Historiographical Rejoinder: On Reviewing Munis Faruqui’s Aurangzeb ‘Alamgir and the Mughal Empire

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

The review of Munis D. Faruqui’s Aurangzeb ‘Alamgir and the Mughal Empire: A History Retold carried out sometime back by the Hindustan Times, Delhi edition, contains a number of factual inaccuracies and interpretative problems. Given the constraints of space, however, I shall confine myself to addressing only some of the most significant historiographical errors rather than cataloguing every shortcoming. Even a brief engagement with these issues, I believe, is sufficient to show that the review’s framing does a disservice both to Faruqui’s work and to the broader tradition of Mughal scholarship.

The first and most fundamental problem is the review’s attempt to position Faruqui in opposition to what is described as the ‘Aligarh School of History’, represented principally by Professor Irfan Habib. Such a framework is historically misleading. There is, in fact, no intellectual contest between Faruqui and the Aligarh historians on the question of Aurangzeb. If anything, Faruqui’s work should be understood as part of the long evolution of Mughal historiography that has unfolded over the past half century.

The review repeatedly invokes Irfan Habib as Faruqui’s principal predecessor, but this is difficult to justify. Habib’s seminal contributions lie in the study of agrarian relations, the Mughal economy, technology, historical methodology and the structural foundations of the Mughal state. He did not produce a sustained interpretation of Aurangzeb’s reign comparable to those of Jadunath Sarkar, M. Athar Ali or Satish Chandra. To compare Habib and Faruqui on Aurangzeb is therefore to compare scholars who addressed fundamentally different historical questions.

The more appropriate historiographical comparison is with M. Athar Ali and Satish Chandra. Athar Ali’s The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb transformed our understanding of the political composition of the Mughal ruling class, while Satish Chandra’s work on the jagirdari crisis and the later Mughal Empire shifted explanations of imperial decline away from moral judgements about Aurangzeb’s personality towards structural and institutional processes. It is precisely against these interpretations that Faruqui’s emphasis on the Deccan campaigns and on the political significance of the imperial household should be evaluated.

Faruqui does not reject the structural analyses of Athar Ali or Satish Chandra. Rather, he supplements them by drawing attention to dimensions of imperial politics that earlier scholarship had not examined in comparable detail. His extensive use of the Akhbarat-i Darbar-i Mu’alla, together with documentary collections such as the Dastawizat, allows him to reconstruct the workings of the imperial court, the harem, the eunuchate and the mechanisms of decision-making with a richness unavailable to earlier historians. These are additions to the historiography rather than repudiations of it.

The second problem is the review’s division of recent Mughal scholarship into an ‘Aligarh School’ and a supposedly more political revisionist school represented by Muzaffar Alam, Richard Eaton, Audrey Truschke and Faruqui. Such categories obscure more than they clarify. These historians differ considerably in their interests, methods and conclusions. Their common rejection of communal interpretations of Mughal history does not make them members of a single intellectual school, nor does it reduce their scholarship to contemporary political intervention. Faruqui’s work is first and foremost an archival and institutional study rooted in close engagement with Persian documentary evidence.

The review also places undue emphasis on Faruqui’s use of Persian sources, contrasting it with Irfan Habib’s command of Persian. Such comparisons are beside the point. Originality in historical scholarship is not measured by linguistic competence alone, but by the questions posed to the sources and the ways in which they are interpreted. Athar Ali, Satish Chandra, Muzaffar Alam and numerous other historians also worked extensively with Persian materials. Faruqui’s contribution lies not in the mere use of Persian sources but in his systematic exploitation of underutilised archival collections and the fresh historical questions he asks of them.

Another weakness is the review’s repeated insistence that Faruqui seeks to ‘rescue’ Aurangzeb from modern political distortions. This interpretation risks attributing motives rather than evaluating arguments. Faruqui’s central objective is to recover the complexity of Mughal governance and political culture through sources that have been neglected by earlier scholarship. Whether or not one accepts all of his conclusions, the book is fundamentally an exercise in historical reconstruction rather than political rehabilitation.

Finally, the review creates an unnecessary impression of conflict where there is, in reality, historiographical continuity. Modern scholarship on Aurangzeb has developed cumulatively. Jadunath Sarkar established the foundational narrative. Athar Ali and Satish Chandra transformed its explanatory framework by emphasising institutions, political structures and fiscal processes. Muzaffar Alam and others enriched our understanding of Mughal political culture and intellectual life. Faruqui extends this trajectory through a remarkable reconstruction of court politics based on previously underused documentary archives. His work belongs within this continuing conversation rather than outside it.

Faruqui’s book deserves critical scrutiny, and some of its arguments, particularly the relative weight assigned to the Deccan campaigns in explaining the transformation of the Mughal Empire, will undoubtedly stimulate further debate. Such debate, however, should proceed by comparing his interpretations with those of Athar Ali and Satish Chandra, whose works remain the principal reference points for any serious discussion of Aurangzeb’s reign. To construct instead a contest with Irfan Habib is to misidentify both the historiographical lineage of the subject and the real significance of Faruqui’s contribution.

The history of Mughal historiography is not a succession of mutually exclusive schools overthrowing one another. It is a cumulative enterprise in which each generation asks new questions of an expanding archive. Faruqui’s book is an important contribution precisely because it continues that process. It deserves to be assessed within that larger historiographical tradition, rather than through artificial oppositions that obscure more than they illuminate.

When Diplomacy Spoke Through the Qur’an

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

آئے گی میری قبر سے آواز میرے بعد
ابھریں گے عشقِ دل سے ترے راز میرے بعد

Aayegi meri qabr se aawaaz mere baad
Ubhrenge ishq-e-dil se tere raaz mere baad

A voice will come from my grave after I am gone; the secrets of your heart will emerge from my love after me.

Mīr Taqi Mīr

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The funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran was not merely an occasion of mourning. It was also a carefully orchestrated moment of political communication. As delegations from across the world approached the bier to pay their final respects, the Qur’anic verses recited changed from one group to another. Iranian authorities offered no official explanation for these choices, yet the pattern was so striking that observers could not help but see in it a sophisticated form of diplomacy expressed through revelation itself.

More than just sending messages, the ceremony revealed Tehran speaking as a victor, not a mourner. Iran had not only survived a devastating war but had emerged from it stronger, with control of the Strait of Hormuz tantalisingly close to becoming a fait accompli. The funeral was religious, but it was also theatre of state. Iran used it to tell its own public that the state could still rally the country in victory and grief; to reassure allies that Tehran had not buckled; to show major powers that it had not been broken; and to remind rivals that it was keeping score. Look closely at the verses and a clear hierarchy appears.

The Saudi Arabian delegation attracted particular attention. As Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed bin Abdulkarim approached the coffin, the recitation turned to Surah Āl ʿImrān, 3:13, a verse recalling the Battle of Badr, where a vastly outnumbered Muslim force routed a much larger army “by the will of God”. Heard at a funeral in modern Tehran, this passage evoked memory, conflict, judgement and moral responsibility. It reminded listeners that history’s verdict is not determined by military might alone, but by divine will. The selection of this particular verse, referring to a battle fought on what is now Saudi soil, seemed to cast Iran as the protector of prophetic virtue while implicitly questioning the Saudi position during recent regional conflicts, particularly reports that Saudi Arabia had allowed US military operations from its territory while also urging Washington to avoid a wider war. Riyadh stayed on the sidelines or, according to some reports, acted against Iran, while Israel sought to “plunge the region into ruin”. Read against that context, the verse takes on a sharper tone: a clear reference to what many are increasingly calling Iran’s victory over the US and Israel.

The Indian delegation encountered a noticeably gentler tone, placing it in the category of “state allies”. Reports described India receiving a passage from Surah Āl ʿImrān, 3:173, often rendered as “do not falter or grieve”. This verse honours those who, when faced with threats or intimidation, respond with absolute trust in God rather than fear. For India, a nation that had maintained contact with Iranian leadership while preserving its relationship with the United States, the message appeared to acknowledge the difficulty of its balancing act without drawing it into the rhetoric of militant resistance. Iran seemed to recognise India as a friendly civilisational partner, while respecting its neutral position.

The Turkish delegation heard a rather different message, placing it in a middle category of “regional partners”. The passage selected, reportedly Surah al-Nisāʾ, 4:95, contrasts those who actively strive in God’s cause with those who remain behind. This verse has long been understood as praising commitment over passivity. Ankara stayed out of the war, making clear from the start that it would not take part. Read in the context of contemporary politics, it appeared to chide Turkey for its cautious neutrality during the recent conflict and broader regional crises, subtly reminding Turkish officials that status is determined not by words alone but by action and responsibility.

What made these recitations remarkable was not only their political suggestiveness, but the extraordinary range of the Qur’an itself. The same sacred text could address Saudi Arabia through the memory of Badr, India through reassurance, Turkey through exhortation, Hamas through fidelity to covenant, and Hezbollah through the promise of triumph. No speech could have achieved such nuanced communication with equal economy and dignity. The Qur’an supplied the vocabulary of grief, diplomacy, gratitude, rebuke and political memory all at once.

For the “Axis of Resistance”, the verses shared a common theme: martyrdom, unbroken pledges to God and victory. For Hamas, the recitation reportedly turned to Surah al-Aḥzāb, 33:23, praising believers who remained true to their covenant with God. The verse celebrates steadfastness, sacrifice and fidelity to one’s pledge. For Hezbollah, whose very name means “Party of God”, the selected passage came from Surah al-Māʾidah, 5:56, promising victory to the “Party of God”. Here the Qur’anic language was not merely consolatory. It affirmed loyalty, sacrifice and ideological companionship. Iran framed the heavy losses sustained by these allies not as military setbacks but as the fulfilment of a sacred contract. For Yemen’s Houthis, the verse selected was Surah Al-Fath, 48:29, a passage on loyalty, discipline and growth in the face of pressure, framing the movement as hard against its enemies but bound by internal solidarity. Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi received the well-known line from Surah Āl ʿImrān, 3:169, insisting that those “martyred in the cause of God” are not dead but alive, simply beyond ordinary perception. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Taliban were both read the opening of Surah Al-Fath, 48:1, speaking of “a clear triumph” granted so that past shortcomings are forgiven.

The Lebanese state delegation, notably, received a different passage from Hezbollah. As Defence Minister Michel Menassa approached, the recitation came from Surah An-Nisa, 4:66, speaking of obedience and sacrifice, and the consequences of failing to follow difficult instructions. The verse reads: “If We had commanded them to sacrifice themselves or abandon their homes, none would have obeyed except for a few. Had they done what they were advised to do, it would have certainly been far better for them and more reassuring.” In Islamic tradition, this verse addresses authority and cohesion. Its use was read by observers as a rebuke to the Lebanese government for failing to do enough to resist Israel’s occupation while attacking Hezbollah’s retaliatory strikes. The symbolism was made more prominent by over a year of worsening relations between Beirut and Tehran, and Hezbollah representatives, attending separately, were seen visibly emotional during the ceremony, highlighting Lebanon’s deep internal political split.

The Qatari delegation received a notably conciliatory message, placing it among the “regional partners”. The verse from Surah Al-Fath, 48:2, spoke of God forgiving sins and completing His favour, guiding one to a straight path. This surah is linked to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, a truce that initially appeared unfavourable for Muslims but later came to be seen as a strategic breakthrough. The verse was widely read as aligning with Qatar’s diplomatic positioning, particularly its key role as a mediator in US-Iran negotiations, acknowledging its usefulness while subtly reminding it of the ultimate victory of strategic patience.

The Russian delegation, categorised as a “state ally”, heard a verse from Surah Al-Qasas, 28:83, contrasting arrogance and corruption with humility and righteousness. Drawing on the Qur’anic narrative of Moses and Pharaoh, the verse states: “That home of the Hereafter We assign to those who do not desire exaltedness upon the earth or corruption.” In a modern interpretation, this was read as a caution against domination and overreach in international affairs, acknowledging Moscow’s role as a stabilising actor while warning against the temptations of imperial overreach.

Two other major delegations, Pakistan and Egypt, received multiple verses, reflecting their complex relationships. For Pakistan, a “regional partner”, the recitation was a personal prayer from Surah Al-Isra, 17:80: “Grant me an honourable entrance and an honourable exit”. From early in the war, Islamabad led the diplomatic track, using its relationship with US President Donald Trump to bridge the divide between Iran and the US. Egypt, straddling the categories, received two verses. One, a reward-focused passage from Surah Al-Bayyinah, 98:7-8, promised “Gardens of Eternity” to the pious. The other, placing it among the “state allies”, told them that “those who believe and do good” are “the best of all beings”, destined for gardens where God is pleased with them. These were the states that showed up, gave Tehran legitimacy, but were not folded into its resistance story. The verses read like thanks extended to partners Iran wants to keep close, not recruits it wants to enlist into its war.

