts to reconstruct the circumstances in which they were produced and the world to which they belonged. The historian therefore works backwards from evidence towards explanation, whereas a scientist may formulate a hypothesis and design an experiment to test it; a historian asks a question and then examines whether the surviving evidence permits a particular answer. This difference is significant because it places limits upon what historians can claim to know.

These limits become especially clear when we consider counterfactual history – the attempt to ask what would have happened if a particular historical event had occurred differently. Such questions are often fascinating, and occasionally they can assist us in thinking about causation, but they cannot provide historical knowledge in the same sense as the study of events that actually occurred. Consider the frequently asked question: what would have happened if Dara Shukoh had defeated Aurangzeb and become the Mughal emperor? We know a considerable amount about Dara Shukoh: his interest in Sufism, his engagement with Hindu religious thought, his association with the translation of the Upanishads into Persian and his intellectual outlook are all matters that can be investigated historically because evidence survives for them. But there is no historical evidence for Emperor Dara Shukoh because Emperor Dara Shukoh never existed. The Dara whom history allows us to study was a Mughal prince who contested the succession and lost; we cannot know how twenty years of kingship might have changed him, what pressures he might have encountered, which alliances he might have formed, what rebellions he might have faced or what compromises the requirements of government might have forced upon him. To move from the ideas of Prince Dara to confident statements about the policies of an imaginary Emperor Dara is to cross the boundary between historical inference and speculation.

The same difficulty arises when we ask what would have happened if the British had not introduced railways into India. Historians can investigate why the railways were constructed, how they were financed and what effects they had upon trade, markets, military movement, migration, urbanisation and the circulation of people and ideas; they can debate whether particular consequences attributed to the railways have been exaggerated. What they cannot do is remove the railway from nineteenth‑century India and observe what happens next. Perhaps roads would have developed more rapidly, perhaps coastal shipping would have expanded, perhaps other technologies would have filled part of the gap; patterns of trade, industrialisation, migration and urbanisation might have followed quite different paths, but once one element is removed from a historical situation, other elements also begin to change, and there is no alternative nineteenth‑century India available for comparison with the India that actually existed.

Counterfactual questions can nevertheless serve a limited analytical purpose: if a historian argues that a particular development could not have occurred without the railways, asking what alternative mechanisms might have produced it can expose weaknesses in that causal argument. Counterfactual reasoning can therefore help historians think about necessity, contingency and causation, but what it cannot do is establish an alternative sequence of events as historical knowledge. Possibility is not evidence, plausibility is not proof, and an imagined alternative is not history.

This limitation arises partly because historians study human beings rather than objects governed only by physical laws. Human beings possess intentions, ambitions, fears, prejudices, beliefs and memories; they react to circumstances and to one another, and they may behave differently in apparently similar situations. A falling object does not know Newton’s laws and alter its behaviour because it has read them; human beings, by contrast, may read theories about society and change their behaviour because of them. History consequently cannot normally produce universal laws capable of predicting human events, which is why Marc Bloch’s famous description of history as the “science of men in time” needs to be understood carefully. The French word science has a broader intellectual meaning than the narrower modern English association with experimental natural science; Bloch was emphasising the systematic and critical nature of historical enquiry, not suggesting that the historian could reproduce the Battle of Waterloo or the French Revolution in a laboratory. Historians nevertheless share something important with scientists: a commitment to evidence. Historical arguments must be capable of being examined, challenged and, where necessary, rejected. If a historian claims that a Mughal emperor issued a particular order, another historian is entitled to ask where that order is to be found, whether the document is authentic, when it was written, whether contemporary sources mention it and whether administrative evidence suggests that it was actually implemented. A proposition unsupported by evidence does not become historical merely because it is confidently asserted.

The historian’s method is therefore based upon source criticism. A source is not accepted simply because it is old; the historian asks who produced it, when it was produced, for whom it was intended and why it was written. A court chronicler may exaggerate the achievements of his patron; an inscription may proclaim a victory more complete than the evidence suggests; a colonial official may describe Indian society through assumptions created by colonial administration; a nationalist writer may romanticise the past; a religious text may preserve important memories while serving purposes very different from those of a modern historical account. The historian must therefore interrogate the source: what could its author have known? What interests did the author possess? Is the account contemporary with the event? Can its statements be checked against independent evidence? Do coins, inscriptions, administrative documents or archaeological remains confirm or contradict it? Historical knowledge becomes stronger when different and independent forms of evidence converge. R. G. Collingwood placed this relationship between question and evidence at the centre of historical knowledge, observing that sources do not simply speak to us; historians ask questions of them. A royal chronicle praising an emperor may tell us something about the emperor, but it may tell us just as much about the conventions of kingship, the expectations of patronage and the political language of the court. The historian is therefore neither a passive collector of facts nor a novelist with complete freedom to construct a story.