This form of diplomatic communication belongs to a much older Islamic tradition. Throughout history, Muslim rulers have used Qur’anic verses in correspondence, inscriptions, coins, public ceremonies and victory proclamations. The Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals all understood that Qur’anic language could legitimise authority, proclaim justice and remind rulers of divine accountability. The inscriptions of Mughal monuments are far more than decorative embellishments. They communicate carefully chosen ideas about kingship, mortality, divine mercy and the hope of Paradise.

The Qutb Minar in Delhi, built in the late twelfth century as a tower of victory, carries intricate carvings and verses from the Qur’an across its red sandstone surface. Its inscriptions declare that the tower was erected “to cast the shadow of God over both East and West”. The Qutb Minar’s epigraphy was not mere ornament, but a statement of Islamic authority and divine sovereignty. Similarly, the Taj Mahal, built by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan as a mausoleum for his beloved wife, is adorned with verses from twenty-two different chapters of the Qur’an. The passages were selected to guide the viewer from mortality towards divine mercy, transforming architecture into a form of spiritual and political conversation conducted through revelation.

What the organisers of the Tehran funeral understood, like their Mughal and Mamluk predecessors, was that a carefully chosen verse can achieve what even the most skilfully drafted diplomatic note often cannot. It can praise without appearing partisan. It can caution without causing offence. It can remind without humiliating. And above all, it can invite reflection instead of provoking confrontation.

This brings to mind Fizza, the Abyssinian companion of Lady Fatima, remembered in Shi’i tradition as one so immersed in the Qur’an that she could answer ordinary questions through its verses. Whether understood literally or symbolically, the tradition expresses a profound idea: for one who has truly absorbed revelation, the Qur’an becomes not only a text to be recited, but a language through which life itself is interpreted. Fizza used the Qur’an in personal speech. The organisers of the funeral used it in diplomatic theatre. The scale was different, but the underlying idea was the same. Revelation was treated as a living vocabulary, capable of speaking to human beings, communities and nations.

The event was not without its domestic political dimensions. Another widely discussed moment came when Hassan Khomeini, grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder and a figure associated with the reformist camp, approached the coffin. As he did so, Verse 95 of Surah An-Nisa, which contrasts believers who stay at home with those who strive “with their wealth and their lives” in God’s cause, began to be recited. Videos circulating online appeared to show him leaving the ceremony shortly after the recitation began, prompting criticism from some conservatives. This suggested that the tailored recitations were not only for foreign delegations but also carried messages for domestic political factions.

The choice of passages prompted widespread discussion on Persian and Arabic-language social media. Iranian news outlets, including the website Fararu, wrote that the verses appeared to have been chosen “not randomly, but deliberately,” while the conservative outlet Tabnak described the practice as “an innovation in public diplomacy.” Supporters argued the selections reflected the recent conduct of regional governments rather than personal criticism. One Persian-language user wrote that reminding neighbouring countries of the consequences of their policies during the war was “a reminder of responsibility, not an insult.” Others argued that using Qur’anic verses to criticise official mourners was inappropriate, with one user stating, “I do not agree with reciting Quranic verses to criticize anyone who has come to pay their respects. It is inappropriate. As far as I know, reproaching guests was never the practice of the prophets, the Prophet Muhammad, the Imams, or the martyred leader.” This debate spread across Arabic-language social media as well, with Iraqi commentator Yaseen Aziz describing the verses recited for the Saudi delegation as “an indicator of the existing hatred and the diplomatic stupidity of the current leadership in Iran.”

One may agree or disagree with the policies of the Islamic Republic. That is a separate debate. Yet it is difficult not to admire the intellectual confidence displayed in this particular ceremony. At a moment when the eyes of the world were fixed upon Tehran, Iran chose not to speak through politicians but through scripture. It trusted the Qur’an to convey gratitude, solidarity, encouragement and moral reflection with a dignity that no political speech could equal. The funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei therefore belongs to a long Islamic tradition of political communication through revelation. It reminded the world that the Qur’an is not merely a book of worship, but a language of civilisation. At a time when modern diplomacy is often reduced to press releases and slogans, the ceremony demonstrated a different register of political speech. Without direct accusation, without flattery and without formal explanation, the Qur’an spoke. Those who understood its verses heard in them grief, judgement, loyalty, warning and consolation. Its power to provoke, as the social media debates showed, was matched only by its capacity to inspire.

The most eloquent diplomacy at that funeral was not spoken by diplomats. It was spoken by the Qur’an.

Why Iran Waited: Muharram, Temporary Burial, and the Sacred Politics of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Funeral

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Note: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, was killed in a joint U.S.-Israeli airstrike in Tehran on February 28, 2026. His remains are being laid to rest in his hometown of, culminating with a final burial in Mashhad on July 9, 2026.

Although the Qur’an does not specifically discuss temporary burial, Islamic jurisprudence has long recognised exceptional circumstances in which the deceased may be temporarily interred before final burial. Among Twelver Shi’as this developed into the well-established practice of amānat, particularly where the deceased wished ultimately to be buried near the shrines of Imam Ali at Najaf, Imam Husain at Karbala or Imām Reza at Mashhad.

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When Mumtaz Mahal died at Burhanpur on 17 June 1631 while accompanying Emperor Shah Jahan during the Mughal campaign in the Deccan, she was buried the very next day in a modest garden known as Zainabad Bagh. Neither the emperor nor the court regarded that grave as her final resting place. Six months later, after elaborate preparations had been completed, her remains were transported to Agra, where they were temporarily interred once again while the magnificent mausoleum that would become the Taj Mahal slowly rose above the banks of the Yamuna. Only after the subterranean crypt had been completed were her remains transferred for the third and final time to the tomb where they continue to rest today.

To the modern reader, three separate burials may appear surprising, particularly in the light of Islam’s well-known preference for prompt burial of the dead. Yet neither Shah Jahan’s contemporaries nor later Muslim jurists regarded these successive interments as inconsistent with Islamic law. The first burial fulfilled the religious obligation of committing the body to the earth without undue delay. The later transfers fulfilled another equally important objective, namely the desire that the deceased should ultimately rest in the place intended by her family and befitting her status.

Nearly four centuries later, another funeral invited similar questions.

When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was finally laid to rest almost four months after his assassination in the joint United States-Israeli bombing campaign, much of the international commentary focused on one obvious question: why had the Islamic Republic waited so long to bury its Supreme Leader? Iranian officials cited continuing security concerns. Given the volatile military situation, that explanation was both understandable and entirely plausible. No responsible government would willingly expose millions of mourners to the possibility of another attack.

Yet security alone does not fully explain the timing of the funeral. It explains why the ceremony could not take place immediately. It does not explain why it eventually took place during Muharram, the most sacred period of mourning in the Shi’i religious calendar, nor why every aspect of the funeral was woven into the symbolic language of Karbala. Neither does it explain why the funeral route stretched from Tehran to Qom, then to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, before finally concluding at the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad.

To understand that decision one must look beyond contemporary geopolitics and enter a much older world of Islamic funerary practice, Shi’i devotional tradition and the historical memory of martyrdom. The answer lies at the intersection of four enduring ideas: the permissibility of temporary burial before final interment, the sanctity of the sacred geography represented by Najaf and Karbala, the profound significance of sacred time embodied in the month of Muharram, and the spiritual prestige of burial near the shrine of a holy Imam. Only by appreciating these traditions does the apparent mystery surrounding the delayed funeral begin to dissolve.

Burial in Islam: Principle and Practice

Few aspects of Islamic law are as widely recognised as the injunction that the deceased should be buried as quickly as possible. The Prophet Muhammad encouraged believers not to delay funeral rites unnecessarily. The body is washed, shrouded, offered the funeral prayer and committed to the earth with dignity and respect. Across much of the Muslim world, burial within twenty-four hours remains the accepted norm.

Like every legal principle, however, this injunction has always been understood in relation to circumstance. The objective of the law is to preserve the dignity of the deceased. It is not to insist upon an inflexible rule regardless of war, epidemic, political turmoil or practical necessity. Classical Muslim jurists therefore recognised situations in which immediate permanent burial might not be possible or even desirable. Temporary burial pending transfer to another location, reinterment in a family cemetery, or movement of the remains for compelling religious reasons all found discussion within the legal literature.

This distinction between immediate burial and permanent burial is often overlooked in contemporary discussions. Yet it is essential for understanding many funerary practices that developed throughout the Islamic world.

Among Twelver Shi’as, this flexibility gradually evolved into a distinctive religious custom known as amānat, literally meaning an “entrustment”. The deceased was entrusted temporarily to the earth until circumstances permitted final burial at the location intended by the deceased or desired by the family. The origins of this practice lay in the immense spiritual significance attached to the shrines of Imam Ali at Najaf and Imam Husain at Karbala. For centuries, believers from Iran, Iraq, the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and the Caucasus expressed the wish that they should ultimately rest near one of these sacred sanctuaries. Burial in their vicinity was regarded not merely as an honour but as a means of remaining spiritually close to the Imams whose lives represented the highest ideals of justice, sacrifice and unwavering fidelity to God.

Before the coming of steamships, railways and modern refrigeration, however, such wishes could rarely be fulfilled immediately. A journey from Isfahan, Lucknow or Hyderabad to Najaf might take many months. Political upheavals frequently interrupted caravan routes, while climatic conditions often rendered long-distance transportation impossible.

The practical solution was temporary burial. The deceased received full Islamic funeral rites and was buried locally. Months or even years later, when circumstances permitted, the remains were carefully exhumed and conveyed to Najaf or Karbala for permanent interment. By the nineteenth century, this practice had become sufficiently common for organised funerary caravans to transport bodies from Iran into Ottoman Iraq, while Indian Shi’as regularly sent the remains of relatives from Bombay to Basra before the final journey to the great cemetery of Wadi al-Salam near the shrine of Imam Ali.

British colonial records reveal that the traffic in human remains became so extensive that regulations were introduced governing their transport through Indian ports. European travellers to Iraq likewise remarked upon the steady arrival of funeral caravans carrying believers who wished their final resting place to be in the shadow of the holy shrines. Far from being regarded as a departure from Islamic law, these practices were accepted because the first burial fulfilled the legal obligation while the later transfer fulfilled the devotional aspirations of the deceased.

Viewed against this historical background, the temporary burial of Ayatollah Khamenei before his final funeral appears neither novel nor exceptional. Rather, it belongs to a funerary tradition whose roots extend deep into the religious life of the Shi’i world.

From Temporary Burial to Sacred Geography

The practice of temporary burial cannot be understood simply as a legal concession to difficult circumstances. Over time it became closely associated with what historians have called the sacred geography of Shi’i Islam, a landscape in which certain places acquired profound spiritual significance because of their association with the Prophet’s family.

Foremost among these sacred centres are Najaf and Karbala. Najaf is revered as the resting place of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Imam according to Shi’i belief. Karbala, barely eighty kilometres away, is the site where Imam Husain, together with members of his family and a small band of companions, was martyred on the tenth of Muharram in the year 61 AH (680 CE). Between these two cities lies not merely geography but the emotional and theological heart of Shi’i civilisation. The third preferred sacred site in shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad.

For centuries, believers from Iran, Iraq, the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and the Caucasus undertook arduous journeys to visit these shrines. Many desired that death should complete the pilgrimage begun in life. Burial in the vicinity of Imam Ali or Imam Husain came to be regarded as a final expression of devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt, the family of the Prophet. This aspiration transformed Najaf into one of the world’s great cemeteries. The vast necropolis of Wadi al-Salam, stretching for kilometres around the shrine of Imam Ali, contains millions of graves accumulated over many centuries. Medieval scholars, Safavid nobles, Qajar princes, merchants from Isfahan, religious scholars from Lucknow and Hyderabad, and ordinary believers from every corner of the Shi’i world found their final resting place there.

The cemetery itself became a map of the Persianate world. Its graves silently record the movement of people, ideas and devotional practices across an immense geographical region extending from India to Iran and Iraq.

This tradition also explains why temporary burial became so widespread among Shi’i communities in South Asia. Wealthy families in Awadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir frequently instructed their heirs that, circumstances permitting, their remains should eventually be conveyed to Najaf or Karbala. The first burial therefore represented not the end of the funeral but the beginning of a longer sacred journey. Such practices reveal that burial in Shi’i Islam has never been understood merely as a practical disposal of the dead. It is also an act of memory, identity and belonging. The deceased is placed not simply in the earth but within a sacred landscape whose significance transcends mortality itself.

Mughal India and the Idea of Successive Burial

The history of Mughal India provides a striking illustration of the distinction between immediate burial and permanent interment. When Mumtaz Mahal died at Burhanpur in June 1631 during Shah Jahan’s Deccan campaign, the emperor acted in accordance with Islamic practice by ensuring that she was buried without delay. Contemporary chroniclers describe how she was laid to rest in the garden known as Zainabad Bagh. Yet neither Shah Jahan nor the imperial court regarded that grave as her permanent resting place.

The emperor had already conceived the idea of erecting a monumental mausoleum in Agra worthy of the memory of his beloved consort. Construction of such a structure naturally required time. Consequently, several months later her remains were transferred with elaborate ceremonial to Agra, where they were once again placed in a temporary grave while work upon the mausoleum progressed. Only after the underground crypt had been completed were her remains finally transferred beneath the great marble dome that later generations came to know as the Taj Mahal.

The three successive burials of Mumtaz Mahal illustrate an important legal and religious principle. Prompt burial satisfied the requirements of Islamic law. Permanent burial fulfilled the wishes of the family. The interval between the two did not represent a violation of religious obligation but rather a practical accommodation to circumstances. The Persian chroniclers treated the successive transfers as entirely natural stages within a carefully planned imperial funeral.

Indeed, the Mughal court was familiar with the movement of royal remains under other circumstances as well. Imperial deaths that occurred during military campaigns or journeys frequently required temporary arrangements before final burial could take place in dynastic mausolea. The distinction between temporary and permanent interment therefore formed part of the practical experience of Muslim courts long before the emergence of the modern nation-state.

The comparison is instructive. Neither Shah Jahan nor his contemporaries imagined that the first burial necessarily had to be the last. Nor have generations of Shi’i Muslims regarded temporary burial before final interment as incompatible with Islamic teaching. Against this historical background, the temporary burial of Ayatollah Khamenei appears less an innovation than the continuation of a long-established tradition.

Muharram: When History Becomes Present

If temporary burial explains how the interval between death and final burial could be accommodated within Islamic tradition, it still leaves unanswered the more significant question: why Muharram?

The answer lies in the distinctive Shi’i understanding of history itself. Modern historical consciousness generally assumes that the past lies behind us. We commemorate anniversaries because events have ended. Memory becomes a means of preserving what time has already carried away. Shi’i Islam approaches sacred history differently.

Karbala is never regarded simply as an event that occurred in the seventh century. It is a reality continually re-entered through ritual. Every year, with the arrival of Muharram, historical chronology yields to sacred memory. The sermons delivered in majalis, the recitation of marsiyas and nauhas, the mourning processions, the carrying of the alam, and the rhythmic expressions of grief do not merely describe Karbala. They recreate it. Participants frequently speak of “being with Husain” rather than merely remembering him. Lady Zaynab’s courage, Abbas’s loyalty, Ali Akbar’s sacrifice, the thirst of the children and Husain’s final stand cease to be episodes confined to history. They become moral experiences through which each generation understands its own age.

It is in this sense that Muharram abolishes ordinary time. The past enters the present. History becomes memory. Memory becomes identity. The funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei was ultimately held within precisely this sacred landscape. That timing transformed it from the burial of a political leader into an event interpreted through the enduring language of Karbala.

The Ritual Language of Muharram

To appreciate why Muharram provided the ideal setting for Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral, one must understand that Shi’i mourning communicates as much through symbols as through words. Every colour, every standard, every lament and every procession forms part of a ritual vocabulary whose meanings have been refined over centuries. To the casual observer these may appear as elements of religious pageantry. To those immersed in the tradition, however, they constitute a language through which sacred history is continually brought into the present.

The most immediately recognisable symbol of Muharram is the colour black. Throughout Iran, Iraq and the Shi’i communities of South Asia, mosques, husayniyyas, imambaras and even private homes are draped in black cloth from the beginning of Muharram. Public celebrations cease. Festive decorations disappear. Black banners bearing Qur’anic verses or the names of Imam Husain and the martyrs of Karbala replace them. The mourners themselves wear black, not because the colour possesses any intrinsic sanctity, but because it has long served as the public expression of grief for the family of the Prophet. By the time Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral took place, Iran had already entered this landscape of mourning. The funeral therefore required no separate visual language. It naturally became part of the wider commemoration of Karbala.

Alongside the black banners appeared another symbol that attracted considerable attention: the red standard. Outside Iran, the red flags were frequently interpreted simply as symbols of vengeance or military retaliation. Such an explanation captures only one aspect of their significance. Within Shi’i devotional culture, the red standard possesses a much older and richer meaning. It recalls the blood of Imam Husain shed upon the plain of Karbala, blood that symbolises an injustice whose moral challenge has never been exhausted. It is less a call for personal revenge than a reminder that tyranny can never enjoy permanent victory over truth.

For centuries Persian poets have employed the imagery of crimson banners and blood-stained standards to evoke the martyrdom of Husain. In Iran and Iraq, the red flag has also come to symbolise the continuing obligation to uphold the principles for which Husain sacrificed his life. During Muharram, therefore, the presence of red standards reminds mourners that Karbala is not simply a historical memory but an ethical responsibility. Their appearance during Khamenei’s funeral invited those present to interpret contemporary events through that inherited moral language.

Equally significant were the alams carried throughout the procession. In the Indo-Persian world, the alam has become one of the most enduring emblems of Muharram. Although its artistic form has evolved over time, its symbolism reaches back to Hazrat Abbas ibn Ali, the standard-bearer of Imam Husain’s small caravan at Karbala. Abbas occupies a unique place in Shi’i devotion. His courage, loyalty and refusal to abandon his brother, even when confronted with certain death, transformed him into the embodiment of unwavering fidelity. His unsuccessful attempt to bring water to the thirsty camp before being martyred has remained one of the most moving episodes in the Karbala narrative. The alam therefore signifies steadfastness under trial and loyalty in the face of overwhelming adversity. Its presence at the funeral subtly reinforced the themes already central to Muharram itself.

The elegies recited during the mourning assemblies performed a similar function. Persian marsiyas and Arabic or Persian nauhas have long served not merely as poems of grief but as vehicles for transmitting historical memory. They recount the events of Karbala with emotional intensity while inviting listeners to identify morally with the suffering of the Prophet’s household. Across the Persianate world, from Isfahan to Lucknow and Hyderabad, these compositions became one of the principal means by which successive generations encountered the story of Ashura. The recitation of these elegies during Khamenei’s funeral therefore did more than express sorrow for the deceased. It situated his death within an already familiar emotional and devotional tradition.

Qur’anic recitation further deepened the symbolism. Verses concerning patience, perseverance and martyrdom have long occupied a central place in Shi’i commemorative practice. Among the most frequently cited is the declaration: “Do not think of those who are slain in the path of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving sustenance” (Qur’an 3:169). Likewise, the verse “Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their wealth in exchange for Paradise” (Qur’an 9:111) has repeatedly been invoked in sermons commemorating those regarded as martyrs. These verses acquired particular prominence during the Iran-Iraq War, when they became part of the public language through which sacrifice was understood. Their presence during Khamenei’s funeral linked the ceremony not only with Karbala but also with the broader Iranian tradition of honouring those who died in defence of the nation.

Taken together, the black banners, the red standards, the alams, the elegies and the Qur’anic recitations formed a coherent symbolic system. None of these elements was created for the funeral itself. Each belonged to a ritual tradition many centuries older than the Islamic Republic. What the funeral achieved was to place the death of the Supreme Leader within that inherited world of meanings.

The Funeral Route: A Pilgrimage Through Sacred Geography

The seven-day funeral procession that began in Tehran and wound through Qom, Najaf, Karbala and finally Mashhad was not merely a logistical necessity. It was a deliberate creation of sacred geography, a state-sponsored pilgrimage that transformed the burial of a political leader into a chapter of sacred history. Each stop on this route held immense significance and was carefully calculated to reinforce a specific message about the nature of Khamenei’s leadership and the character of his death.

Tehran, as the political capital of the Islamic Republic, served as the appropriate starting point. The immense crowds that gathered there demonstrated the popular support that the regime continued to command and provided the visual spectacle of national mourning that state funerals require. Yet Tehran’s significance was political rather than religious. The real meaning of the funeral would unfold only as the procession moved southward toward the spiritual heart of Shi’i Islam.

The first religious stop was Qom, the centre of Shi’i learning in Iran and the city that nurtured the 1979 revolution. Qom occupies a unique place in modern Iranian history. It was from Qom that Ayatollah Khomeini directed the opposition to the Shah, and it was to Qom that the revolutionary clergy returned after the revolution’s triumph. By bringing the body of the Supreme Leader to Qom, the Islamic Republic connected him to the clerical establishment’s spiritual and revolutionary authority. The seminaries of Qom had produced generations of religious scholars, and their endorsement of Khamenei’s leadership had been essential to his legitimacy. Processing through the city was therefore a reaffirmation of the bond between the religious institution and the political order it had helped to create.

From Qom, the funeral crossed the border into Iraq. This was a decision of immense geopolitical significance. Iraq, though overwhelmingly Shi’i in population, had long been a rival of Iran. The devastating Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s had left deep scars on both sides. Yet by 2026, Iranian influence over Iraq’s political and religious institutions had grown considerably. The decision to route the funeral through Najaf and Karbala was a calculated demonstration of this influence, presenting Iran as the protector of Shi’i holy sites and its leader as a figure of pan-Islamic, and specifically pan-Shiite, importance.

Najaf, the first Iraqi stop, is revered as the resting place of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib. For Shia Muslims, Najaf represents the foundation of rightful leadership. Ali was not only the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad but also the first Imam, the figure from whom all subsequent Shia authority derives. By bringing the body of the Supreme Leader to Najaf, Tehran was casting Khamenei within that same lineage of just authority. The symbolism was unmistakable: just as Ali had stood for justice and righteousness against tyranny, so too had Khamenei stood against the aggression of the United States and Israel. The procession through Najaf invited mourners to see the late leader as a defender of the faith in the tradition of the Imams themselves.

From Najaf, the funeral moved to Karbala, the emotional and spiritual core of Shia Islam. Karbala is the site where Imam Husain, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, was martyred along with most of his family and a small band of companions on the tenth of Muharram in the year 680 CE. The tragedy of Karbala is the defining event of Shia history, the moment that crystallised the community’s identity as a persecuted minority standing against overwhelming power. The procession to the shrines of Imam Husain and his half-brother Abbas directly connected the Supreme Leader’s death to this defining tragedy. The symbolism was unmistakable: his assassination in a United States-Israeli strike was framed not as a political death but as a sacrifice in the same mould as that of Imam Husain.

The banners that appeared in Karbala during the funeral revealed this connection explicitly. One banner read “We bid you farewell,” a phrase typically reserved for the departure of a venerated saint or martyr, rather than a political leader. The mourners who gathered in Karbala were not merely expressing grief for a deceased statesman. They were participating in an act of religious commemoration that placed Khamenei within the narrative of Karbala itself. The parallels were deliberately invoked: steadfastness in adversity, sacrifice in the face of overwhelming power, and fidelity to principle despite mortal danger. The funeral in Karbala was not simply a procession. It was a reenactment of sacred history.

From Karbala, the funeral crossed back into Iran today and, as I write, is proceeding eastward to Mashhad, the final resting place.

Mashhad, meaning “Place of Martyrdom,” is the site of the shrine of Imam Reza, the Eighth Imam and the only shrine of a Shia Imam located within Iran’s borders. For centuries, millions of pilgrims have travelled to Mashhad to pay their respects at the zarih surrounding Imam Reza’s tomb, a threshold to the sacred and a tangible point of connection to the divine. To be buried in its proximity is considered an immense honour and a blessing, a belief that has driven the desire for burial near sacred shrines for centuries.

The choice of Mashhad as the final resting place for Ayatollah Khamenei is therefore not arbitrary. It is the culmination of the entire funeral journey, the moment when the deceased leader was integrated into the sacred landscape of Shi’i Islam. Burying him near the shrine of Imam Reza transforms his memory into a permanent part of the nation’s holiest site and embeds his legacy into the foundational fabric of Twelver Shi’ism. His grave would not stand as a memorial to a politician but as a shrine visited by millions, his legacy eternally intertwined with the holy Imams he sought to emulate.

The Islamic Republic has fully embraced this tradition. By granting the Supreme Leader a burial place of such unparalleled spiritual prestige, the regime ensured that his memory would be preserved not just in history books or official ceremonies but in the daily devotional life of the Shi’i world. The millions of pilgrims who visit Mashhad each year would inevitably encounter his grave, and each encounter would serve as a quiet reaffirmation of his place in the sacred history of the community.

From Ritual to Political Theology

Every state funeral seeks to accomplish more than the burial of a distinguished individual. It reaffirms continuity, strengthens collective identity and reassures society that political authority survives the death of its leaders. In Iran, however, state funerals perform an additional function. They draw legitimacy not merely from constitutional authority but from sacred history.