This brings us to the difficult question of interpretation. Every serious historical account involves interpretation because evidence does not arrange itself into an explanation; historians decide which questions to ask, which connections are significant and how particular developments are to be explained. Two historians may study the same Mughal revenue system and reach different conclusions, one may emphasise agrarian extraction and pressure upon the peasantry, while another may place greater emphasis upon monetisation, commercialisation and economic expansion, and both interpretations may be legitimate if both are able to account seriously for the available evidence. Interpretation, however, is not the same as invention. The existence of disagreement among historians does not mean that every account of the past is equally valid; evidence places boundaries around interpretation. Historians may disagree about the character and consequences of the Mughal land‑revenue system, but one cannot reasonably argue that no such system existed, for the documentary evidence would make such a claim impossible to sustain. This distinction is particularly important when E. H. Carr’s description of history as an “unending dialogue between the present and the past” is invoked. Carr did not mean that every generation is free to create whichever past it finds politically or emotionally convenient; historians inevitably approach the past from the present, and they ask questions shaped by their own societies and intellectual concerns, and new questions can reveal aspects of the past overlooked by earlier generations. Yet the answers remain constrained by evidence; the present may ask the questions, but it cannot dictate the answers.

History therefore differs fundamentally from collective memory, mythology and propaganda. Memory tells us how individuals or communities remember the past, and those memories are themselves important subjects of historical enquiry; myth may reveal how societies understand their origins and identities; propaganda selects or manufactures versions of the past for present purposes. History must do something different: it asks what can reasonably be established about what happened, on the basis of evidence that can be examined and challenged by others. Historical knowledge is necessarily provisional. Documents disappear, archaeological discoveries produce new information and neglected sources may transform an established interpretation, so a historian may revise an earlier conclusion without undermining the discipline of history. Indeed, the willingness to change an interpretation when the evidence demands it is one of the strengths of historical scholarship. The absence of absolute certainty should not be confused with the absence of truth. A court record may be incomplete, a chronicler may be biased and an archaeological layer may permit more than one interpretation, but this does not mean that the historian knows nothing. Historical knowledge exists in degrees of probability and confidence: some conclusions are overwhelmingly supported by evidence, others remain probable, and still others must remain uncertain. Intellectual honesty requires the historian to distinguish between them.

There is consequently something misleading about asking simply whether history is or is not a science. If by science we mean an experimental discipline capable of reproducing phenomena, controlling variables and establishing universal predictive laws, history is clearly not a science; if, however, we mean a systematic form of enquiry governed by evidence, criticism, verification and rational argument, history possesses many qualities associated with scientific thought. It is perhaps more useful to describe history as a critical discipline for establishing and explaining what can reasonably be known about the human past. Its strength does not lie in reproducing the past experimentally, because that is impossible; its strength lies in the disciplined interrogation of the evidence the past has left behind. This understanding also defines the historian’s limits. Historians can explain why Dara Shukoh lost the war of succession; they cannot tell us what India would certainly have become had he won it. They can investigate what the railways did to colonial India; they cannot reconstruct with historical certainty an India in which the railways were never introduced. They can debate why an empire declined, why a revolution occurred or why a political movement succeeded, but they cannot rerun history with one variable altered and observe the result. The historian must therefore resist two temptations: the first is to pretend that history possesses the experimental certainty of the natural sciences; the second, and more dangerous, is to conclude that because such certainty is impossible, anything may be said about the past. Neither position is defensible. History occupies the demanding ground between them: it accepts uncertainty without surrendering to relativism, allows interpretation without permitting invention and recognises imagination as useful only when disciplined by evidence. The historian may ask what was possible, what contemporaries believed was possible and why one possibility prevailed over another; what the historian cannot do is convert a past that never happened into a past that can somehow be known. Ultimately, therefore, the distinction is quite simple. The past cannot be repeated, but it can be investigated; it cannot be experimentally recreated, but its surviving traces can be critically examined; it cannot tell us with certainty what might have happened, but it can tell us a great deal about what did happen and why. That is both the limitation of history and the source of its intellectual integrity.