The funeral of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989 remains one of the largest public funerals of the modern age. Millions gathered to accompany the founder of the Islamic Republic on his final journey. The ceremony expressed grief but also reaffirmed the continuity of the Revolution after the death of its principal architect. Three decades later, the funeral of Qasem Soleimani similarly became a national act of remembrance. Although Soleimani was a military commander rather than a religious authority, official discourse consistently presented him as a martyr whose sacrifice formed part of the continuing struggle against oppression. Once again, religious symbolism and political memory became inseparable.

The funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei differs from both of these precedents in one crucial respect: its timing and its route. Neither Khomeini’s funeral nor Soleimani’s burial was deliberately postponed until Muharram. Neither was processed through the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. Khamenei’s funeral, by contrast, unfolded within the annual season of mourning itself and wove through the sacred geography of Shi’i Islam. Consequently, it is no longer simply a state funeral accompanied by religious ritual. It became part of the ritual calendar of Shi’i Islam and part of the sacred landscape of the faith.

This distinction is of considerable historical importance. Rather than constructing an entirely new ceremonial language, the Islamic Republic drew upon symbols that generations of believers already recognised as their own. The state did not invent Muharram. It inherited a ritual tradition extending back over thirteen centuries and employed that tradition to interpret one of the defining events of its own history. Similarly, the state did not create the sanctity of Najaf, Karbala or Mashhad. It placed the funeral within a sacred geography that had been revered for centuries.

For the historian, this is perhaps the most revealing aspect of the funeral. It demonstrates how religious memory and political authority continue to interact within contemporary Iran. Sacred history is not merely remembered. It provides the moral vocabulary through which the present is understood. The funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei was not simply the burial of a statesman. It was an act of remembrance performed within the sacred landscape of Muharram, where the memory of Karbala continues to shape religious devotion, political imagination and historical consciousness.

Why Iran Waited

The question that first confronted observers around the world was deceptively simple. Why did Iran wait nearly four months before conducting the public funeral and final burial of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?

The answer cannot be reduced to a single explanation. The security situation undoubtedly mattered. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks that claimed the lives of the Supreme Leader and members of his family, the possibility of renewed military action remained very real. Any gathering of millions in Tehran would have presented an obvious target. No responsible government could have ignored such risks.

Yet security alone does not explain why the funeral eventually took place during Muharram. That decision belongs to another realm altogether, the realm of religious memory. Islamic law encouraged prompt burial, but it also recognised exceptional circumstances in which temporary interment might precede final burial. Within Shi’i Islam this legal flexibility evolved into the well-established practice of amānat, whereby the deceased was entrusted temporarily to the earth until circumstances permitted permanent burial, often in the sacred cities of Najaf or Karbala. This was not a modern innovation but a tradition observed for centuries across Iran, Iraq and the Indian subcontinent.

The experience of Mughal India illustrates precisely the same principle. Mumtaz Mahal’s remains rested successively at Burhanpur, in a temporary grave at Agra, and finally within the completed Taj Mahal. The first burial fulfilled the requirements of religion. The final burial fulfilled the wishes of the emperor. Neither contemporaries nor later jurists regarded these successive interments as inconsistent with Islamic practice. Historical precedent therefore helps explain how Iran could postpone the public funeral without abandoning the religious imperative of honouring the dead.

The more significant question, however, concerns why the funeral was ultimately held during Muharram. For Shi’i Muslims, Muharram is not simply the opening month of the Islamic year. It is the season in which sacred history enters the present. Through sermons, elegies, mourning assemblies and public processions, the events of Karbala are not merely remembered but relived. The ethical struggle embodied by Imam Husain becomes a continuing reality through which each generation understands its own age. By placing the funeral within this sacred season, the Islamic Republic transformed what would otherwise have been an extraordinary state ceremony into an event situated within the oldest and most powerful narrative of Shi’i Islam.

The choice of the funeral route reveals the same logic. By processing through Qom, Najaf, Karbala and Mashhad, the regime ensured that the Supreme Leader’s death would be understood not as a political assassination but as a martyrdom in the tradition of the Imams. The body was brought to the shrines of Ali and Husain so that the mourners in those sacred cities could bid farewell to their leader in the language they reserved for saints and martyrs. The final burial in Mashhad ensures that his memory would be forever intertwined with the most revered shrine in Iran.

This point deserves careful emphasis. The symbolism did not equate Ayatollah Khamenei with Imam Husain or Imam Ali. Such an interpretation would be wholly inconsistent with Twelver Shi’i belief, in which the Imams occupy a unique and incomparable position. Rather, the funeral invited mourners to understand Khamenei’s death through the ethical categories established by Karbala: steadfastness in adversity, sacrifice in the face of overwhelming power, and fidelity to principle despite mortal danger. The black banners of mourning, the red standards recalling Husain’s blood, the alams of Hazrat Abbas, the recitation of Qur’anic verses on martyrdom and perseverance, the elegies recounting the tragedy of Karbala, and the immense public processions all formed part of a symbolic language that long predated the Islamic Republic itself. The state did not invent these symbols. It inherited them. Nor did it create the memory of Karbala. It drew upon a devotional tradition that has shaped Shi’i civilisation for more than thirteen centuries.

For the historian, this distinction is crucial. Modern analyses of West Asia frequently privilege military strategy, diplomacy, economics or constitutional structures. These are indispensable for understanding contemporary events, but they do not exhaust the subject. Societies also act through inherited memories, sacred narratives and ritual practices. Political decisions often derive meaning not only from immediate circumstances but also from historical traditions that continue to shape collective consciousness.

Iran offers perhaps one of the clearest examples of this phenomenon. Since the Revolution of 1979, the language of Karbala has repeatedly provided the moral vocabulary through which war, sacrifice and national endurance have been understood. During the Iran-Iraq War, the memory of Imam Husain inspired countless volunteers. The funerals of those killed in battle consciously drew upon the rituals of Muharram. Similar symbolism accompanied the mourning for General Qasem Soleimani. The funeral of Ayatollah Khamenei belongs within this longer historical continuum.

Understanding this does not require agreement with the political programme of the Islamic Republic. Historical explanation is not the same as political endorsement. The task of the historian is first to understand why events unfolded as they did and only then to evaluate their wider significance.

Seen from that perspective, the timing and route of Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral appear far less enigmatic. The body had already been committed to the earth. The funeral itself awaited sacred time and sacred space. By allowing the final ceremonies to unfold during Muharram and by processing through the holiest cities of Shi’i Islam, the Islamic Republic ensured that the death of its Supreme Leader would be interpreted through the enduring memory of Karbala and the sacred geography of the faith. Contemporary history was placed within sacred history. Individual loss became collective remembrance. Political tragedy acquired religious meaning. Whether one accepts that interpretation or not, its historical significance cannot be ignored. The funeral demonstrated that, in contemporary Iran, ritual remains one of the principal means through which politics is understood and history is remembered.

Conclusion

The essay began with Mumtaz Mahal. Her successive burials remind us that Islamic civilisation has long distinguished between the necessity of immediate burial and the choice of a permanent resting place. Four centuries later, another funeral reminds us of a second and equally important truth.

History is not only about events. It is also about the meanings that societies attach to those events. For millions of Shi’i Muslims, Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral was never simply the burial of a statesman. It was an act of remembrance performed within the sacred landscape of Muharram, where the memory of Karbala continues to shape religious devotion, political imagination and historical consciousness. The procession through Qom, Najaf and Karbala transformed the funeral into a pilgrimage. The final burial in Mashhad integrated the Supreme Leader’s memory into the most sacred site within Iran. The timing during Muharram ensured that his death would be understood through the ethical categories of sacrifice and steadfastness that Karbala represents.

In the end, Iran did not merely postpone a funeral. It waited until history, memory and ritual could speak with one voice. The security concerns that delayed the initial burial were real, but they were not the whole story. The real explanation lies in a much older tradition, one that has shaped the devotional life of Shi’i Muslims for centuries and that continues to shape the political imagination of the Islamic Republic today. The funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was not simply a response to contemporary geopolitics. It was an act of sacred politics, a ritual performance that wove the death of a political leader into the enduring fabric of Shi’i sacred history.

The Call of Destiny III: The Teachers Who Shaped My Mind

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

If The Call of Destiny I was how I left the subjects I did not like and waded towards my interests, and The Call of Destiny II recalled the summer during which my father quietly but firmly chose the course of my future, then this is about the remarkable men and women who shaped that future. Looking back after nearly half a century, I realise that while my father had placed me on the path of history, it was my teachers who taught me how to walk it. Whatever little I have achieved as a historian owes an immeasurable debt to them.

I often think that I belonged to perhaps the luckiest generation of students to have studied in the Department of History at Aligarh. The late 1970s and early 1980s represented, in my view, the Department at its intellectual zenith. It was an age when the senior-most faculty members did not consider undergraduate teaching beneath their dignity. On the contrary, they believed that the foundations of scholarship had to be laid at the very beginning. Consequently, students entering the BA (Hons) programme encountered some of the finest historians of the country from their very first day in the classroom. It was an extraordinary privilege, although at that age we scarcely appreciated how fortunate we were. We simply assumed that universities everywhere functioned in this fashion.

Thus, as an undergraduate, I found myself being taught Indian History by the likes of Irfan Habib, M. Athar Ali and Iqtidar Alam Khan. Ancient Indian History was taught by Professor R. C. Gaur, the History of England by Shireen Moosvi, and the Delhi Sultanate by Raza Naqvi. It is remarkable to note that Habib taught Modern Indian history at undergraduate level, and History of Europe and Economic History of Mughals in MA. Khan and Athar Ali taught the Mughals, both at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Today, looking back, it almost sounds improbable. At that time, however, it appeared perfectly natural. Only years later did I realise that students elsewhere often completed their entire university education without ever entering the classroom of scholars of such distinction.

One of the greatest beneficiaries of this remarkable system was the undergraduate student himself. By the time I reached the MA classes, many of the fundamental questions and debates had already become familiar. We had not merely memorised facts. We had learnt to think historically. That became most evident in the case of Professor Raza Naqvi. Naqvi Sahib taught the Delhi Sultanate with such thoroughness that when we eventually entered Professor K. A. Nizami’s celebrated postgraduate lectures, we realised, somewhat to our surprise, that there was very little in the political history of the Sultanate that Naqvi Sahib had not already covered. This is not intended as a criticism of Nizami Sahib. It is, rather, a tribute to the remarkable thoroughness of Naqvi Sahib’s teaching. He had quietly built such solid foundations that we found ourselves entering postgraduate classes unusually well prepared.

Where Nizami Sahib truly came into his own was in the history of Sufism. Those lectures were unlike any others. As he spoke about the great Chishti saints, mystical doctrines or the spiritual experiences of medieval India, the classroom itself seemed gradually to disappear. Quite suddenly he would fall silent. His gaze would drift somewhere far beyond the walls before us, as though his mind had wandered into another world altogether. We would sit motionless, hardly daring to shift in our seats, convinced that we were witnessing a moment of profound contemplation. Then, after what felt like an eternity, he would gently return to the present, smile almost apologetically and say, “Khair! Let it be! What was I saying?” None of us ever had the courage to remind him. Perhaps we feared interrupting a conversation he had momentarily been holding with the saints themselves. There are historians who explain Sufism. Nizami Sahib seemed, at times, almost to experience it.

Ironically, this deeply mystical scholar remained personally quite orthodox. I discovered that rather painfully. Like many young students intoxicated by newly discovered ideas, I had begun reading Ali Shariati and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Their philosophical writings fascinated me, and with all the confidence of youth I decided that one of Nizami Sahib’s sessional examinations offered the perfect opportunity to display my intellectual maturity. Instead of writing what the examination required, I produced an elaborate philosophical meditation inspired largely by Shariati and Nasr. I handed it in feeling quietly pleased with myself. Nizami Sahib read every page. He then awarded me just enough marks to pass. No comment. No criticism. No sermon. Merely a mark sheet that gently but unmistakably conveyed the message that while philosophy has its place, historical questions are best answered historically. It was one of the most valuable lessons I ever received.

If Nizami Sahib possessed a mystical aura, Professor M. A. Alvi, whom we all knew as Mujtaba Alvi, possessed something altogether different. He had style. It was said that he had been a classmate of General Zia-ul-Haq at St Stephen’s College. Fortunately for history, only one of them chose the classroom as his destiny. Alvi Sahib taught us the French Revolution. To say that he spoke beautiful English would scarcely do him justice. His language flowed with such elegance that we often found ourselves listening less to the content than to the sheer music of his speech. Every sentence seemed perfectly crafted. Every paragraph unfolded effortlessly into the next. We sat mesmerised, hoping the lecture would never end. Naturally we assumed that if only we faithfully copied every point he made, we too would acquire some measure of that brilliance. One day several of us made a determined effort to note down everything. The experiment proved deeply disappointing. On paper, the points looked perfectly ordinary. The magic had never been in the notes. It had been in the man.

One incident remains unforgettable. A class test had been announced when, just before it was due to begin, a message arrived summoning him to the Vice Chancellor’s office. Most teachers would have postponed the examination. Alvi Sahib calmly distributed the answer books, dictated a few questions and then, gathering his papers, looked at us with complete confidence. “You may attempt any one of them,” he said. “If you wish, you may even consult your books.” And with that he walked out. No invigilator. No supervision. Nothing. For a brief moment we congratulated ourselves on having perhaps the most liberal teacher in the University. Within minutes our celebration ended. The questions demanded understanding rather than information. Every book we opened stubbornly refused to provide an answer. That afternoon we learnt a lesson which has stayed with me ever since. An open-book examination is only easy for those who have never sat one. The books may be open. The mind still has to do the work.

Iqtidar Alam Khan, affectionately known throughout the Department simply as Bhai Khan, represented yet another school of teaching altogether. His lectures on the Mughal Empire were legendary, not merely for their scholarship but for their astonishing richness of detail. Every institution, every campaign, every administrative regulation acquired layer upon layer of explanation until our notebooks began to resemble abbreviated editions of the Akbarnama. By the end of each lecture the real work had only just begun. Before revising our notes, we first had to summarise them. Perhaps that was his hidden teaching method. Without ever announcing it, he compelled us to distinguish between detail and argument, between information and interpretation. In later years, while writing my own books and articles, I often realised how much I owed to those painstaking exercises in condensation. The ability to summarise without oversimplifying is itself a historian’s craft. And Bhai Khan taught it without ever saying so.

If scholarship commanded our admiration, affection belonged, above all, to Professor Satya Prakash Gupta and Dr Shafiullah. Looking back today, I realise that while some teachers impressed us by the brilliance of their intellect, others entered our hearts by the warmth of their humanity. Guptaji belonged unmistakably to the latter category. He was perhaps the least pretentious professor I have ever known. Slightly rotund, always smiling and perpetually approachable, he possessed none of the airs that often accompany academic distinction. There was no invisible wall separating teacher from student. He treated us less as pupils than as younger companions who happened to be travelling along the same intellectual road. He taught us both in the BA and MA classes, and every lecture reflected the same unaffected simplicity. There was nothing theatrical about him. He neither cultivated an aura nor sought to impress. He simply enjoyed teaching.

One incident remains etched permanently in my memory. One evening I was sitting in the MA Seminar Room, deeply engrossed in writing a term paper. Or at least I imagined that I was. Like most postgraduate students, I was probably spending as much time staring thoughtfully at books as actually writing. Suddenly Guptaji appeared at the door. “Nadeem!” I looked up. “Come outside for a minute.” Wondering whether I had inadvertently committed some academic offence, I followed him into the corridor. With complete seriousness he asked, “Can you explain the Nur Jahan Junta to me? I have to take a BA class tomorrow.” For a fleeting moment I confess that I experienced one of the proudest moments of my student life. A professor was asking me to explain a historical problem to him. Perhaps he sensed my swelling self-importance. He immediately laughed and said in his familiar style, “Arrey, time nahin hai itna padhne ka. Tum term paper likh rahe ho. Jaldi se summarise kar do.” There was no embarrassment. No concern that a student might think less of him. No pretence that a professor must always know everything. He simply needed a quick summary and knew that one of his students had recently been reading the subject. Only much later did I appreciate the significance of that episode. Truly learned people are never frightened of admitting that they have not had the time to read something. Intellectual insecurity belongs to the vain, not to genuine scholars.

Outside the classroom Guptaji possessed two abiding passions. The first was travel. The second was food. Whenever vacations arrived, he would gather a few of us and set off to visit historical sites. These journeys gradually acquired a life of their own. We certainly visited forts, mosques, temples and archaeological mounds, but somehow every excursion also involved discovering the best local eateries. Guptaji insisted on paying for much of the journey himself and seemed to derive greater pleasure from watching his students enjoy themselves than from any monument we had gone to see. Looking back now, I sometimes wonder whether we travelled to study history or whether history merely provided a respectable excuse for travelling and eating well. Whatever the answer, those journeys remain amongst my happiest memories of student life.

Then there was Dr Shafiullah. His room stood directly opposite the MA Seminar Room on the third floor of the Department, and he also took my tutorials in English History. Those tutorials rarely remained confined to the prescribed syllabus. A question on the Reform Bill or the English Civil War would somehow lead to discussions on historiography, personalities, university life or some delightful anecdote from his own student days. As a result, many evenings that ought to have been devoted to research quietly dissolved into long conversations in his room. No one regretted the diversion. Originally from Odisha, Shafiullah Sahib had completed his doctoral research on Tārīkh-i Hasan under the supervision of Professor Syed Nurul Hasan. That association itself guaranteed that almost every conversation eventually found its way to Nurul Hasan Sahib. What stories those were! He spoke not merely about the scholar but about the man. There were anecdotes about his scholarship, his habits, his generosity, his humour and the intellectual atmosphere that surrounded him. Through Shafiullah Sahib’s recollections, figures whom we knew only through books gradually became living personalities. His room became an informal classroom where no attendance was taken, no examinations were held and yet some of the most valuable lessons were learnt.

Our relationship with him did not end when classes finished. Every Eid and Baqrid there was an unspoken understanding amongst his students. We would go to his home. He would already be waiting for us with his characteristic smile, while his gracious wife busied herself producing a feast that none of us could ever hope to forget. There was, of course, the obligatory bowl of rich siwai, without which no Eid gathering could ever be complete. But that was merely the beginning. Soon followed grilled mutton, baked mutton and one dish that acquired almost legendary status amongst us. Tarāza. It was dried meat baked until it reached a perfection that I have seldom encountered anywhere else. Many discussions on English constitutional history were undoubtedly enriched by that remarkable dish. Academic hospitality, I discovered, is sometimes best appreciated around a dining table.

Then there was Professor Ahsan Jan Qaisar. Qaisar Sahib suffered from a pronounced stammer. Many teachers might have regarded that as a handicap. He transformed it into an entirely original method of teaching. Instead of speaking continuously for an hour, he would walk quietly to the blackboard and begin writing. One column contained the themes. The next listed the principal historians. Beside each appeared the important arguments advanced by them. Finally came the bibliography. By the time he had finished, the blackboard resembled a carefully prepared map of the historiography of the subject. His concluding instruction was invariably brief. “Now go and read them.” And we did. He compelled us to read the original historians rather than rely upon classroom notes. We encountered interpretations first hand, learnt to compare one scholar with another and gradually discovered that history is constructed through debate rather than dictated from a lectern. Years later I realised what a remarkable education he had given us. One rarely forgets what one has discovered for oneself.

It would, however, be less than honest to suggest that every teacher in the Department possessed such gifts. Every great institution has its own gallery of unforgettable characters. Ours was no exception. There was one colleague whose lectures consisted almost entirely of dictating notes placed carefully before him. We often wondered whether, if someone mischievously removed the file from the desk before class began, the lecture itself might simply fail to take place. Another professor possessed the extraordinary ability to speak continuously for an hour without a single student being able afterwards to explain what had actually been said. We would emerge from the classroom united by complete bewilderment. There was yet another whose English was so magnificently unconventional that the lecture itself became secondary entertainment. We eagerly collected his memorable expressions, repeated them over tea in the canteen and laughed over them for days afterwards. It was perhaps the only class from which students carried away quotations instead of notes. And then there was the teacher whose lectures deserve recognition by medical science. Within ten minutes eyelids became heavy. Within twenty minutes heads began to nod. By the end of the hour an astonishing peace descended upon the classroom. Had the University ever established a clinic for insomnia, this distinguished colleague would surely have been appointed its honorary consultant.

Yet I mention these personalities not in ridicule but with affection. They too belonged to an age that has now passed into history. Together, the brilliant scholars, the gifted teachers, the eccentrics and the absent-minded professors created an academic world unlike any I have known since. Departments are not built merely by distinguished publications or administrative achievements. They are shaped by personalities, friendships, conversations in corridors, shared meals, laughter after class, arguments in seminars and the countless small acts of kindness that never find a place in official records. As I look back today, I realise that I was not merely fortunate to have studied history. I was fortunate to have been taught by historians who were, each in their own way, unforgettable human beings. Some inspired by the sheer brilliance of their scholarship, some by their generosity, some by their originality as teachers and some, quite unintentionally, by the quirks that made them such memorable personalities.

Between them they taught us not only to read sources and weigh evidence, but also to remain intellectually honest, to question received wisdom and, above all, to recognise that learning is a lifelong pursuit. When I entered the Department as a young undergraduate, I imagined that I was merely beginning a degree. I now know that I was answering a call that had begun much earlier and would shape the course of my entire life. My father had shown me the path. These remarkable teachers taught me how to walk it.

The story, however, does not end here. Beyond the classrooms lay another world: the MA Seminar Room, the Maulana Azad Library, hostel debates that continued long after midnight, friendships forged over endless cups of tea, heated arguments over historiography, and the exhilarating discovery that history was not merely a subject to be studied but a way of thinking and living.

That, however, is the material for the next part of this story ….

Beyond Conflict: The Nabivamsha, the Allopanishad, and the Indian Reception of Karbala

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

Much of the contemporary discourse on medieval India remains trapped within the language of conflict. The past is too often reduced to a binary narrative of conquest and resistance, ruler and subject, Hindu and Muslim. Yet such reductive frameworks obscure one of the most remarkable and consequential developments in the history of the Indian subcontinent: the emergence of entirely new cultural worlds through the sustained interaction of Islam with indigenous traditions. The history of Islam in India was never simply a story of political expansion; it was equally a story of translation, adaptation and profound cultural creativity. When Islam encountered the diverse and layered societies of South Asia, neither remained unchanged. Out of this long and complex encounter emerged new languages, literary traditions, devotional practices, architectural forms, legal interpretations and ethical ideals that profoundly shaped the civilisation of the subcontinent. What developed over centuries was not merely a fragile coexistence but the active creation of shared cultural spaces where communities interacted, borrowed from one another and generated hybrid forms of expression that defied simple religious categorisation.

This process unfolded not only in imperial centres such as Delhi, Agra and Lahore but also in regions far removed from political capitals. Bengal, Malabar, Kashmir, Punjab and the Deccan became vital laboratories of cultural exchange. In these regions, Muslims and non-Muslims lived, traded, worshipped and interacted in ways that generated entirely new cultural formations. The interaction was not uniform; it varied according to local conditions, the nature of political authority, the presence of Sufi orders and the existing social and religious landscape. Yet across these diverse regions, a common pattern emerged: Islamic ideas were not imposed from above but were translated, adapted and reimagined through local categories of thought. This process of vernacularisation and cultural translation was one of the most creative forces in South Asian history. As Richard Eaton demonstrates in The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760, the spread of Islam in Bengal was not primarily a result of conquest but of a long process of cultural adaptation and social integration, in which Islamic institutions became embedded in the agrarian landscape and in the social fabric of rural society (Eaton 1993).

Perhaps nowhere is this process more visible than in Bengal, where the seventeenth-century poet Saiyad Sultan composed the Nabivamsha (The Prophet’s Lineage). This work is arguably the first major text to present Islamic doctrine systematically to Bengalis in their own language, and it represents one of the most ambitious attempts in South Asian history to explain Islam through categories familiar to a non-Muslim audience. The Nabivamsha is a literary milestone in the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural history of Islam, marking a significant contribution not only to Bangla’s rich literary corpus but also to our understanding of Islam’s localisation in Indic culture in the early modern period. The work is divided into two books: the greater part of the first book draws upon the medieval Arabic Qiṣaṣ al-Anbiyāʾ tradition, especially the thirteenth-century collection attributed to al-Kisāʾī, recounting the stories of the prophets from creation onwards; the second book presents a detailed biography of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet Saiyad Sultan did not merely translate these narratives into Bengali. He reimagined them within the intellectual and cultural universe of Bengal, effectively reconstructing Islamic prophetology to include Hindu divinities and sacred traditions. As Ayesha Irani demonstrates in The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam, figures identifiable as Śiva and the various avatāras of Viṣṇu, including Rāma, appear in the Nabivamsha as agents sent to eradicate evil from the world (Irani 2021). Their inability to establish lasting righteousness prepares the way for the creation of Ādam and the succession of prophets recognised in Islamic tradition. From Ādam onwards, the narrative proceeds through Śiś, Idrīs, Nūḥ, Ibrāhīm, Mūsā, Dāʾūd, Sulaymān and ʿĪsā before culminating in the Prophet Muhammad. Most remarkably, Hari or Krishna himself appears within this sacred history as the only Hindu deity to punctuate the otherwise conventional line of prophets after Ādam.

This was a bold and sophisticated intellectual exercise. Saiyad Sultan was not attempting to merge Hinduism and Islam into a syncretic whole; rather, he sought to create a shared language through which Islamic revelation could be understood within the cultural landscape of Bengal. In doing so, he implicitly expanded the Qur’anic idea of divinely guided communities to include the Hindus of Bengal, presenting them as people who had received partial guidance but awaited the final revelation. The Nabivamsha reveals a society in which translation was not merely linguistic but civilisational, a process through which entire cosmologies and ethical systems were reframed in terms intelligible to a local audience. This act of cultural translation was not dilution but creative reinterpretation, and it enabled Islam to take root in Bengal not as a foreign imposition but as a tradition that spoke to local concerns and resonated with existing worldviews. Irani’s work lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by Saiyad Sultan, a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual, to invite others to his faith. These premodern works, which articulate Islamic ideas in a regional language, represent a literary watershed and underscore the efforts of rebel writers across South Asia, many of whom were Sufis, to defy the linguistic cordon of the Muslim elite and the hegemony of Arabic and Persian as languages of Islamic discourse.

The desire to establish common intellectual ground produced other remarkable experiments as well. One of the most intriguing is the Allopanishad, a text that attempted to present Allah and Islamic doctrines through the authority of Vedic revelation. Although later scholars, including Rajendralal Mitra, dismissed it as a spurious composition, its historical significance remains considerable. The very existence of such a text tells us something important about the society that produced it: it emerged from a world in which religious traditions were not sealed off from one another but were understood as potentially in dialogue. Its author believed that the language of the Vedas and the language of Islam could be brought into conversation, and that Islamic truths could be validated through the authority of indigenous scripture. Scholars have suggested that the text may have been written in connection with “the Din-i-Ilahi movement” during Akbar’s reign, as part of broader initiatives for religious accommodation under his doctrine of sulh-i-kul (universal peace) (Eliot 1921; Eraly 2000). Swami Vivekananda, while rejecting its authenticity, noted that he was told it was written in Akbar’s reign ‘to bring Hindus and Muslims together’ (Vivekananda n.d.). Like the Nabivamsha, the Allopanishad demonstrates that medieval and early modern India was a place where scholars and thinkers actively searched for points of dialogue and shared authority across religious boundaries. These texts are evidence of a remarkable intellectual openness and a willingness to engage with the religious other on terms that were not merely polemical but genuinely exploratory.

Such interactions were not confined to texts; they shaped everyday life, material culture and social practice across the subcontinent. On the Malabar coast, Muslim communities adopted local architectural forms, social customs and languages while remaining connected to wider Islamic networks stretching across the Indian Ocean. Mosques in Kerala often resembled traditional temple or nalukettu structures, with tiled roofs and wooden carvings, rather than buildings imported from Arabia or Persia. This architectural synthesis was not mere aesthetic borrowing but reflected a deep integration into local society and its patterns of life. In Kashmir, Islamic spirituality interacted with older Rishi traditions, producing a distinctive Sufi culture that drew on both Islamic and indigenous ascetic practices. In Punjab, Sufi shrines became spaces where religious identities frequently overlapped, with Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs visiting the same tombs and participating in shared devotional practices. The verses of Baba Farid, a thirteenth-century Sufi saint, were incorporated into the Sikh scripture, the Guru Granth Sahib, where they continue to be recited and revered. Shared festivals, culinary traditions, agricultural practices and kinship networks further cemented these relationships, creating a social fabric in which religious boundaries were often porous and negotiable.

Among the most important contributions of Islam to this evolving cultural landscape was the narrative of Karbala. Rooted in Shi’i memory, the martyrdom of Imam Husain, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, at the hands of the Umayyad forces of Yazid in 680 CE came to exercise an influence far beyond sectarian boundaries. The events of Karbala symbolise resistance against injustice, fidelity to moral principles and the willingness to sacrifice everything in the pursuit of truth. These themes resonated deeply within the cultural environment of South Asia, where stories of duty, sacrifice and righteous struggle already occupied a central place in popular imagination, from the epics of the Mahabharata and Ramayana to regional ballads and folk traditions. When the story of Karbala reached India, it acquired meanings that transcended theology. Imam Husain became not merely a religious figure but a universal symbol of courage in the face of oppression, an archetype of moral resistance whose appeal crossed communal boundaries. Muharram commemorations drew participation from communities beyond the Muslim fold: Hindu artisans built tazias (replicas of the tombs of the martyrs), local rulers patronised commemorative rituals and entire towns took part in processions remembering the tragedy. The appeal of Husain lay in his ethical message; his refusal to submit before tyranny transformed him into a symbol of moral resistance whose significance could be appreciated irrespective of religious affiliation. As the poet Josh Malihabadi wrote: ‘Just let humanity awaken / Every community will say “Husain is ours”‘ (cited in Zaidi 2022).

The participation of Hindus in the commemoration of Karbala has deep historical roots. One of the most remarkable examples is the tradition of the Husaini Brahmins, a caste of Brahmins who trace their origins to the Gandhara region and are more formally known as Mohyals. According to traditions told by both Indian Shi’a and the Husaini Brahmins, in the period prior to 610 CE when the Prophet Muhammad received his first revelations, and in the years leading up to the battle of Karbala in 680, there was a population of Hindus who lived in Arabia, where they worshipped the god Śiva. These Hindus were involved with the Arabs in the extensive trade networks that crisscrossed land and maritime routes between India and the Middle East. The Husaini Brahmins’ ancestor Sultan Rahab Datt is believed to have fought on behalf of Imam Husain’s cause at Karbala. According to one version of the origin story, Rahab Datt and his seven sons journeyed from Mecca in search of Husain and his entourage, but arrived after the massacre. They pursued Yazid’s army, seized the Imam’s head and offered their own sons’ heads in exchange for it. The heroic sacrifice of Rahab’s sons is recounted in a Punjabi kabitt, a poem composed in a four-line quatrain, which narrates the history of the Datt’s settlement in Arabia, their battlefield heroism and their unwavering loyalty to Imam Husain. Following Karbala, the Datts demonstrated their allegiance to Husain’s cause by joining Mukhtar ibn Abi ‘Ubaid al-Saqafi’s rebellion against the Umayyad caliphate, and following their battlefield success, Mukhtar established a quarter in Kufa for the Hindus, the Dair-e Hindiyyah, which exists even today. Upon returning to the subcontinent, they acquired the name ‘Husaini Brahmin’. A popular saying about the Husainis captures their dual identity: ‘Wah Dutt Sultan, Hindu ka dharm, Musalman ka iman, Adha Hindu adha Musalman‘ (Oh Dutt the king / With the religion of the Hindu / And the faith of the Muslim / Half Hindu, half Muslim) (Stracey 1938). As Nonica Dutt, a history professor and Husaini Brahmin herself, has described, the loyalty Husaini Brahmins have for Imam Husain is inscribed on their bodies through the ritual cutting of mundan: ‘On his/her throat s/he bears a line of cutting, which is indicative of the fact that s/he is the descendant of those Brahmans whose throats were cut in the battle of Karbala’ (cited in Hussain 2008). This extraordinary tradition exemplifies how the Karbala narrative was not merely imported into India but was woven into the very fabric of local identities and communities.

Beyond the Husaini Brahmins, Hindu participation in Muharram has been widespread and enduring. In Lucknow, prominent Hindu noblemen like Raja Tikait Rai and Raja Bilas Rai built Imambaras to house alams representing the Karbala event (Sikand n.d.). In Rajasthan, certain Hindu castes stage plays enacting the death of Imam Husain, after which women come out in procession, crying and cursing Yazid for his cruelty, a custom known as pitna dalna (Sikand n.d.). In the village of Mahmudabad in Uttar Pradesh, almost 500 Hindus participate each year in a religious procession two days before Ashura, with women traditionally fasting for three days (AFP 2022). As a young Hindu participant observed: ‘The sacrifice of Imam Hussein in Karbala is an inspiration and we Hindus of Mahmudabad honour this. Although he was killed, it was a victory of right over wrong’ (AFP 2022). In contemporary Lucknow, Muharram continues to draw Hindu participation, though local observers have noted concerns about rising communal tensions (AFP 2022). These traditions testify to the deep roots of Karbala in India’s shared cultural landscape.

In Bengal, Karbala acquired a particularly rich afterlife. Through puthi literature (manuscripts written in Bengali verse), oral performances and popular narratives, the story became woven into the region’s cultural fabric. As Epsita Halder shows in Reclaiming Karbala: Nation, Islam and Literature of the Bengali Muslims, Karbala emerged as one of the central narrative reservoirs through which Bengali Muslims articulated questions of morality, identity and community (Halder 2023). The tragedy was no longer experienced as a distant event in seventh-century Iraq but as part of Bengal’s own emotional and cultural landscape. Halder’s multi-layered study explores what it means to be Muslim in Bengal, examining the nuanced relationship between religion, linguistic identity and literary modernity that marks both Bengaliness and Muslimness in the region. She argues that the Karbala narrative provided Bengali Muslims with a framework for understanding suffering, resistance and redemption that was both authentically Islamic and deeply rooted in local sensibilities. The marsiya tradition in Bengali, unlike its Persian and Urdu counterparts, developed its own distinctive idiom, drawing on local poetic forms and imagery. The story of Husain was told and retold in village gatherings, at religious festivals and in domestic settings, becoming a living tradition that shaped moral consciousness across generations. Halder’s work, which analyses an extensive range of texts and publications across multiple genres, formats and literary lineages, shows how shifts in vocabulary, register and narrative focus need to be understood in the light of theological, political and aesthetic positions and debates.

The influence of Karbala extended into literature, ritual and public culture across the subcontinent. In Awadh, especially under the Shi’i rulers of Lucknow, poets such as Mir Anis and Mirza Dabeer transformed the memory of Husain into one of the most sophisticated literary traditions in South Asia. Through marsiyas (elegiac poems), mourning assemblies and public commemorations, Karbala became an enduring source of ethical reflection and emotional expression. The marsiya tradition in Lucknow reached extraordinary heights of literary refinement, combining classical Persian poetics with Indian vernacular sensibilities and drawing on the rich resources of Urdu. These compositions were performed in public spaces and private gatherings, creating a shared culture of mourning that drew together people from different religious backgrounds. The rituals of Muharram also incorporated local customs and symbols; elephants, horses and elaborate processions became part of the commemorative landscape, reflecting the influence of Indian courtly and popular culture. The Karbala narrative thus became a site of cultural synthesis, where Islamic piety, Indian aesthetics and local traditions converged.

The modern reception of Karbala continued this tradition of cultural translation and political engagement. In 1924, Munshi Premchand, a prolific author in Urdu and Hindi and a supporter of the nationalist movement, published his drama Karbala, a retelling of the seventh-century battle. As evidenced from personal correspondence, Premchand’s intentions for this drama were political: it was to be a vehicle for promoting Hindu and Muslim cooperation through encouraging non-Muslims to recognise the ethical example set by a Muslim past. In his preface to the play, Premchand explained his belief that ignorance of the moral nature of Muslim historical figures (such as Husain) was at the heart of the socio-religious conflict in his present: ‘It is a shame that although we have been living with Muslims for centuries we are ignorant of their past histories. This is the reason for discord between the two communities. We are not aware of the good qualities inherent in the great men of the Muslim community’ (Premchand 1924). Premchand had earlier, in July 1923, published an essay in Prabha titled ‘Hazrat Ali’, presenting a biographical sketch that highlighted Ali’s strength of character, his sympathy for the oppressed, his valour and his sense of justice (Zaidi 2022). In his drama, he developed a new storyline based on a historical legend of Hindu assistance in the Shi’i Muslim fight for justice. He inserted the characters of the Hindu brothers Sahas Rai and Hars Rai, who fight alongside Husain and sacrifice their lives in his cause. At one point, the Imam praises Sahas Rai, calls his religion ‘a true religion,’ and prays for the glory of this religion (Zaidi 2022). The play even includes a Yogi who has come from India to pay his respects to the Prophet. In several scenes, Hindus and Muslims articulate how their religious commitments obligate them to cooperate on a seventh-century battlefield. Muslim voices in Karbala articulate how the terms of their respect for and obligation towards Hindus are mandated by the principles of their Islamic faith, and Hindu characters, inspired by the ethical actions of Muslims, assert that their faith mandates that they join this Muslim cause. The play reveals a moment from north Indian religious, literary and political history when a vision for Indian social unity was articulated by a Hindu author representing a sacred Shi’i Muslim history (Zaidi 2022).

Premchand’s Karbala has since been rendered into English twice, a testament to its enduring significance. The first of these is a critical edition edited, translated and introduced by Professor Nishat Zaidi of Jamia Millia Islamia, published by Oxford University Press in 2022 (Premchand 2022a). This volume includes an extensive introduction, Premchand’s notes and essays in defence of the play, and a comparative analysis of the Hindi and Urdu versions. It was followed by a second translation, introduced by Dr Sami Rafique of Aligarh Muslim University and co-translated with Haris Qadeer, published by the Sahitya Akademi in 2023 (Premchand 2023b). Both editions are excellently produced and have contributed substantially to making Premchand’s vision accessible to English-reading audiences worldwide.

However, the reception of Premchand’s play reveals the obstacles that cultural translation faced in a communalised political context. Premchand’s editor was hesitant to publish the play, fearing it would upset Muslim sentiments. Some Muslims rejected his translation as unfaithful to the historical record and questioned his characterisation of Yazid as an exaggeration. Premchand defended his choices, citing Shi’i scholars like m Amir Ali to show that he had done nothing more than what Muslim authors themselves had done. He went so far as to suggest that the real reason some Muslims found fault with his translation was his identity as a Hindu writer, rather than misrepresentation or historical inaccuracy. In a letter to his editor, Premchand wrote: ‘If Shi’i Muslims read a masnavi or marsiya on the lives of these leaders, why should they have an objection with this drama? Or, is it because a Hindu wrote it?’ (Zaidi 2022). This exchange reveals how the communal context of the play’s production and reception meant that any cultural or political expression was narrowly construed within categories of belonging defined by religious community, which came with it assumptions about language, history and cultural expression. Despite his intentions, Premchand’s work was undercut by the narrow assumptions of religious identity that he sought to challenge.

The issue of linguistic translation further complicated Premchand’s project. In his play, different registers of spoken Hindi and Urdu marked the main characters: the Hindu brothers spoke a slightly Sanskritised Hindi, while the Muslim characters used a heavily Persianised and Arabicised Urdu. Although Premchand claimed to adhere to what is natural or innate (svabhāvikata) in developing the language of his characters, the vast differences in register indicate that he mapped language and vocabulary choice onto his characters’ religious identity, a translation that seemed more relevant to his twentieth-century context than to the seventh-century past. This example illustrates the challenges of translating religious narratives across cultural and linguistic boundaries, where the translator’s choices inevitably reflect their own context and assumptions.

What unites the Nabivamsha, the Allopanishad and the Indian reception of Karbala, both in its premodern and modern forms, is the search for a shared language of meaning. Each represents an attempt to communicate across cultural boundaries without erasing difference; each acknowledges the reality of religious diversity while seeking to create points of connection and mutual intelligibility. These texts and traditions remind us that medieval and modern India was not simply a land of competing religious communities but also a place where people continuously borrowed, translated and adapted ideas from one another. This was not a process of homogenisation but of creative engagement, in which distinct traditions influenced one another while maintaining their own identities. The result was a dynamic and pluralistic culture in which religious boundaries were often fluid, overlapping and subject to negotiation.

This does not mean that conflict was absent. Medieval and modern India witnessed episodes of tension, rivalry and violence, as did all societies. Political ambitions, economic competition and theological disagreements sometimes led to conflict, and instances of temple destruction, iconoclasm and religious persecution are documented in the historical record. Yet conflict alone cannot explain the historical record. Alongside political rivalries and theological disagreements existed centuries of interaction, accommodation and cultural creativity. The same rulers who patronised Islamic institutions often supported Hindu temples and festivals; the same cities that witnessed religious controversy also produced magnificent works of art and literature that drew on multiple traditions. To focus only on conflict is to miss the larger picture of a civilisation that was continuously shaped by exchange and dialogue. Indeed, as Eaton has argued, the spread of Islam in Bengal was not primarily a result of conquest but of a long process of cultural adaptation and social integration, in which Islamic institutions became embedded in the agrarian landscape and in the social fabric of rural society.

Some of the most enduring achievements of Indian civilisation emerged precisely from these encounters. Urdu literature, with its rich vocabulary and poetic traditions drawing on Persian, Arabic and Indic sources, is a testament to the creative power of linguistic and cultural synthesis. Indo-Islamic architecture, from the Qutb Minar to the Taj Mahal, represents a fusion of Persian, Central Asian and Indian building techniques and aesthetic sensibilities. Sufi devotional cultures, with their emphasis on love, music and poetry, created spaces where Muslims and non-Muslims could share in religious experience. Bengali Muslim literary traditions, from the Nabivamsha to the puthi literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, testify to the deep integration of Islamic themes within local cultural forms. The widespread appeal of Karbala, extending far beyond Shi’i communities, demonstrates the power of a narrative to transcend its origins and speak to universal human concerns. All of these cultural forms cannot be reduced to a single religious origin; they are products of encounter, translation and synthesis.

The greatest legacy of medieval and modern India was therefore not the triumph of one civilisation over another. It was the emergence of shared cultural worlds that enriched them both, creating a civilisation of remarkable diversity and creativity. In an age increasingly shaped by narratives of separation and conflict, that forgotten history of dialogue, translation and cultural exchange deserves to be remembered and studied. It offers not only a more accurate picture of the past but also a model for thinking about cultural interaction in the present. The history of Islam in India is not a story of confrontation but of conversation, a conversation that produced some of the most vibrant and enduring cultural achievements in human history. The Nabivamsha, the Allopanishad and the Indian Karbala traditions, from the Husaini Brahmins to Premchand’s drama and the Bengali puthi literature, are not merely historical curiosities; they are witnesses to a vision of cultural pluralism that remains relevant and urgent today. They remind us that religious traditions are not fixed and unchanging but are continuously reinterpreted and reimagined in new contexts, and that the encounter with the religious other can be a source of creativity rather than conflict. In recovering this history, we recover not only a more nuanced understanding of the past but also resources for building a more inclusive and dialogical future.


Further Reading

Cole, Juan R. I. Roots of North Indian Shi’ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722–1859. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Eaton, Richard M. The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Eliot, Charles. Hinduism and Buddhism: An Historical Sketch. Vol. 2. London: Edward Arnold, 1921.

Eraly, Abraham. Emperors of the Peacock Throne: The Saga of the Great Mughals. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000.

Ernst, Carl W., and Bruce B. Lawrence. Sufi Martyrs of Love: The Chishti Order in South Asia and Beyond. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Halder, Epsita. Reclaiming Karbala: Nation, Islam and Literature of the Bengali Muslims. London: Routledge, 2023.

Irani, Ayesha A. The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Pinault, David. Horse of Karbala: Muslim Devotional Life in India. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

Premchand, Munshi. Karbala: A Historical Play. Translated, edited and introduced by Nishat Zaidi. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2022a.

Premchand, Munshi. Karbala: A Play. Translated by Haris Qadeer and Sami Rafique, introduced by Sami Rafique. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2023b.

Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas. A History of Sufism in India. 2 vols. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978–83.

Stewart, Tony K. Witness to Marvels: Sufism and Literary Imagination. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019.

Stracey, T. P. Russell. History of the Muhiyals: The Militant Brahman Race of India. 2nd ed. Lahore: Silver Printing Press, 1938.

Reassessing Aurangzeb’s Relations with the Shi‘as: Orthodoxy, Pragmatism and the Politics of Empire

Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi

The reign of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb ‘Alamgir (1658–1707) has long occupied a contentious position in the historiography of medieval India. Few rulers have been subjected to such divergent interpretations. While some nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historians depicted him as the archetype of Islamic orthodoxy whose reign marked the decline of the Mughal Empire, more recent scholarship has sought to recover the political complexities that underlay his decisions. Within this larger debate, Aurangzeb’s relationship with the Shi‘a community has remained surprisingly under-examined. The prevailing assumption has generally been that his personal adherence to Sunni orthodoxy translated into a sustained policy of hostility towards the Shi‘as. Such an interpretation, repeated in both academic and popular literature, rests largely upon selected episodes of sectarian disagreement while overlooking a substantial body of evidence which points towards a more complex and nuanced reality.

This essay argues that Aurangzeb’s relationship with the Shi‘as cannot be understood through the simple categories of tolerance or persecution. He undoubtedly regarded himself as a defender of Sunni orthodoxy and occasionally acted against practices which he considered incompatible with Hanafi jurisprudence. Yet as emperor he repeatedly distinguished between theological disagreement and political loyalty. The Mughal Empire continued to depend upon the services of numerous Shi‘a nobles, administrators and scholars, maintained diplomatic engagement with Safavid Iran, recognised important Shi‘a religious institutions and confirmed grants to Sayyid families and learned divines. Aurangzeb’s conduct therefore reflected not an ideological campaign against Shi‘ism but the pragmatic requirements of governing a composite empire.

The historiography itself requires reconsideration. Sir Jadunath Sarkar’s monumental studies, despite their enduring value as repositories of information, interpreted much of Aurangzeb’s career through the lens of religious orthodoxy. His emphasis upon the emperor’s personal piety often encouraged subsequent historians to explain political decisions primarily in religious terms. Colonial historiography more generally tended to depict medieval India as a succession of religious conflicts, thereby reinforcing the image of Aurangzeb as an intolerant monarch. Later nationalist writings frequently accepted this framework, while recent political discourse has transformed Aurangzeb into a symbolic figure within contemporary debates over India’s past. The cumulative result has been the creation of a remarkably consistent image that has often escaped critical scrutiny.

Recent scholarship has begun to question this interpretation. M. Athar Ali’s seminal study of the Mughal nobility demonstrated that the imperial elite under Aurangzeb remained as ethnically and regionally diverse as under his predecessors. The Iranian element continued to occupy a prominent place within the mansabdari system, and many among these nobles belonged to families whose Shi‘a affiliation was well known. Satish Chandra similarly emphasised that factional politics at the Mughal court revolved principally around patronage, regional interests and succession rather than sectarian loyalties. More recently, Munis D. Faruqui has argued that Aurangzeb’s reign must be interpreted within the larger traditions of Mughal kingship. His principal concern, Faruqui suggests, was not the construction of a confessional state but the preservation of imperial authority over an increasingly complex political landscape. Religious conviction undoubtedly informed Aurangzeb’s worldview, yet it did not displace the practical imperatives of governance.

Perhaps the most immediate challenge to the conventional narrative lies within Aurangzeb’s own family. His mother, Arjumand Banu Begum, the celebrated Mumtaz Mahal, belonged to the Persian family of Asaf Khan, whose origins lay in Safavid Iran and whose cultural affiliations remained closely connected with the Persian Shi‘a world. Even more significant was Aurangzeb’s marriage to Dilras Banu Begum, the daughter of Mirza Badi al-Zaman Safavi and a direct descendant of the Safavid dynasty. She remained his chief consort until her death in 1657 and was the mother of Prince Muhammad Azam, whom Aurangzeb later regarded as one of the principal claimants to the throne. These dynastic relationships do not establish religious sympathy in themselves, but they certainly complicate any attempt to portray Aurangzeb as instinctively hostile towards the Shi‘a community.

The composition of the Mughal nobility provides stronger evidence still. Throughout Aurangzeb’s reign, Iranian nobles continued to occupy some of the highest offices of the empire. They served as governors of major provinces, commanders of imperial armies, ministers, diplomats and financial administrators. Their advancement was determined less by sectarian affiliation than by military competence, administrative experience and personal loyalty to the emperor. Zafar Khan was one such sipahsālār under Aurangzeb. No systematic attempt was made to remove Shi‘a nobles from imperial service after 1658. Indeed, the continuity visible in the composition of the nobility strongly suggests that Aurangzeb consciously retained the cosmopolitan administrative structure created by Akbar and consolidated by Jahangir and Shah Jahan.

This political inclusiveness extended beyond the aristocracy to learned and religious circles. One aspect of Aurangzeb’s reign that deserves greater attention is the continued recognition of Sayyid families and Shi‘a scholars within the framework of imperial patronage. The Mughal institution of madad-i ma‘ash, tax-free revenue assignments granted to scholars, saints and religious dignitaries, was not abolished under Aurangzeb. On the contrary, the emperor undertook a general review of such grants in order to eliminate fraudulent claims while confirming legitimate endowments. The scrutiny applied to these grants reflected fiscal reform rather than sectarian discrimination. Surviving farmāns and revenue documents indicate that recognised descendants of the Prophet, including families associated with Shi‘a traditions, continued to enjoy imperial support where their claims were accepted. Likewise, learned divines whose reputation rested upon scholarship rather than political activity retained their endowments. Aurangzeb’s objective appears to have been administrative regularisation rather than religious exclusion.

The published Akhbārāt-i Darbār-i Mu‘allā, although still insufficiently exploited by historians, reinforce this impression. They reveal an emperor deeply concerned with appointments, pensions, grants and ceremonial observances across the empire. Their notices rarely suggest any general policy directed against the Shi‘a community. Instead, they portray a ruler engaged in the ordinary business of imperial administration, in which Sayyids, scholars and nobles of differing regional and sectarian backgrounds continued to appear as recipients of imperial favour. Where disciplinary action occurred, it was normally linked to questions of political conduct or administrative responsibility rather than confessional identity.

Nor should Aurangzeb’s patronage of Sunni institutions be misunderstood as evidence of hostility towards all others. His sponsorship of the Fatāwā-i ‘Ālamgīrī undoubtedly reflected his desire to strengthen Hanafi jurisprudence within the empire. Yet the compilation itself was intended primarily as a legal manual for judges and administrators. It did not establish a programme for the persecution of Shi‘as, nor did it seek to exclude them from public life. The distinction between affirming Sunni orthodoxy and suppressing Shi‘ism is fundamental. Aurangzeb undoubtedly did the former; the evidence for the latter remains far less convincing than has often been assumed.

Aurangzeb’s relations with the wider Shi‘a world likewise demonstrate that political calculation consistently outweighed sectarian antagonism. The Mughal Empire and Safavid Iran had been rivals since the early sixteenth century, their principal point of contention being the fortress of Kandahar and the commercial routes linking Central and South Asia. These disputes neither originated with Aurangzeb nor acquired a specifically sectarian character under him. Diplomatic embassies continued to be exchanged between Isfahan and Delhi throughout his reign. Persian merchants, physicians, scholars and artisans continued to enter Mughal India, while Indian scholars travelled westwards in search of learning and patronage. Persian retained its position as the language of administration, diplomacy and literary culture within the Mughal Empire, and the cultural prestige of Iran remained undiminished. Had Aurangzeb regarded Shi‘a Iran primarily as a religious adversary, such sustained diplomatic and intellectual exchange would have been difficult to sustain. Instead, relations were conducted according to the conventions of early modern interstate politics, in which dynastic prestige and territorial interests took precedence over confessional differences.

The same distinction between political ambition and religious identity is evident in Aurangzeb’s conquest of the Deccan sultanates. Bijapur and Golconda have often been described as victims of Sunni hostility towards Shi‘a kingdoms. Such an interpretation overlooks both chronology and context. Mughal expansion into the Deccan had begun under Akbar, was pursued under Jahangir and Shah Jahan, and represented one of the enduring objectives of imperial policy. The annexation of Bijapur in 1686 and Golconda in 1687 was therefore the culmination of a century of imperial expansion rather than a sudden sectarian crusade. The conduct of Aurangzeb after these conquests is equally revealing. Neither the Adil Shahi nor the Qutb Shahi administrative class was systematically displaced. On the contrary, numerous officers, secretaries, military commanders and landed magnates entered Mughal service and were incorporated into the imperial mansabdari system. Their experience of governing the Deccan made them valuable servants of the empire, and Aurangzeb displayed little hesitation in employing them. A case in point is Mir Jumla and his son, both of whom rose to high positions and offices. Such a policy would have been inconceivable had Shi‘a affiliation been regarded as an insurmountable obstacle to imperial service. Loyalty to the Mughal throne remained the decisive criterion.

An equally important, though often neglected, dimension of Aurangzeb’s policy concerns the religious landscape of Delhi itself. The shrine of Shah-e Mardan occupies a significant place in this discussion. Established during the reign of Shah Jahan around the relic associated with the sacred footprint of Imam Ali, the shrine gradually developed into one of the principal centres of Shi‘a devotion in the imperial capital. Although the imposing structures visible today belong largely to the eighteenth century, especially the patronage of Qudsia Begum and Ahmad Shah, the institution itself acquired increasing prominence during Aurangzeb’s reign. Pilgrimage continued, Sayyid families remained associated with the shrine, and there is no evidence that the Mughal administration attempted either to suppress its activities or to confiscate its endowments. The continued recognition of Shah-e Mardan is significant because it demonstrates that Aurangzeb distinguished between recognised centres of devotion and activities which he considered politically disruptive or capable of provoking sectarian disorder. The existence and gradual consolidation of such a shrine within the immediate vicinity of the imperial capital would have been difficult to reconcile with the notion of an emperor pursuing an indiscriminate anti-Shi‘a policy.

This broader pattern is also reflected in the administration of religious endowments. Aurangzeb’s reign witnessed a systematic review of madad-i ma‘āsh grants across the empire. The purpose of this exercise was fiscal and administrative. Grants that could not be substantiated were resumed, while those supported by documentary evidence were confirmed. Surviving farmāns and later compilations indicate that Sayyid families, descendants of the Imams, scholars and religious establishments continued to receive imperial recognition where their legal claims were accepted. This process affected Sunni and Shi‘a beneficiaries alike. Rather than abolishing endowments associated with Shi‘a scholars, Aurangzeb sought to integrate them within a more closely supervised administrative framework. The distinction is important. Administrative scrutiny should not be confused with sectarian discrimination.

Aurangzeb’s attitude towards Muharram observances illustrates the same complexity. Contemporary evidence suggests that he objected to public expressions of tabarrā’, the ritual denunciation of the first three caliphs, which Sunni jurists regarded as offensive. On occasions when Muharram processions or public ceremonies threatened to provoke communal violence, the imperial administration intervened. Such interventions have often been interpreted as proof of hostility towards Shi‘ism itself. Yet Mughal authorities had long regulated public ceremonies of various religious communities whenever questions of public order arose. Aurangzeb’s actions therefore reflected a concern for maintaining civic peace as much as theological conviction. Significantly, Muharram commemorations continued throughout much of northern India during his reign, while Shi‘a devotional literature and scholarship experienced no discernible interruption.

Indeed, the intellectual life of the Shi‘a community continued to flourish during the later seventeenth century. Learned Sayyids remained active in Delhi, Agra, Lahore, Kashmir and the Deccan. Persian works on theology, jurisprudence and devotional literature continued to circulate freely. The movement of scholars between Iran and India remained uninterrupted, reinforcing the long-standing intellectual connections that had linked the Mughal and Safavid worlds since the sixteenth century. None of this suggests the existence of a state policy directed towards the suppression of Shi‘a learning.

The cumulative effect of this evidence compels a reconsideration of Aurangzeb’s relationship with the Shi‘as. He was unquestionably a ruler whose personal religious convictions were deeply rooted in Sunni orthodoxy. He supported Hanafi jurisprudence, cultivated Sunni scholars and occasionally acted against practices that he regarded as contrary to accepted doctrine. Nevertheless, his conduct as emperor reveals a consistent distinction between confessional preference and political practice. Shi‘a nobles continued to occupy the highest offices of state. Matrimonial ties linked the imperial family with the Safavid dynasty. Diplomatic relations with Iran remained active. The administrative elites of Bijapur and Golconda were absorbed into Mughal service rather than excluded from it. Shi‘a shrines continued to function, Sayyid families retained imperial recognition, and madad-i ma‘āsh grants continued to be confirmed where legally justified.

Why then has the contrary image become so firmly established? The answer lies partly in the historiography of the Mughal Empire itself. Colonial historians frequently interpreted Indian history through the framework of religious conflict, presenting political developments as the inevitable consequence of sectarian antagonism. Although Sir Jadunath Sarkar’s scholarship remains indispensable for its documentary richness, his interpretation of Aurangzeb emphasised religious ideology to an extent that subsequent historians often accepted without sufficient qualification. Later nationalist and communal narratives further simplified this interpretation, transforming Aurangzeb into a symbol within contemporary political debates rather than a historical figure operating within the constraints of seventeenth-century kingship.

Recent scholarship has rightly begun to move beyond this binary. The works of M. Athar Ali, Satish Chandra, Muzaffar Alam and, most recently, Munis D. Faruqui have collectively restored politics, administration and imperial culture to the centre of the discussion. Their findings suggest that Mughal governance cannot be understood through modern categories of sectarian identity alone. Aurangzeb’s reign was characterised by a continuous negotiation between personal piety and imperial responsibility. His religious convictions were genuine, but they were repeatedly mediated by the practical necessities of governing an empire that depended upon the cooperation of diverse elites.

A reassessment of Aurangzeb’s relations with the Shi‘as therefore leads to a more balanced conclusion. He was neither an advocate of Shi‘ism nor its relentless persecutor. Rather, he was a Sunni emperor who sought to preserve what he regarded as Islamic orthodoxy while simultaneously recognising that the stability of the Mughal Empire rested upon the participation of men drawn from different sectarian, regional and ethnic backgrounds. The distinction between theology and governance remained fundamental to his conception of kingship. It is only by recognising this distinction that Aurangzeb’s relationship with the Shi‘a community can be understood in its proper historical context. The evidence suggests that modern scholarship has frequently mistaken Aurangzeb’s affirmation of Sunni orthodoxy for a programme of sectarian exclusion. In practice, Mughal sovereignty continued to function through political inclusion rather than confessional exclusivity. Aurangzeb’s reign therefore illustrates not the triumph of sectarian government, but the capacity of an early modern empire to reconcile personal orthodoxy with administrative pragmatism.


Reading List

Primary Sources

Aurangzeb, Adāb-i ‘Alamgiri (Letters of Aurangzeb), edited by A. R. Kulkarni, Pune: Deccan College, 1976.

Ā’īn-i Akbarī, translated by H. Blochmann and D. C. Phillott, Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1927–1949.

Akharāt-i Darbār-i Mu‘allā (Daily Court News), unpublished manuscripts, Sālārjung Museum, Hyderabad, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, and National Archives of India, New Delhi.

Fatāwā-i ‘Ālamgīrī, compiled under the supervision of Shaykh Nizam Burhanpuri, 6 vols, Calcutta: Nawal Kishore Press, 1828–1832.

Ma’āsir-i ‘Ālamgīrī of Saqi Must‘ad Khan, translated by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1947.

Muntakhab al-Lubāb of Khafi Khan, edited by Maulavi Kabir al-Din Ahmad, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1860–1874.

Secondary Sources

Alam, Muzaffar, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707–1748, 2nd edn, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Ali, M. Athar, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, revised edn, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Chandra, Satish, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707–1740, 4th edn, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Dalmia, Vasudha and Faruqui, Munis D., eds, Religious Interactions in Mughal India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Faruqui, Munis D., The Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504–1719, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Faruqui, Munis D., Aurangzeb ‘Alamgir and the Mughal Empire: A History Retold, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2026.

Faruqui, Munis D., ‘Aurangzeb and the Mughal State in the Seventeenth Century’, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Hardy, Peter, Historians of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing, London: Luzac, 1960.

Hodgson, Marshall G. S., The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. 3, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Lal, Ruby, Empress: The Astonishing Reign of Nur Jahan, New York: W. W. Norton, 2018.

Metcalf, Barbara D. and Metcalf, Thomas R., A Concise History of Modern India, 3rd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Moosvi, Shireen, People, Taxation and Trade in Mughal India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Richards, John F., The Mughal Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, History of Aurangzib, 5 vols, Calcutta: M. C. Sarkar & Sons, 1912–1924.

Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, Mughal Administration, Calcutta: M. C. Sarkar & Sons, 1920.

Streusand, Douglas E., Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011.

Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, Mughals and Franks: Explorations in Connected History, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Truschke, Audrey, Aurangzeb: The Man and the Myth, New Delhi: Penguin, 2017.

Journal Articles and Essays

Alam, Muzaffar, ‘The Pursuit of Persian: Language in Mughal Politics’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, 1998, pp. 317–349.

Ali, M. Athar, ‘The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, 1975, pp. 385–396.

Faruqui, Munis D., ‘The Forgotten Prince: Mirza Kamran and the Mughal Empire in the Sixteenth Century’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 48, no. 4, 2005, pp. 487–523.

Karamustafa, Ahmet T., ‘The Origins of the Shrine of Shah-e Mardan in Delhi’, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–20.

Moosvi, Shireen, ‘The Mughal Empire and the Deccan: A Study in Political Relations’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 52, 1991, pp. 234–245.

Moosvi, Shireen, ‘The Mughal Empire and the Deccan: Economic Factors and Consequence’, Explorations in Pre-Modern Deccan, ed. Syed Ali Nadeem Rezavi, Primus, 2025, pp. 178-200

Nayeem, M. A., ‘The Shi‘a Nobility under Aurangzeb’, Islamic Culture, vol. 51, no. 3, 1977, pp. 187–202.

Qaisar, A. J., ‘The Royal Grants under Aurangzeb: A Study in Administrative Policy’, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, vol. 28, no. 2, 1980, pp. 89–106.

Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas. Review of The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors, by Sri Ram Sharma. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 96, No. 1 (1964), pp. 68–69..